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Abstract
The “tribute system” has been the central organizing concept for our thinking about 
historical East Asian politics since the 1940s. Despite its dominance in the literature, 
however, the concept remains ill-defined and underspecified. The extant frameworks 
constructed around the concept also have not been evaluated conceptually and 
empirically in a systematic way. Most importantly, the tribute system, as an 
important institution for interstate relations in East Asian history, remains 
undertheorized in the existing literature.
This thesis identifies three interrelated ways in which the “tribute system” concept 
has been used in the literature and argues that they all encounter problems in 
interpreting or explaining historical East Asian politics. The thesis deconstructs this 
concept by developing a theory of Chinese primacy in historical East Asia and by 
evaluating it against evidence from early Ming China’s (1368-1424) relations with 
Korea, Japan, and the Mongols.
The theory and evidence show that East Asian politics under the condition of Chinese 
primacy or unipolarity are best described as the dynamics between China’s 
political/military domination and other states’ accommodation and resistance. A 
variety of motives and strategies that China and its neighbours can employ toward 
each other are identified. The multiplicity of the relations between China and its 
neighbours suggests the need to deconstruct the analytical category of the “tribute 
system” and develop new conceptualizations about historical East Asian politics. The 
thesis calls for new thinking about historical East Asian politics, contributes to 
theorizing in this field by developing a synthetic theory of Chinese primacy that 
draws on both realist and constructivist theories of International Relations, and 
evaluates some persistent myths about Chinese foreign policy and East Asian politics 
in history.
3

Acknowledgements
Having initially wanted to explore whether there is an “Asian” or “Chinese” way of 
international politics in East Asian history, I have found such a premise problematic 
and shifted the focus to a study on East Asian politics during China’s early Ming 
dynasty (1368-1424). The starting point has been to examine the cherished idea of 
the “tribute system,” particularly its manifestations during the early Ming period and 
its meanings in scholarly works. Starting with puzzles about the tribute system, I 
have tried to develop a theoretical framework to explain the relations between early 
Ming China and its neighbors, bypassing the long-standing tribute system paradigm. 
During three years of research and writing, the project has faced many conceptual 
and empirical challenges. The difficulties would not have been overcome had there 
not been many teachers and friends who provided advice and encouragement as the 
thesis progressed.
My greatest debt is to Chris R. Hughes, my supervisor in the International Relations 
Department of the London School of Economics and Political Science. Chris has 
constantly pushed me to sharpen my thinking on the important questions the thesis 
must tackle and saved me from many analytical errors. I am also greatly indebted to 
Victoria Hui for her invaluable advice ranging from thesis writing, conference 
attendance, to job hunting. Barry Buzan and Karen Smith, members of my research 
panel, helped with the thesis in its early stage.
I also gratefully acknowledge a number of other scholars who have provided 
encouragement and advice in the past three years. Zheng Yongnian emphasized the 
importance of theory and the potential for theory innovation in China studies during 
several meetings in London and Paris. The conversations with William Wohlforth 
and Richard Ned Lebow, both at Dartmouth College, greatly helped improve the 
theoretical part of the thesis. Chen Jian read the chapter on the tribute system with an 
historian’s eye and improved my understanding of Fairbank. Yan Xuetong 
emphasized the importance of theory and methodology when I first embarked on the 
project. I also thank Ja Ian Chong, Lin Chun, David Kang, Jack Snyder, Masayuki 
Tadokoro, Wang Yuan-kang, and Arne Westad, as well as participants at the annual 
meetings of the International Studies Association and the American Political Science 
Association for their inputs.
Two leading historians, Nicola Di Cosmo and John E. Wills, Jr., generously sent me 
their ongoing work for reading. Song Chengyou at Beijing University kindly gave 
me his book on the historical East Asian order during my field research. Yu Wanli 
and Zhang Qian were very helpful when I was conducting library research at Beijing 
University. The project was supported by the Vincent Cheng scholarship at the LSE, 
without which I probably would not have been able to do my PhD.
5
But most importantly, I would not have undertaken this PhD or completed this thesis 
without the unwavering support and help of my wife Shu Man. She has provided 
indispensable moral support while pursuing her own master’s study in London. 
Although the topic of my project may seem obscure to her, she is the most important 
person behind its initiation and completion.
Table of Contents
Abstract......................................................................  3
Acknowledgements...................................................................................... 5
Table of Contents............................................................ 7
Note on Romanization and Transliteration................................................ 9
Chapter 1 Introduction.......................................................................... 11
The Literature.............................................................................................13
Historical and Analytical Problems......................................................... 27
Methodology............................................................................................. 30
Contribution to the Field of IR................................................................. 33
Part I  Theory
Chapter 2 A Theory of Chinese Primacy................................................................. 38
An Overview............................................................................................. 38
The Security Motive and Its Implications...............................................43
The Identity Motive and Its Implications................................................ 53
Hypotheses.................................................................................................64
Part II Case Studies
Chapter 3 Early Ming China and Korea.................................................................66
Chinese Attempts at Domination..............................................   67
Korean Accommodation and Resistance................................................. 75
Strategies and Structure in Sino-Korean Relations................................. 96
Conclusion................................................................................................ 102
Chapter 4 Early Ming China and Japan...............................................................103
Chinese Attempts at Domination............................................................ 104
Japanese Accommodation and Resistance............................................. 114
Strategies and Structure in Sino-Japanese Relations............................ 130
Conclusion................................................................................................ 135
Chapter 5 Early Ming China and the Mongols.................................................... 137
Chinese Attempts at Domination............................................................ 137
Mongol Resistance and Accommodation.............................................. 150
Strategies and Structure in Sino-Mongol Relations.............................. 159
Conclusion................................................................................................ 168
Part III Implications
Chapter 6 Rethinking the “Tribute System”..................................  169
The Tribute System: Three Views.  .......................................................170
The Inherent Weakness of the Fairbank Model.....................................174
The Model and the Early Ming Case......................................................181
Beyond the Tribute System................................... .................................189
Conclusion............................................................................................... 193
Chapter 7 Myths of the “Chinese Tradition” ...................................................... 196
Constructing the Myths of the “Chinese Tradition”............................. 198
Evaluating the Myths of the “Chinese Tradition”................................ 206
Historical Myths and Contemporary Chinese Foreign Policy............. 221
Conclusion............................................................................................... 226
Chapter 8 Conclusion.............................................................................................. 229
Findings................................................................................................... 230
Implications......................... . ..................................................................234
Further Research......................................................................................236
Appendix I: Major Periods in Imperial China...................................... 239
Appendix II: Glossary............................................................................ 240
Bibliography.............. ......................................................... ....................241
8
Note on Romanization and Transliteration
Chinese names and terms are romanized in accordance with the pinyin system unless 
the authors in question have followed the Wade-Giles system or Cantonese system in 
English publications. Following the Chinese custom, Chinese names start with the 
surname followed by the given name unless the authors publish in English and have 
followed the English custom of putting their given names first.
The Hepburn system is used for the transcription of Japanese names and terms, and 
the McCune-Reischauer system for Korean names and terms.
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Chapter 1 
Introduction
Two notable features stand out in existing studies of historical East Asian politics: the 
dominance of the tribute system framework since the 1950s and the lack of analytical 
innovations to systematically update or supersede it. Although the “tribute system” is 
an analytical category invented and refined by historians over half a century ago, 
today we are still following it when trying to make sense of imperial China’s foreign 
relations. It is only a slight exaggeration to say that the “tribute system” has been the 
only clearly, recognizable paradigm in the study of East Asian diplomatic history. Its 
remarkable staying power demonstrates its intellectual attractiveness while at the 
same time attesting to the dearth of conceptual innovation.
Despite the dominance of the “tribute system” in the academic discourse on East 
Asian history, however, the concept remains underspecified. As a result, it is not 
always clear what is meant by the “tribute system” as it appears in the writings of 
various scholars. As a “system” of foreign relations, the fundamental characteristics 
of the tribute system are also ill-defined. For example, it is not clear whether it is 
supposed to encompass the whole range of relations between China and its neighbors. 
The extant frameworks constructed around the concept also have not been evaluated 
conceptually and empirically in a systematic way. Most importantly, the tribute 
system, as an important institution for interstate relations in East Asian history, 
remains undertheorized in the existing literature.
With a few notable exceptions in recent years, the “international relations” of 
historical East Asia has been purely the field of historians. Yet, after a remarkable 
period of intellectual creativity from the 1930s to the 1960s thanks largely to the 
pioneering work of John King Fairbank,1 historians’ interest in East Asian 
diplomatic history gradually waned, so much so that the field has become
1 These include Fairbank and Teng 1941; and Fairbank 1942, 1953, and 1968a, b.
“unfashionable and underpopulated.” Researches during this “classic era” on 
China’s foreign relations produced a number of important insights and laid the 
foundation for our understanding of historical East Asian politics. But this body of 
research is also marked by analytical confusion and empirical omissions. Starting 
from the 1980s, many historians began to reexamine Fairbank’s “tribute system” and 
“Chinese world order” frameworks, exposing some previously hidden assumptions 
and bringing to light new historical evidence that contradicted existing 
interpretations. While these researches critique Fairbank, in general they do not seek 
to replace the tribute system model with some new explanatory frameworks. 
Historical scholarship in this area is thus still in the early stages of a paradigmatic 
shift.
Political scientists, particularly international relations (IR) scholars, should be very 
interested in historical East Asian politics. This can be a fertile field for theoretical 
innovations, just as European history has been for the development of modem IR 
theories. Yet, although this potential for theory building has always been recognized, 
relatively few scholars have ventured into this field with in-depth historical and 
theoretical research. Often researches that do look at the subject rely on secondary
• • • 'Xsources, thus impeding analytical and theoretical innovations in the first place. The 
few works that have consciously tried to exploit historical Asia for theory 
development have produced fresh approaches and insights. Two most innovative 
works in this regard are Iain Johnston’s Cultural Realism and Victoria Hui’s War and 
State Formation in Ancient China and Early Modern Europe.4 However, although 
these two books have generated important perspectives on China’s strategic culture 
and the state formation process in ancient China, they have said little about the 
tribute system itself. Little IR work has systematically examined the tribute system. 
Adding to this lack of attention is the widespread “sinocentric” bias in both the 
existing historical and IR scholarships—their tendency to focus on China’s foreign
2 Wills 1988, 229. Holding a similar view is Michael Hunt, who wrote in the early 1980s that “little fresh work 
[on historical Chinese foreign relations] is appearing and... the pool o f specialists in the field has not been 
sustained.” Hunt 1984, 37, fn. 14.
3 See, for example, Swaine and Tellis 2000.
4 Johnston 1995; and Hui 2005.
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relations to the neglect of those of other polities in the region.
This study is designed to address some of these gaps and inadequacies. It seeks to 
examine scholarly writings on the tribute system and evaluate their analytical utility 
for understanding historical East Asian politics. It does so, however, from an IR 
perspective and thus pays special attention to theory development and policy 
discussion in addition to historical analysis. My central objective is to clarify the 
nature of historical East Asian politics during a period when China was unified and 
strong by critiquing the application of the tribute system paradigm to that time and 
by developing a theory of what will be called “Chinese primacy” as an alternative 
explanation. In this introductory chapter, I review the extant literature on the tribute 
system, identify the historical and conceptual puzzles behind this study, outline the 
research methodology, and discuss the implications of this work for history, theory, 
and policy analysis.
The Literature
The literature can be broadly divided into three sets: the foundational researches 
initiated by Fairbank and the responses and critiques that these have stimulated, the 
somewhat similar perspectives and models in the Chinese and Japanese historical 
literatures, and IR scholars’ recent efforts to build on this historical scholarship or 
apply IR concepts and theories to the study of historical East Asian politics.
FAIRBANK AND HIS CRITICS
A large English literature now exists on East Asian diplomatic history. General 
accounts of historical East Asian politics can be found in several works.5 The most 
prominent part of this literature, however, still centers on the research efforts 
Fairbank initiated in the “classic era” and the critiques these have inspired 
subsequently. Fairbank’s writings are prominent for both their intellectual creativity
5 Cohen 2000; and Holcombe 2001. For earlier overviews of East Asian history, see Fairbank, Reischauer, and 
Craig 1978; and Reischauer and Fairbank 1960.
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and widespread popularity and influence. They are still an important basis upon 
which contemporary scholars (both historians and political scientists) draw 
inferences about various aspects of historical East Asian politics.
Fairbank developed his interpretive frameworks largely out of research on the 
mid-Qing tribute system and Qing officials’ inability to deal adequately with the 
encroaching Western challenge. He was also influenced, however, by the then 
prevailing assumptions on traditional Chinese foreign policy. The dominant view at 
the time was well captured by the prominent Chinese historian T. F. Tsiang in a 
seminal essay published in the 1930s. Tsiang characterized the nature of imperial 
Chinese foreign relations in this way:
[The Neo-Confucian dogma in regard to international relations] asserts that 
national security could only be found in isolation and stipulates that whoever 
wished to enter into relations with China must do so as China’s vassals, 
acknowledging the supremacy of the Chinese emperor and obeying his 
commands, thus ruling out all possibility of international intercourse on terms 
of equality. It must not be constructed to be dogma of conquest or universal 
dominion, for it imposed nothing on foreign peoples who chose to remain 
outside the Chinese world. It sought peace and security, with both of which 
international relations were held incompatible. If relations there had to be, 
they must be of the suzerain-vassal type, acceptance of which meant to the 
Chinese acceptance of the Chinese ethic on the part of the barbarian.6
On tributary relations, Tsiang argued that
It must not be assumed that the Chinese Court made a profit out of such 
tributes. The imperial gifts bestowed in return were usually more valuable 
than the tribute. The latter was a symbol, signifying the submissiveness of the 
tributary state, which obtained in return, besides the imperial gifts, the
6 Tsiang 1971, 130-1.
much-coveted permission to do a limited trade...On China’s part the 
permission to trade was intended to be a mark of imperial bounty and a
• 7means of keeping the barbarians in the proper state of submissiveness.
Fairbank followed many of these arguments8 and made two enduring contributions. 
He began research on the tribute, system from the 1930s and developed an 
interpretive model in the next two decades. These researches then culminated in what 
he called the “Chinese world order,” “a preliminary framework” advanced in the 
1960s to account for traditional China’s foreign relations.9
According to Fairbank, historical East Asia formed a unique sinocentric order 
characterized by the Chinese assumption of superiority and the extension of China’s 
domestic order into the external realm. Since the Chinese empire was organized 
hierarchically internally, “China’s foreign relations were accordingly hierarchic and 
nonegalitarian, like the Chinese society itself.”10 Such a “Chinese world order” was 
established and maintained through the tribute system, which Fairbank described as 
having “handled the interstate relations of a large part of mankind throughout most of 
recorded history.”11 Further, this order contained “an unusually large ideological 
component,” 12 that is, China’s moral and cultural superiority underpinned by 
Confucianism.
On the tribute system, Fairbank and S. Y. Teng assert “(1) that the tributary system 
was a natural outgrowth of the cultural pre-eminence of the early Chinese, (2) that it 
came to be used by the rulers of China for political ends of self-defense, (3) that in 
practice it had a very fundamental and important commercial basis, and (4) that it
1 3served as the medium for Chinese international relations and diplomacy.” Foreign 
rulers were expected to observe Chinese rituals in order to enter relations with China.
7 Ibid., 131.
8 More generally, Fairbank tended to interpret the record of the nineteenth-century diplomatic encounter between 
China and Western powers in similar fashion to Tsiang. Evans 1988, 27.
9 See note 1.
10 Fairbank 1968a, 2.
11 Ibid., 1.
12 Ibid., 6.
13 Fairbank and Teng 1941,137.
The formalities of the tribute system constituted a mechanism by which foreign 
countries were given their place in the sinocentric order. “Outside countries, if they 
were to have contact with China at all, were expected and when possible obliged to 
do so as tributaries.”14 It is argued that Chinese rulers initiated tributary relations 
because they valued the prestige that foreign tribute would bring to their rule, while 
foreign rulers participated in tributary politics because they valued the benefits of 
trade with China. Thus, “trade and tribute were cognate aspects of a single system of 
foreign relations, the moral value of tribute being the more important in the minds of 
the rulers of China, and the material value of trade in the minds of the barbarians.”15
These interpretations have for a long time dominated scholars’ understanding of the 
historical East Asian order. Many concurred with Fairbank’s assessment of the tribute 
system or differed only slightly from it. Immanuel Hsu, for example, wrote that “the 
tributary relations were primarily ceremonial and ritualistic, rather than exploitative. 
Economically, the tributary practice was a loss to China, yet its prestige value could 
not be overlooked.”16 Some tried to expand and refine the model. Mark Mancall, for 
example, argued that the tribute system functioned to “intermesh” China and its 
neighbors, and this intermeshing was “highly institutionalized and simultaneously 
took place along several dimensions, such as the economic, the political, and the
1 7cultural.” He noted that there was a large element of trade in tributary relations, but 
tribute also carried its enormous political and diplomatic significance and therefore 
should not be misread as simply a cover for trade.
Yet here conceptual ambiguities immediately emerge. Mancall notes that the Qing 
tribute system did not embody a unified set of principles in China’s foreign relations. 
The degree of acceptance of the system on the part of China’s neighbors varied 
greatly—from complete acceptance of Confucianism as the tributary state’s own 
ideology, as in Vietnam, to analogous, but distinct, set of assumptions, as in the case 
of Siam, to total political cynicism in the search for survival, as among the Turks in
14 Fairbank 1968a, 4.
15 Fairbank and Teng 1941, 140-1.
16 Hsu 1960, 5.
17 Mancall 1984, 15.
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Central Asia. Mancall thinks that this variation illustrated the flexibility of the tribute 
system.18 One can ask, however, whether the variation reflected the flexibility of the 
. tribute system or the multiplicity of China’s foreign relations that could not be neatly 
captured by the tribute system.
At first sight Yu Yingshi’s study of the Han tribute system seems to confirm 
Fairbank’s and Mancall’s interpretations of the tribute system. The Han system 
developed out of Chinese efforts to regulate Han-Xiongnu relations in a politically 
acceptable way. To the Han court, “it was the symbolic value of submissiveness 
rather than the actual economic worth of the Xiongnu tribute that was important.”19 
The Han clearly considered the tribute system “a political necessity, despite its 
economic undesirability.” For the “barbarians,” trade was always the paramount 
motive in participating in the tribute system, though they sometimes also sought 
protection from China. However, Yu also observes that for the tribute system to work, 
economic attraction must be accompanied by military awe. Moreover, because the 
maintenance of a well-balanced tribute system required political, military, and 
economic variables on both the Chinese and “barbarian” sides, Yu concludes that 
“the system was, by its very nature, unstable” and maybe conceived as “a state of 
delicate equilibrium, generally sensitive to the change of conditions on either side.”21 
This raises several questions. What is the relationship between economic attraction 
and military force in the tribute system? Military force hardly figures in Fairbank’s 
model, yet Yu demonstrates that the functioning of the Han tribute system depended 
on political, military, and economic variables. Yu gives a dynamic picture of the 
tribute system, and his argument that it was by nature unstable begs the question of 
what accounted for this instability and how to explain the variation in China’s foreign 
relations.
Almost from its inception, Fairbank’s argument has had its critics. The Chinese 
World Order is in many respects a classic statement on traditional China’s foreign
18 Ibid., 65.
19 Yu 1967, 46.
20 Ibid., 49.
21 Ibid., 58, 140.
17
• • 99 •relations partly because it contains Fairbank’s “preliminary framework.” Yet this is 
also a volume with many other first-rate essays expressing a range of views some of 
which cannot be easily accommodated by the framework. The essays by Lien-sheng 
Yang, Joseph Fletcher, and John E. Wills Jr., for example, have raised doubts about 
the general applicability of the sinocentric framework. A more focused critique
9*3
comes from Moms Rossabi’s volume China among Equals. Rossabi and his 
collaborators find that the “Chinese world order” as identified by Fairbank did not 
persist throughout China’s imperial history, and they focus on the Song dynasty 
(960-1279) to show that Song rulers could not enforce a sinocentric tribute system 
and instead had to treat its neighbors as equals.
This finding would not be surprising even if one had just done a cursory review of
imperial China’s foreign relations. The sinocentric, hierarchic, and normative
“Chinese world order” can be fairly called a myth in various periods of Chinese
history. As Lien-sheng Yang writes, “Reviewing the whole range of Chinese
history...one finds that this multidimensional Sinocentric world order was a myth
backed up at different times by realities of varying degree, sometimes approaching
nil.”24 In practice, China was not always superior to foreign countries; it could be
equal or even inferior to them. Not only did weak dynasties such as the Song had to
make humiliating peace with their powerful rivals, but apparently strong regimes
such as the Han (206 BC-AD 220) and the Tang (618-907) also had to appease
foreign chiefs by, for example, giving princesses or girls of the imperial clan as
brides. Both the Han and the Song in fact paid tribute in reverse to their northern
neighbors. And the “Chinese world order” simply collapsed during periods of the
Middle Kingdom’s fragmentation, leading to an East Asian order that was
“uncentered.”25 Clearly, “there were limits to China’s claim to be the suzerain of the
civilized world.”26 Fairbank himself acknowledged that “the Chinese world order
was a unified concept only at the Chinese end and only on the normative level, as an
»
22 Fairbank 1968a, b.
23 Rossabi 1983a.
24 Yang 1968, 20.
25 For a good historical overview, see Cohen 2000.
26 Liu 1980, vii-viii.
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ideal pattern.”27
The most significant critiques of the tribute system model, however, concern its 
conceptual foundation. Wills has for a long time cautioned against over-generalizing 
from the model.28 He observed that the model was primarily relevant in the Qing 
period to relations with Korea, Vietnam, and Liuqiu, but could not fit into relations 
with the Europeans in the Canton system of trade in the eighteenth century. He noted 
the model’s conceptual confusions and suggested that the term “tribute system” be 
used only for the Ming dynasty’s systematic complex of bureaucratic regulation 
developed around 1400. More importantly, he suggested that scholars should 
“become more intellectually ambitious and more self-critical” and “should not 
tolerate the conceptual muddle that authors continue to get into around the phrase 
‘tribute system’”.29
A number of scholars have challenged the rigidity and unitary nature of the model. In 
addition to Wills, Joseph Fletcher noted a high degree of flexibility in Ming foreign
*2 A
policy in as early as his 1968 contribution to The Chinese World Order volume. 
James Millward criticized the model as monolithic and unchanging and argued that 
“the Sinocentric notions that underlie the ‘tribute system’ paradigm bear very little 
relation to Qing policy vis-a-vis the pastoral nomads or other peoples in or bordering 
on Xinjiang.” Moreover, he pointed out that the Emperor Qing Gaozong’s 
(1736-1795) pluralist configuration of the empire, which did not put Han Chinese or 
the Chinese civilization at the center, contradicted Fairbank’s sinocentric, hierarchic 
scheme of the “Chinese world order.” 31 Peter Perdue noted that “tribute” 
encompassed many different kinds of trading and power relations in both the Ming
A A
and the Qing. In examining Qing relations with Kirghiz nomads in the early 
eighteenth century, Nicola Di Cosmo argued that the tribute system as it operated on 
the Qing’s northwestern frontier was an integral part of the political management of
27 Fairbank 1968a, 12.
28 Wills 1974,1984, 1988.
29 Wills 1988, 229.
30 Fletcher 1968.
31 Millward 1998,49, 199.
32 Perdue 2005, 269.
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the frontier that helped reduce local challenges to Qing authority not so much in 
terms of its economic content, but rather by virtue of the political environment it 
created. James Hevia examined Fairbank’s model from a postmodern perspective 
and argued that the model was a functional one and thus shared the weakness of 
classic functional models. He sought to bypass it by conceiving of the Macartney 
embassy not in terms of tributary relations but in terms of an encounter between two 
expansive imperialisms.34
This part of the historical scholarship can therefore be read as a development from 
initial researches centering on Fairbank’s “tribute system” and “Chinese world order” 
frameworks between the 1930s and 1960s to responses, critiques, and attempts to 
move away from them since the 1980s. However, although these critiques, both 
empirical and conceptual, have ably demonstrated the flaws of these models, the 
analytical category of the “tribute system” is still serving as a primary reference point 
in the study of East Asian history. Hevia, to be sure, has tried heroically to eschew it 
altogether, but his postmodern analysis is a method of deconstruction for a particular 
event, not even amenable to contingent generalization of a historical period. Many 
scholars still use the tribute system language in a taken-for-granted way without 
examining its underlying assumptions. Thus, although the attraction of Fairbank’s 
arguments has waned over the years, the tribute system paradigm he helped to 
establish is very much alive. New approaches with greater interpretive and 
explanatory power have yet to emerge.
JAPANESE AND CHINESE PERSPECTIVES
Japanese scholars have made some important contributions to the study of East Asian 
diplomatic history. Two of the most prominent models in this area are those of the 
“investiture system” and “tributary trade.” Nishijima Sadao was the first scholar in 
East Asia to have developed the “investiture system” (Japanese: sakuho taisei) model. 
This model closely parallels Fairbank’s tribute system model. Indeed it identifies the
33 Cosmo 2003.
34 Hevia 1995.
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same practices like the granting of Chinese titles and tribute-paying by foreign rulers 
as those of the tribute system. This is unsurprising since tribute and investiture were 
often two sides of the same coin in the ceremonial aspects of China’s foreign 
relations. Sadao also argued that the “investiture system” embodied sinocentrism 
ideologically and extended China’s hierarchical domestic order institutionally. Indeed, 
like Fairbank, he called this the “East Asian World.” Also like Fairbank, he argued 
that whatever their motivations, foreign countries’ contacts with China were, without 
exception, conducted through the medium of the “investiture system.” Since the 
“investiture system” model has so many similarities with the tribute system model, it 
must also share the latter’s flaws.
The most prominent advocate of the “tributary trade” model is Takeshi Hamashita. 
This model still takes the tribute system as the larger framework—albeit viewing it 
as an organic network of relations between various layers of the center and the 
periphery—while singling out maritime trade as the most significant aspect of 
tributary relations.36 Hamashita portrays a tribute-trade based economic exchange 
network that had matured in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and asserts that 
“it is quite legitimate to view tribute exchange as a commercial transaction.”37 He 
argues that a sinocentric tribute system spanning Asia, above all characterized by 
tributary trade relationships, was Asia’s only—and only Asia’s—historical system. 
Even during the second half of the nineteenth century when Western powers tried to 
impose a treaty port system in East Asia, the tribute system retained its primacy, 
subsuming the treaty system.
Although Hamashita’s emphasis on regional economic integration is a departure 
from earlier accounts of the tribute system, he offers no distinctive challenge to the 
tribute system framework as a whole. Moreover, his theory purports to explain a 
small part of historical East Asian politics—maritime tributary trade in modem 
times—and says little about tributary relations in the Asian continent and during
35 See Wang 1989, 11-20.
36 See Hamashita 1994, 1997, and 2003.
37 Hamashita 1994, 96.
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other periods. If on the maritime front trade was the defining characteristic whereas 
overland security was the dominant concern,38 the analytical task ought to be a 
synthesis of these two perspectives for a systemic framework that can account for 
both features in historical East Asian politics.
In the Chinese literature dominant interpretations of historical East Asian politics 
tend to resemble those of Fairbank and his followers, though this has begun to 
change in recent years. Partly this is because of the influence Fairbank’s work has 
had on many Chinese scholars. But partly this is also because many of these scholars 
have even more uncritically drawn on traditional Chinese sources and thus produced 
interpretations of China’s foreign relations that mirror the views of the imperial 
Chinese state. In an influential essay entitled “the Huayi jS) Order”, for example, 
the historian He Fangchuan outlined his own version of the East Asian order. In 
addition to sinocentric and hierarchic characteristics, He also argued that this order 
was distinguished by its peacefulness and harmony and that the tribute system was 
the institutional guarantee of this Pax Sinica.39
Song Chengyou also sees the interactions between China and its neighbors as having 
formed a distinctive international order. He manages to examine the political, 
economic, and cultural aspects of these interactions without mentioning the tribute 
system. However, although he offers an excellent historical summary of the origin, 
evolution, and decline of this order, he does not develop a conceptual discussion on 
the nature of this order.40
In another recent study, Li Yunquan offers the most thorough examination of the 
historical evolution of the tribute system available in the literature. But his emphasis 
is on the bureaucratic development of the tribute system on the Chinese side, not the 
nature of the East Asian order of which the tribute system may be regarded as a
38 Peter Perdue, for example, while recognizing the importance o f trade, sees security as the overriding problem 
that made military rather than commercial power the decisive force in inter-state relations in the historical East 
Asian system. Perdue 2003.
39 He 2007a.
40 Song 2002.
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notable feature. Li distinguishes between three types of tributary relations during the 
Ming dynasty: typical and substantive, general, and nominal. This can be a promising 
entry into an exploration of the nature of East Asian politics during this time, but Li’s 
focus on the bureaucratic features of the tribute system has prevented him from 
examining further the implications of the variations in tributary relations.41
From a different perspective, the Taiwan-based historian Gao Mingshi examines in 
great detail the origin and evolution of the historical East Asian order (what he calls 
the Tianxia order) and offered his own Tianxia theory.42 The term Tianxia 
T ) — “under heaven”, if translated literally—refers to a cosmology in which China is 
understood as “all under heaven.” Gao argues that this order can be understood from 
the Confucian ideas of virtue (de ® ), ritual (li ^L), administration (zheng ®t), and 
punishment (xing jfflj). These four key elements of Confucianism combine to produce 
four principles of the Tianxia order, those of linkage, governing, distancing, and 
virtue. Although Gao, like Fairbank, also conceives of the structure of the Tianxia 
order as a concentric circle, the idea of the tribute system plays no central role in his 
theory. Indeed, drawing heavily on Nishijima Sadao, Gao is more influenced by the 
Japanese investiture theory than by the tribute system theory in the English literature, 
though, as noted above, the investiture system and the tribute system are two sides of 
the same coin.
Gao’s theory has merits, particularly in terms of its careful examination of the 
philosophical and institutional basis of the Tianxia order. But this is also the source 
of its main weakness. His theory takes Confucian principles as both the means and 
ends of China’s foreign relations, but these cannot incorporate all of China’s foreign 
policy motives, strategies, and goals in practice and do not always reflect the nature 
of Chinese foreign policy. Exacerbating the Confucian bias, Gao takes supporting 
evidence from dynastic sources and interprets them almost entirely at their face value 
(that is, in the way that the scholar-officials who compiled these sources had intended
41 Li 2004.
42 Gao 2003.
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them), thus committing the “confirmation bias.” There is a certain degree of 
superficiality in both the theory’s logic and the evidence supporting it. Further, Gao’s 
theory is heavily biased toward the institutional side of the Tianxia order—issues 
such as investiture and other kinds of the governance system devised by China—and 
then only from the Chinese angle. Because Gao draws so heavily on Confucianism, 
which constituted a great part of the imperial ideology, at times his arguments appear 
indistinguishable from the stated principles of imperial regimes. The theory, as a 
whole, is therefore seriously biased and incomplete.
THE TRIBUTE SYSTEM IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS DISCOURSE 
IR scholars, when they discuss the tribute system, have generally followed the 
Fairbankian paradigm, though couching it with IR terms and concepts. Suisheng 
Zhao, for example, draws uncritically on Fairbank and asserts that a sinocentric 
hierarchic order existed for thousands of years in East Asia. According to him, all 
countries within the tribute system were subservient to China and can be called its 
“satellites”.43 Yongjin Zhang, writing within the English School, asserts that the 
Chinese world order “can be counted as one of the greatest institutional innovations 
and achievements of traditional China. One of the remarkable feats of Pax Sinica, 
which is also an enduring puzzle, is the longevity and flexibility of its fundamental 
institution, the tribute system.”44 These scholars regard the analytical category of the 
“tribute system” as unproblematic and use it to frame their discussions. However, 
their discussion often stops with the thought of the tribute system as a historical 
institution without trying to explain it. If the longevity and flexibility of the tribute 
system is a puzzle, how might one account for it? Answers to this question should 
have taken us far beyond some existing interpretations and get into the heart of the 
nature of historical East Asian politics.
Some scholars have sought to apply mainstream IR concepts and theories. Victor Cha, 
for example, asserts that the predominant security dynamics in historical Asia was
43 Zhao 1997, 15-9.
44 Zhang 2001, 52.
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not balancing but bandwagoning by smaller states with the dominant Chinese 
power.45 This view, however, stays at the level of an assertion rather than a 
well-supported argument. Although other countries clearly accommodated China, at 
times they also sought to resist or at least keep a distance from it. Can bandwagoning 
along capture the dynamics of the relations between China and its neighbors?
The most notable recent writings have concentrated on structural features of the 
historical East Asian system and whether international politics here were uniquely 
“Asian” as opposed to European-style balance of power and hegemonic war. 
Muthiah Alagappa suggests that the structure of the historical East Asian system 
should be seen as hierarchy under anarchy: “The deep structure of this system may 
be characterized as anarchic, for each unit had its own separate territory and 
government, and the tributaries were not under the direct political control of China. 
This anarchy, however, permitted hierarchic relations among the units based on the 
ideas of universal kingship and higher culture.”46 Although this is an interesting 
hypothesis, it is not tested and Alagappa’s brief discussion leaves it unclear why the 
ideas of universal kingship and higher culture would lead to hierarchic politics.
Samuel Huntington is an early advocate of Asian uniqueness in international politics. 
He asserts that “Asians generally are willing to ‘accept hierarchy’ in international 
relations.. .Until the arrival of the Western powers in the mid-nineteenth century, East 
Asian international relations were sinocentric with other societies arranged in 
varying degrees of subordination to, cooperation with, or autonomy from 
Beijing...the Asian hierarchy of power model of international politics contrasts 
dramatically with the European balance of power model.”47 A similar view is held 
by the Chinese scholar Qin Yaqing, who is even more enthusiastic in arguing for 
Chinese uniqueness. He asserts that China’s Tianxia philosophy and the tribute 
system contain distinctively Chinese ideas that Western IR perspectives are simply 
unable to explain. Further, he believes that the structure of the Tianxia order is
45 Cha 1998.
46 Alagappa 1998.
47 Huntington 1996, 234-5.
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hierarchic— and o n ly  h ierarchy can  m aintain  stab ility  and harm ony.48
These assertions are often made without the support of historical evidence, but the 
view of Asian hierarchy as opposed to European anarchy is somehow becoming the 
received wisdom among many IR scholars. One of the more influential such 
arguments comes from David Kang, who asserts that “Historically, it has been 
Chinese weakness that has led to chaos in Asia. When China has been strong and 
stable, order has been preserved. East Asian regional relations have historically been 
hierarchic, more peaceful, and more stable than those in the West.”49
Kang’s thesis suffers from a number of weaknesses. Although hierarchy is a key 
concept in his argument, it is not well defined. Equally problematic is his discussion 
of hierarchic politics in Asian history without specifying its logic or how it came 
about in the first place. Moreover, the evidence Kang gives is selective and sporadic. 
Finally, Kang notes a correlation between Chinese strength and regional peace. But 
the correlation cannot hold for all periods of Chinese strength: Evidence abounds that 
powerful Chinese dynasties tried at various times to dominate and even conquer 
neighboring territories and thus destabilized the region. Yet, even assuming that the 
correlation holds, Kang has not explained whether this is also a causal relationship. 
When peace prevailed in East Asia, was this because of Chinese power or something 
else? What was the relationship between Chinese power and peace and stability in 
Asian history?50
Amitav Acharya’s challenge focuses precisely on some of these problems, though he 
does not answer the question of whether the historical East Asian system is a 
hierarchy.51 Moreover, both Acharya and Kang tend to selectively use evidence to 
support their particular views. Separately, each of their evidence may all make sense. 
But collectively, what does it tell us about the nature of historical East Asian politics?
48 Qin 2006,10.
49 Kang 2003, 66. Although arguing from a different perspective, Barry Buzan and Richard Little also believe 
that hierarchy persisted in East Asia during the ancient and classical era; see Buzan and Little 2000, 232.
50 In his recent book Kang gives a more solid historical discussion, but still does not solve all the shortcomings in 
his original argument. See Kang 2Q07, especially chap 2.
51 Acharya 2003/04. See Kang’s reply in Kang 2003/04.
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The exchange between Kang and Acharya has exposed too many unanswered 
questions, and their debate provides just an entry into this subject.
Historical and Analytical Problems
What, then, is the tribute system in East Asian history? If one sees the term “tribute 
system” as an analytical category, an intellectual construct invented to shed light o n ' 
historical events, then the construct has proved problematic. As the preceding section 
shows, scholars have found various flaws in Fairbank’s tribute system model. While 
many have tried to refine its formulations and delimit its scope and applicability, 
some have sought to bypass or reject it. This raises the question: Should we do away 
with the concept of “tribute system” altogether? In analytical terms, what would we 
lose and what would we gain?
If one sees the tribute system as a historical institution, several problems emerge with 
regard to extant researches on the various tribute systems in East Asian history. To 
begin with, historical researches on the tribute system have focused on the widely 
separated periods of the Han and the Qing dynasties.52 Yu Yingshi’s work explored 
the origin of the tribute system in the Han, while Fairbank’s model developed out of 
his work on the mid-Qing. Many other works mentioned above also focus on the 
Qing period. We lack systematic studies of the tribute system in other periods. 
Particularly puzzling is the neglect of the Ming tribute system, despite the 
recognition that it is during the Ming that the tribute system was first 
institutionalized.
Second, few contingent generalizations or models that improve on Fairbank’s 
original one have been developed in the last few decades. The scholarly trend in the 
history field has been to focus on particular events and develop specific 
interpretations. This method has proved very useful and offered powerful insights on 
a number of important events. But the downside is that it tends to lose the big picture.
52 Wang 1989,26.
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The method is faithful to the discipline of history, though as Wills has argued, 
historians should also be more conceptually conscious and intellectually ambitious. 
For IR scholars, however, an important task is to develop theories that can explain a 
class of historical events. On the tribute system no such theory has yet been offered. 
Even though some scholars talk about the tribute system as a fundamental institution, 
we are still left wondering about its operation and evolution.
Many more specific questions about the tribute system can be raised. Yu Yingshi, 
Mancall, and many others have noted the variation of the tribute system and its 
inherent instability. Other polities’ reactions to China’s tribute-system scheme of 
relations ranged from complete acceptance, to opportunistic and cynical following, to 
indifference and even rejection. The variation needs explanation. What are the 
motives behind China’s construction of tributary relations and other countries’ 
participation (or the lack thereof)? Can the tribute-trade duality that has been 
traditionally identified—China valued tribute for prestige and foreign countries 
valued trade with China through tribute presentation—capture the motives of all the 
parties involved? It has also been noted that the tribute system contained a large 
symbolic dimension: Many “tributaries” acted out of self-interest and only accepted a 
nominal subordination to China. This begs two questions. What were these 
self-interests apart from the economic motive? If tributary relations were largely 
symbolic, what kind of relations were “real” and what does this “symbolic-real” 
distinction tell us about the nature of historical East Asian politics?
More importantly, the observed variation and instability of the tribute system indicate 
that the tribute system must not be taken as an “independent variable” to explain 
historical East Asian politics. Instead, it must be seen as a “dependent variable” and 
thus something to be explained in the first place. The variation and instability tell us 
something deeper about historical East Asian politics. We need a further, more 
enduring set of variables to explain both the tribute system and the larger politics 
between China and its neighbors of which the tribute system may be only a part. 
Talking about the “flexibility” of the tribute system may in fact commit
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essentialization; we must try to deconstruct specific tribute systems and examine 
what lies behind their supposed flexibility.
Further, if the “Chinese world order” is to be understood as a Chinese ideal and thus 
a political myth, what might be a better characterization of the actual historical East 
Asian order? Fairbank offered his “preliminary framework” to describe the Chinese 
ideal pattern. We now need new frameworks to account for the workings of the East 
Asian order. These frameworks should be able to answer the following more 
IR-related questions.
First, is the structure of the historical East Asian system a sinocentric hierarchy, as is 
so often claimed? To answer this question one must be able to define hierarchy 
sensibly, specify how hierarchy is created, and describe the logic of hierarchic 
politics. The extant literature discussed above is weak on all these points.
Second, what are the main patterns of interaction in the relations between China and 
its neighbors and the driving forces behind these interactions? This should be a 
central question in studying the tribute system, yet the answers given so far are 
inadequate. The tribute-trade duality still largely informs our understanding of the 
motives, strategies, and goals of both China and its neighbors. Discussions are 
mostly descriptive without solid conceptual foundations. Moreover, this part of the 
research suffers from the “sinocentric” bias—too much emphasis has been put on the 
Chinese side of the story at the expense of that of other polities.
Finally, is historical East Asian politics so unique that the Western experience is of 
no use here, rendering current IR theories useless, as some seem to believe? Are 
Asians more willing to accept hierarchy and hegemony? Are hierarchy and 
hegemony good for peace and stability in this region? These questions will not be 
answered until we have explored the aforementioned historical and analytical puzzles 
first.
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Methodology
My study is designed to help solve some of these puzzles. The ultimate analytical 
challenge is to explain both the structural variation of the East Asian system and the 
variation in the interactions between China and its neighbors. This, in total, would be 
a too ambitious task. My more limited starting point is, therefore, to examine an 
essential yet somewhat neglected case of the tribute system—the early Ming 
(1368-1424) tribute system.
It is during the early Ming period that the tribute system became fully
• • • * • c iinstitutionalized for the first time in Chinese history. In terms of its scope, function, 
and sophistication, the Ming tribute system surpassed that of all previous Chinese 
dynasties. The subsequent Qing dynasty made some institutional innovations, 
notably the Lifanyuan (JUSSIS) for Inner Asian affairs.54 But in other areas of 
foreign tributary relations they largely inherited the political and institutional 
legacies of the Ming.55 Moreover, the Qing lagged far behind the Ming in terms of 
the scale of tributary relations. Whereas the early Ming had over 100 tributaries 
according to some Chinese sources, the Qing only managed to obtain 7 regular 
tributaries during the Qianlong reign (1736-1795), the last era of Qing strength.56 As 
a bureaucratic management of China’s foreign relations, the tribute system declined 
and eventually collapsed during the Qing.
Analytically, focusing on the early Ming has driven me to work out a theory to 
explain historical East Asian politics under the structural condition of Chinese 
unipolarity. The historical East Asian system might be seen as unipolar when China 
was unified and strong (what I call “Chinese primacy”). The system during the early 
Ming can be seen as a good case of unipolarity as this period saw a consolidation and 
expansion of Chinese power. Developing a theory of Chinese primacy makes sense
53 Historians have consensus on this point. See Fairbank and Teng 1941, 137; Mancall 1984, 13; Wills 1984, 14; 
and Li 2004, 14,61.
54 Chia 1993.
55 This is not to deny the Qing’s updating of the terminological template for identifying tributary groups. See
Crossley 2002, 333.
56 Li 2004, 136.
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as a first step toward theorizing historical East Asian politics because, as the above 
discussion shows, political dynamics in East Asian history vary with the power of the 
Chinese empire. Indeed, the unqualified belief of Chinese strength is the first cause 
behind confusions on the nature of historical East Asian politics. China was powerful 
only at times, and the periods of Chinese unification and strength constitute no more 
than half of its imperial history.57
I examine Sino-Korean, Sino-Japanese, and Sino-Mongolian relations during the 
early Ming to test the theoretical propositions developed in Chapter 2. The early 
Ming case is further divided into these three relationships because they encompass a 
wide range of relations between China and its neighbors, from the most cooperative 
(Sino-Korean relations) to the most difficult (Sino-Mongolian relations), thereby 
ensuring that I will not miss any significant variation of the political dynamics during 
this period.
Three general questions are asked to guide the historical analysis in each empirical 
chapter. What were the Chinese strategies toward Korea/Japan/the Mongols? What 
were the Korean/Japanese/Mongolian strategies toward Ming China? And what kind 
of structure formed in Sino-Korean/Japanese/Mongolian relations as a result of their 
interactions? In contrast to many “sinocentric” and thus ultimately incomplete 
analyses, I pay as much attention to the Korean/Japanese/Mongolian side of the story 
as I do to the Chinese side.
I use both primary and secondary sources for the historical analysis. The main 
primary resources I rely on are the Mingshilu (Veritable Records of the Ming
co
Dynasty) and the Mings hi (Official History of the Ming dynasty). The Mingshilu
57 Victoria Hui has recently argued that China Proper formed a unified empire for only 980 years from 221 BC to 
AD 2000 and thus that historical China should be seen as cycles of multistate systems as much as cycles of 
unified dynasties. Hui 2008b.
58 For the Mingshilu I have used a number of compilations. The most important is MSLLZ, which is a 
comprehensive compilation of materials on Ming China’s foreign relations from the original Mingshilu, including 
those on Sino-Korean, Sino-Japanese, and Sino-Mongolian relations. For Sino-Korean relations I have also used 
MSLCXZLJL, which is a specific compilation o f materials about Korea from the Mingshilu', and CXLCSL, 
which is a compilation of materials regarding China from the Veritable Records o f  the Yi Dynasty in Korea. For 
the Mingshi I have used the 2004 edition of the MS, which is part o f a major recent publication project on China’s 
“official histories.” This edition contains both the old Chinese originals and mandarin translations.
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are the successive reign annals of the emperors of Ming China (1368-1644). They 
summarize items presented to or issued by the emperor in his daily court sessions 
and are thus the most authoritative and comprehensive records of the domestic and 
foreign affairs of the Ming dynasty available in print. They constitute one of the most 
important primary texts of the Ming and contain a wealth of materials unrecorded in 
other sources. Most subsequent histories of the Ming have relied directly or 
indirectly on the Mingshilu. The Mings hi, issued in 1739, is the official history of the 
Ming dynasty written by historians of the subsequent Qing dynasty (1644-1911). 
Regarded as one of the best of the later dynastic histories (there are 24 such 
“histories” altogether), it uses a wide range of materials produced during the Ming, 
including the Mingshilu. For secondary sources I draw on the best historical 
scholarship available in the English and Chinese literatures.
The combination of primary and secondary sources allows me to check 
inconsistencies and disputes regarding interpretations of some historical events. 
More importantly, the use of primary sources has enabled me to identify events that 
are highly relevant for my analysis but are obscured or overlooked in the secondary 
literature. Indeed, it is often necessary for political scientists to do more original 
research based on primary sources, for at least two reasons. First, because historians 
and political scientists approach their topics with different sets of questions, 
secondary historical accounts may not contain the kind of data that political scientists 
need for theory development and testing. Second, political scientists and historians 
have different criteria for selecting evidence, which makes it risky for political 
scientists to rely solely on secondary sources written by historians.59 In the case of 
East Asian diplomatic history where so many secondary accounts are written on the 
basis of a few essential primary documents, it is all the more important to check the 
primary sources for the original presentations of events.
One problem with primary sources such as the Mingshilu and the Mingshi is that 
there are likely to be distortions of facts and biases of interpretations, since these
59 Larson 2001.
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documents were products of official historiography written by Chinese court officials 
often through some particular ideological lenses. Since secondary accounts have had 
to rely on them in varying degrees, misinterpretation is also an inherent problem. On 
the other hand, however, many secondary works contain careful analyses of the 
plausibility of events as recorded in the primary documents, thus offering an 
important check against unnecessary misinterpretation. Careful use of these 
secondary works can also minimize the risk of overreliance on official Chinese 
sources.
At the same time, prudent use of traditional Chinese sources can be achieved by 
generally making use of the occurrence of events as recorded but not necessarily the 
interpretations of them as offered by the scholar-officials. There is no feasible way of 
knowing past events other than by carefully utilizing the extant historical sources, but 
interpretations of these events do not necessarily have to follow the “official view,” 
since they can be arrived at by a careful reconstruction of a sequence of events. I 
have tried to the extent possible to check back and forth between the primary and 
secondary materials, grounding my interpretations in ways that seem the most 
plausible given all the available sources.
Contribution to the F ield o f  IR
This study has a number of implications for East Asian historical scholarship, IR 
theory, and policy discussion on China’s role in East Asia. I hope to simultaneously 
speak to IR scholars, China specialists, and historians of East Asia by striking a 
balance between theory, history, and policy analysis. The theory developed in the 
next chapter is meant to explain some enduring puzzles in East Asian diplomatic 
history and help one better understand how international politics here might have 
worked. The historical case studies evaluate the theory while enriching our empirical 
knowledge of how relations between Ming China and its neighbors were actually 
carried out. Theory and history then inform our policy discussions on China’s 
evolving roles in East Asia and the likely consequences of its contemporary
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reemergence.
HISTORY
The study originates from a historical puzzle: What is the “tribute system” and how 
might one explain it as a “system” of China’s foreign relations? I develop a theory of 
Chinese primacy that explains more than just the tribute system. The first 
contribution I hope to make is to help advance our understanding of historical East 
Asian politics. Over the years various historians have criticized Fairbank’s original 
model, but these criticisms somehow have not accumulated to a critical level where 
entirely new models or theories might be fashioned. I attempt such a theory-building 
endeavor, focusing on the condition of Chinese primacy in East Asian history while 
bringing to light the somewhat neglected case of the early Ming tribute system. The 
theory, with supporting evidence from the early Ming case, explains some puzzles 
and anomalies left over from previous scholarship. It is presented as an alternative 
explanation to models constructed around the central concept of the “tribute system”, 
in an attempt to move beyond this enduring paradigm in the East Asian historical 
scholarship.
THEORY
There is still a wide gap in theorizing historical East Asian politics by IR scholars. 
My theory of Chinese primacy, following the pioneering works by Iain Johnston and 
Victoria Hui, is intended as a small step toward filling that gap. It is hoped that it will 
provoke new thinking on historical East Asian politics and encourage more scholars 
to exploit the theory-building potential of the historical Asian field. At the same time, 
it is also hoped that the theory will add to the IR literature on unipolarity from an 
East Asian vantage point. Those on imperialism and hegemony aside, theories that 
directly address unipolarity are still relatively few. Stuart Kaufman observes that 
“there has been shockingly little theorizing about unipolar systems and how they 
change.”60 Yet unipolarity has its distinct logics and theorizing it will refine and 
expand many existing IR theories.
60 Kaufman 2008, 8.
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The theory proposed in Chapter 2 lays out fully the logic of unipolar politics in a 
historical East Asian context. It synthesizes the insights of realism and 
constructivism in a coherent framework developed in terms of the co-constitution of 
agency and structure and shows how material and cultural factors interact to produce 
behavioral patterns. Unlike Kang, whose discussion of hierarchy remains vague, I 
envision historical East Asian politics along a spectrum from the more anarchic to the 
more hierarchic end, presenting clearly the logics of anarchy and hierarchy as well as 
the conditions under which anarchic or hierarchic politics may become more likely. 
Although the theory is grounded in the East Asian context, it will have relevance for 
unipolar politics in general. It advances our understanding of how unipolarity might 
operate and expands the existing realist and constructivist theories on the basis of 
materials from historical East Asia.
POLICY
Many contemporary discussions on China’s historical role in East Asia have either 
implicit or explicit implications for our understanding of its present foreign policy 
and how this might affect contemporary East Asia politics. The reference to history is 
inevitable and in some cases also necessary, since, as Gerrit Gong has argued, history 
not only influences states’ identities but also to some extent their strategic alignment 
in the present era.61 Yet some of these discussions are based on faulty assumptions 
and inadequate understandings of historical East Asian politics. I undercut these 
assumptions through in-depth historical case studies and establish a more solid 
theoretical and empirical understanding of historical East Asian politics, thus creating 
a more credible ground for discussion about the relevance of history. In Chapter 7, 
for example, I bring history and policy together by evaluating the myths of the 
“Chinese tradition” found in some part of the Chinese literature and consider their 
consequence for contemporary Chinese foreign policy.
Several misleading interpretations of the contemporary implications of historical East
61 Gong 2001.
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Asian politics are readily apparent in the extant literature. For example, an emerging 
trend of research—represented most notably by David Kang—argues that the 
historical East Asian system is a hierarchy and that hierarchic politics centering on 
China may return to East Asia. According to this line of argument, hierarchy or 
hegemony induced by the rising Chinese power may again cement regional peace 
and stability.
A strong China might indeed contribute to East Asian stability, but the mechanisms 
that might lead to that happy outcome are far less clear. Kang’s assertion that the 
historical East Asian system is a hierarchy is unfounded. I show that even during 
periods of Chinese preponderance politics here are more anarchic than hierarchic in 
many aspects. Historical East Asian politics are also more power-political than many 
have realized. If the historical East Asian system with Chinese preponderance is not a 
sinocentric hierarchy, we will have less reason to believe that the contemporary East 
Asian system will be such a hierarchy when China has to share regional influence 
with other countries.
Yet Kang is careful in making historical analogies. There are analysts who simply 
extrapolate China’s and East Asia’s future from the past. According to some, “China
• • • fS)is essentially ‘hardwired’ by its history and culture to seek domination.” 
Huntington, for example, asserts that “China’s history, culture, tradition, size, 
economic dynamism, and self-image all impel it to assume a hegemonic position in 
East Asia... History, culture, and the realities of power strongly suggest that Asia will 
opt for peace and hegemony...China is resuming its place as regional hegemon, and 
the East is coming into its own.” But what are the history, culture, and power 
realities in East Asia? What has been China’s role in this region? Surely, as China 
regains its power, history and culture will be more important in its foreign relations. 
But without first understanding what East Asian history and culture might have been, 
we will have a hard time speaking intelligently about their contemporary
62 This is Aaron L. Friedberg’s summary o f this literature; Friedberg 2005, 21, fii. 39.
63 Huntington 1996, 229, 238. For a similar line, see Dibb 1995, 13-14. More or less similar views can also be 
found in Mosher 2000; and Terrill 2004.
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implications.
Chapter 2 
A Theory of Chinese Primacy
In this chapter I explore how insights from recent developments in realist and 
constructivist IR theories can be used to explain how Chinese primacy shaped 
historical East Asian politics when China was unified and strong. No one studying 
historical East Asian politics will fail to recognize China’s material preponderance, 
nor will anyone fail to appreciate its cultural influence at the same time. Our 
perception of the reality of historical East Asian politics calls for a synthetic 
approach that can take into account both material and cultural factors.1 Theoretical 
synthesis is a growing trend in the IR literature. As Legro observes, a synthetic 
framework provides more and better specified explanatory power than theories 
emphasizing just one dominant factor, by capturing the way different causal forces 
conjointly shape outcomes. By considering the factors of both relative power and 
identity, it should be possible to explain the patterns of interaction between China 
and its neighbors as well as the motivations behind their strategies toward each other.
An Overview
“International primacy” can be taken to mean a system in which there is only one 
great power, which is called “unipolarity” in realist language. Realists have defined 
a unipolar system as containing “one state whose share of capabilities places it in a 
class by itself compared to all other states.”4 Unipolarity should, therefore, naturally 
fall within the realist research agenda by virtue of its emphasis on polarity as the key
1 A direct comparison of realism and constructivism may be problematic since constructivism is not a substantive 
theory of international politics like realism (Fearon and Wendt 2002, 56). My point o f synthesis, however, is not 
to suggest such a comparison but rather to focus on and take full advantage of the explanatory factors emphasized 
by each approach—material power in the case of realism and ideas in the case of constructivism. I also take a 
pragmatic stance toward theoretical synthesis and leave aside the philosophical and ontological debates that are 
not essential to problem-driven research.
2 Legro 2005, 46.
3 I use “primacy” and “unipolarity” interchangeably to refer to a system of only one great power. But because 
“unipolarity” seems particularly associated with realism, I prefer the term “Chinese primacy” to “Chinese 
unipolarity” since my theory also takes into account the cultural aspects of the historical East Asian system.
4 Brooks and Wohlforth 2008, 12-3. See also Ikenberry, Mastanduno, and Wohlforth 2009, 5; Wohlforth 1999, 9; 
and Jervis 1993, 52.
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structural variable. Yet until recently unipolarity has been a neglected subject of 
realist theorizing. Waltz, as Richard Little has recently pointed out, “might have been 
more willing to entertain the possibility of an enduring unipolar world.”5 His work 
has nevertheless consistently maintained that unipolarity is “unusual.” 6 Only 
recently, however, has Waltz begun to confront the logic of the contemporary 
American unipolarity.7 The two variants of neorealism—defensive realism and 
offensive realism—do not seem to offer obvious insights into the workings of
o
unipolarity. Nor do the various hegemonic realist theories provide much of a clue. 
Although Robert Gilpin discusses hegemonic war and transition, he does not 
elaborate on how the dominant and secondary powers may interact in a stable 
system.9 Power transition theory is mainly concerned with the relationship between 
power distribution and war.
William Wohlforth is the first realist scholar to have explicitly theorized American 
unipolarity.10 He persuasively shows the stability of this unipolar system, but stops 
short of presenting a full logic of unipolar politics between the U.S. and other major 
powers. Stephen Walt’s recent research on American primacy lays out more clearly 
the strategies that the U.S. and other states can employ toward each other without, 
however, developing a full-blown theory of American unipolarity. 11 In a 
wide-ranging and ambitious book, scholars have tested the systemic 
balance-of-power theory against an impressive range of premodem and 
non-European historical evidence and found that both balance and hegemony are 
equally common structural features of the international system.12 Yet, although the 
book gives an outline of a new theoretical framework to account for these alternative 
outcomes, it does not theorize political dynamics within a unipolar system.
5 Little 2007, 189. According to Little (p. 167), Waltz’s model “points the way to the emergence of a unipolar 
system and the absence of any sustained discussion of unipolarity represents, as a consequence, a significant 
weakness of Theory o f  International Politics.”
6 See Waltz 1993 and 2000.
7 Waltz 2008, xii-xiii.
8 These include hegemonic transition theory, see Gilpin 1981; power transition theory, see Organski 1958, and 
Organski and Kugler 1980; and leadership long-cycle theory, see Modelski and Thompson 1989. Levy labels 
these theories “hegemonic realism,” see Levy 2002, 354-55.
9 Gilpin 1981.
10 Wohlforth 1999.
11 Walt 2005.
12 Kaufman, Little, and Wohlforth 2007.
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Unipolarity is more explicitly theorized in a recent special issue of the journal World 
Politics, but most articles are centrally concerned with the dynamics of the current
1 7American unipolarity. As yet, however, “we have neither a powerful theory nor 
much evidence about how unipolar systems operate.”14 Moreover, several authors 
note that we do not possess multiple historical cases for systematic comparisons.15 
Developing a theory of Chinese primacy and then evaluating it against empirical 
materials from historical East Asia can thus usefully contribute to the emerging 
research on unipolarity.
While realist theories capture the key factor of power differential and its possible 
behavioral effects, constructivist frameworks should also contribute to theorizing 
unipolarity since in such a system the dominant power’s beliefs, ideology, and 
identity might also shape political dynamics. Indeed, in East Asian history, China’s 
cultural influence over its neighbors was profound. I identify one cultural factor 
pertinent to international relations in this region—sinocentrism—and theorize its 
causal effects. Taking into account China’s preponderant material power as well as its 
sinocentric cultural assumption yields a synthetic theory with greater explanatory 
power than theories emphasizing just one dominant factor.
The theory proposed below is a systemic one, taking into account both structural and 
unit-level factors. Its propositions follow first from assumptions about two kinds of 
human motives: the need to meet both security and identity requirements. The agents 
or actors for meeting these requirements are the ruling elites of China and its 
neighboring states, not these states as unitary actors.16 As Wight points out, “The
13 World Politics (January 2009).
14 Jervis 2009,188.
15 Ikenberry, Mastanduno, and Wohlforth 2009, 25. Jervis notes that “examining Rome and ancient China could 
be illuminating;” Jervis 2009, 200.
16 “Units” would be a better term than “states” in the context o f historical East Asia. For convenience I define 
states broadly as “coercion-wielding organizations that are distinct from households and kinship groups and 
exercise clear priority in some respects over all other organizations within substantial territories.” Tilly 1992, 1-2. 
Thus political units such as China, Korea, and Japan in historical East Asia qualify as states. In the case studies I 
also consider the Mongols as political units because of the importance of their interactions with early Ming 
China.
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17state cannot exercise power independent of those agents that act on its behalf.” 
These state agents have to meet the security and identity needs, moreover, under 
structural constraints and incentives, both material and normative.
From these assumptions three propositions about patterns of behavior and interaction 
can be generated. First, the behavioral tendency of China is political and/or military 
domination over its neighbors. The urge to dominate grows out of both structural 
incentives and internal political needs. Second, although accommodation appears the 
most sensible response from a structural perspective, other states may also resist 
Chinese demands for internal reasons, suggesting that unit-level factors can at times 
override structural imperatives. The main pattern of interaction in such a system is 
therefore Chinese domination versus other states’ accommodation and resistance. 
Third, a variety of state strategies, underpinned by different motivations, can be 
employed. Chinese rulers have at their disposal the strategies of war, blackmail, 
inducement, and persuasion, while the rulers of other states may try submission, 
bandwagoning, defying, balancing, challenging, and isolation.
By adopting these theoretical perspectives, it is possible to contribute to the 
discussion of the sinocentric system in three ways. First, historical East Asian politics 
can be analyzed using the idea of unipolarity as found in the IR theoretical literature. 
This suggests that it is possible to explore the nature of asymmetrical relations 
between China and its neighbors without a tribute-system perspective. This should 
become clearer when tributary relations are analyzed from the perspectives of both 
China and its neighbors. While one can of course conceive of an asymmetrical 
system as consisting of the parties participating in tributary relations, doing so does 
not necessarily offer distinctive analytical advantages. In fact, deconstructing the 
tribute system enables one to see the asymmetrical nature of historical East Asian 
politics more clearly. By examining the relations between China and its neighbors 
from a holistic perspective—that is, both the tributary and non-tributary part—it is in 
fact possible to suggest that there are motives, strategies, and goals for both China
17 Wight 2006, 222.
41
and its neighbors that go beyond the “tribute system” paradigm.
Second, by using realist and constructivist perspectives, it is possible to reveal a 
more complete logic of Chinese unipolarity than is found in the existing literature, 
which should add to our understanding of how unipolar politics might operate in 
general. This also involves connecting previously unconnected insights and 
expanding existing theories to draw out more clearly their implications for 
unipolarity. For example, although defensive realism and offensive realism do not 
deal with unipolarity per se, it can be proposed that they do have implications for 
such a model and, if extended, actually offer identical predictions for how a 
dominant power might behave. I present the logic of Chinese unipolarity in terms of 
a range of strategies that China and its neighbors can employ toward each other. 
Some of these are familiar in the literature. But others such as inducement, 
persuasion, balking, defying, challenging, and isolation have not been given much 
attention in light of unipolarity. These diverse strategies suggest that the dynamics of 
unipolar politics cannot be captured by the simple dichotomy between balancing and 
bandwagoning.
Third, the theory seeks to refine some existing concepts and lay out more clearly the 
logics of anarchy and hierarchy in a historical East Asian context. For example, 
attention can be drawn to the exploitative nature of bandwagoning in unipolarity—in 
which secondary states take advantage of the dominant power to enhance their own 
power as well as their own security. I also show how sinocentrism might lead to 
hierarchy and specify the kind of evidence that can give us confidence in believing 
the presence of a sinocentric hierarchy. Finally, the theory is presented in terms of the 
co-constitution of agency and structure and shows how material and cultural factors 
interact to produce outcomes.
In the following two main sections, I present the theory’s logic, starting with the 
implications of the security motive followed by a discussion on identity in historical 
East Asian politics. In the third section I identify five hypotheses about state behavior
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to be tested in the case studies.
The Security Motive and Its Implications
To assume that one primary goal of states in the international system is survival is 
relatively uncontroversial. Security is one of three key goals that realist theories posit 
states invariably pursue (the other two being wealth and power). Certainly the 
security assumption is foundational in neorealism.18 Constructivists criticize the 
assumption not because they dispute the security motive per se but because they fault 
the security assumption as being inadequate for theory building.19 Wendt, for 
example, argues that in addition to basic needs such as physical security and
• • • 90autonomy, states also have to meet their identity needs.
Taking security as the starting point, one can begin to explain how second-tier states 
in a unipolar system behave, since one of their greatest worries must be how to deal 
with the preponderance of the primary state. Such worry is less prevalent for the 
latter, since the only great power in the system necessarily enjoys a high degree of 
security. But this does not imply that security can thereby be ignored in foreign 
policy making. Even the dominant power has to worry about security, because the 
possibility of relative power shift and challenge from secondary states always 
remains. Primacy can reduce, but not eliminate, the dominant state’s fear of other 
states. Indeed, the case study of early Ming China shows that having newly acquired 
primacy did not eliminate its fear of security challenges from the Mongols and other 
actors in the system.
UNIPOLARITY IN DEFENSIVE REALISM
In an anarchic world of self-help, if both the primary and secondary states, 
possessing some offensive capabilities, want to survive, yet uncertain about others’
18 Waltz 1979.
19 For example, Martha Finnemore argues that neorealism’s and neoliberalism’s material and static treatments of 
interests are not so much wrong as “grossly incomplete;” these theories “can explain only a small amount o f what 
goes on in the world.” Finnemore 1996,27.
20 Wendt 1999, 132, 241, and 328. See also Wendt 1994, 385.
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intentions, how will they rationally behave? As noted, although defensive realism 
and offensive realism differ on the effects of anarchy on state behavior in more or 
less balanced systems and although neither of them deals with unipolarity as such, 
they offer almost identical predictions for the behavior of the primary state in 
unipolarity.
As is well known, Waltz, usually regarded as a defensive realist, argued that states try
0 1internal or external balancing to achieve security. Balancing is the primary strategy 
for survival. However, although states engage in balancing to increase internal 
strength or gain external allies, they need only have “an appropriate amount” of
' j'ypower for the sake of security. “They cannot let power, a possibly useful means, 
become the end they pursue...The first concern of states is not to maximize power 
but to maintain their positions in the system.” For defensive realists, the 
international structure encourages states to seek and preserve “only the minimum of 
power needed for security,”24 not to increase power relentlessly.
Because they emphasize security-seeking rather than power-maximizing, unipolarity 
appears as “the least stable,”25 if not an unimaginable, structure for defensive realists. 
Yet, carrying the defensive realist logic forward, one can in fact derive some 
important hypotheses. Its argument that “The first concern of states is not to 
maximize power but to maintain their positions in the system” can still apply. Indeed, 
if Schweller’s criticism of defensive realism that “Only in reference to satisfied 
countries can it be said that the primary goal is ‘to maintain their positions in the 
system’”26 is right, then the best application of the defensive realist argument is 
found in unipolarity because the dominant power in such a system will generally be 
more satisfied than states in bipolar or multipolar systems.
In unipolarity the position the polar power has to maintain is primacy, not balance;
21 Waltz 1979, 118.
22 Waltz 2008, 57.
23 Waltz 1979, 126.
24 Waltz 2008, p. 46.
25 Ibid., 88.
26 Schweller 1994, 86.
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and its behavior amounts to domination, not balancing. Maintaining primacy means 
preserving its relative power in the system or preventing the relative power increase 
of other states. Indeed, balancing, whether internal or external, would have no use for 
the only great power in the system. Domination, by creating and maintaining a 
preponderance of power so as to forestall the rise of peer competitors and suppress 
challenges from other states, becomes feasible—indeed, likely—simply because of 
the concentration of power in the primary state. If in multipolar and bipolar systems 
structure is “a set of constraining conditions,”27 in unipolarity it is more of a 
disposing and enabling force. Waltz, believing as he does that it is unlikely for a 
dominant power to “behave with moderation, restraint, and forbearance,” argues that 
unipolarity will be eventually restored into balance.28 It is unclear, however, how 
long it will take for that eventuality to arrive. Historically, unipolar systems, from the 
Roman Empire in the West to the Chinese Empire in the East, have had impressively 
long life-spans. The distinctiveness of unipolar politics cannot be easily dismissed. •
OFFENSIVE REALISM AND UNIPOLARITY
Offensive realists, on the other hand, argue that the international system creates 
powerful incentives for states to look for opportunities to maximize power at the 
expense of rivals. A state’s ultimate goal is to be the hegemon in the system.29 Since 
hegemon is defined as the only great power in the system,30 this amounts to saying 
that a state’s ultimate goal is to create unipolarity or primacy. Indeed, according to 
Mearsheimer, all states are revisionist power-maximizers except the regional 
hegemon who will genuinely be satisfied with the status quo. “The pursuit of power 
stops only when hegemony is achieved” because hegemony will eliminate any 
possibility of challenge by another great power. A hegemon “would be a status quo 
power, and it would go to considerable lengths to preserve the existing distribution of 
power.”31
27 Waltz 1979, 73.
28 Waltz 2008, 88. See also Layne 1993 and 2006.
29 See Mearsheimer 2001.
30 Ibid., 2,40.
31 Ibid., 34-35, 42.
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The implication of offensive realism for unipolar politics is then straightforward: 
Satisfied with the unipolar distribution of power, the hegemon, or the primary state, 
will strive to maintain this power distribution since this will almost guarantee its 
security. In contrast to defensive realism, offensive realism not only offers a logic of 
why international primacy is possible but also why it can be worthwhile. It is 
possible because the international system encourages states to be aggressive 
power-maximizers for hegemony. It is worthwhile because hegemony, or primacy, is 
the best guarantee for security.
That both variants of neorealism offer almost identical hypotheses for the behavior of 
the primary state is not surprising. Neorealism requires only one factor to explain 
why the primary state will pursue domination, namely, the concern for relative power. 
What divides defensive realism and offensive realism is whether “structural 
modifiers”—such as the offense-defense balance and geography—will influence the 
severity of the security dilemma between states. In a unipolar system, the divide 
disappears because the effect of these structural modifiers on the security dilemma 
with regard to the primary state is minimal. The security dilemma does not disappear 
in unipolarity, but its consequence is more likely to be felt in the future rather than in 
the present, because in the present the security of the primary state cannot be 
challenged by other states. Security competition and war, therefore, are least likely to 
occur in a unipolar system.
THE DRIVE FOR DOMINATION
Both defensive and offensive realism offer the prediction that the primary state will 
try to maintain its relative power position. But it is not yet clear what precisely the 
tendency to maintain power preponderance will entail in actual behavior, nor does it 
tell us how the primary state will respond to power trends in the system. Some 
neorealists argue that in anarchy “the fundamental goal of states in any relationship is
32 Taliaferro 2000/01. On structural modifiers, also see Snyder 1996. On the security dilemma, see Jervis 1978; 
and Glaser 1997.
33 This is consistent with Waltz’s contention, emphasized by .Wohlforth, that systemic stability—defined as the 
absence of system-wide wars—is greatest when the number of great powers is smallest.
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to prevent others from achieving advances in their relative capabilities.”34 This 
proposition needs some qualification in the case of unipolarity. A unipole still has to 
consider the cumulative increases of the capabilities of the weak and the possibility 
of conflict in the future. Its sensible response, however, is not to prevent any such 
increase, even when it has the capabilities to do so. In a unipolar system the 
war-causing potential of anarchy is sufficiently attenuated that the primary state need 
not be concerned with every increase of other states’ relative power.
Similarly, if security is the underlying motive, the primary state should not relentless 
expand whenever it has the capabilities to do so. Rather, expansion, conquest, and 
preventive war are responses to rising security threats. It is these threats that drive it 
to try military domination in the periphery. Because the primary state already enjoys 
a wide margin of security, it will try conquest or preventive war only when this 
margin of security is threatened by other states’ growing power. Such military 
domination needs to be properly defined as preventing others from achieving 
threatening advances in relative power—“threatening” being ultimately a function of 
rulers’ perceptions.
STRATEGIES OF DOMINATION ’
What strategies can the primary state employ for domination? Realism dictates that 
the primary means to obtain desired outcomes are to threaten punishment or offer a
• 36 •side payment. Three strategies therefore appear prominent in a realist world: war, 
blackmail/threat, and inducement. War and blackmail are coercive means (the use of 
force and the threat of force) to get another state to change its behavior. War is the 
most well-known strategy that states have used to acquire power. The primary state 
can employ war to eliminate existing threats or prevent the rise of challengers. This 
does not mean, however, that it will start war at every instance of secondary states’ 
resistance or power increase.
34Grieco 1988.
35 Some defensive realists argue that “states motivated primarily by security should not as a general rule try to 
maximize their relative power.” Glaser 1994/95, 72.
36 Traditional or classical realism also has room for persuasion and legitimacy in foreign policy. Schweller and 
Priess 1997.
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When other states are weak and vulnerable or when geography inhibits them from 
posing a serious threat, the primary state may tolerate their resistance for quite a 
while. Preventive war is most likely to occur when the primary state perceives threat 
from an emerging power. This, for example, largely explains early Ming China’s 
repeated campaigns into the Mongolian steppe. The likelihood of war will also be 
influenced by “structural modifiers” such as geography. The frequency of wars 
between Ming China and the Mongols are partly explained by their proximity. And 
although early Ming rulers threatened Japan with war, they never executed the threat 
partly for fear of the unpredictability of warfare across the sea (while certainly 
remembering the spectacular failures of the Mongol conquest of Japan a century 
ago).
Blackmail, whereby a state threatens to take some undesirable action unless the 
target state offers some form of compliance, is also a strategy for domination. The 
primary state can blackmail other states into accepting its dominance. Although 
blackmail is often associated with military threats, it can also have an economic 
dimension. Economic sanction, for example, is a typical form of economic blackmail 
in the contemporary world. Early Ming China could apply a sort of economic 
blackmail by closing down border markets or rejecting tributary relations with states 
that were eager for profit from trade with China.
Inducement is a strategy whereby a state hopes to change another state’s behavior by 
promising political and economic benefits. The primary state can induce other states 
into accepting its dominance by offering them political and economic rewards. Early 
Ming rulers, especially the Yongle emperor (1403-1424), frequently bestowed 
political titles and economic gifts to other rulers to obtain their compliance. Together 
these three strategies constitute, though not exhaust, the “carrots and sticks” for 
domination. They are all intended to change secondary states’ behavior by altering 
the costs and benefits of their policies through threats of punishment or promises of
37 This definition follows Walt 2005,24,152, See also Mearsheimer 2001, 152.
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reward.
SECONDARY STATES’ RESPONSE
If the behavioral tendency of the primary state in unipolarity is domination, what are 
the behavioral tendencies of the secondary states? A unipolar system is, by definition, 
one in which the balance of power fails to work. Secondary states cannot 
counterbalance the polar power either alone (internal balancing) or in combination 
(external balancing). As Wohlforth puts it, “A unipolar system is one in which a 
counterbalance is impossible.”38 This does not mean that balancing as a state 
strategy does not exist, but only that balancing in unipolarity is usually ineffective 
and unlikely to bring about balance as a systemic outcome.39
Given the power asymmetries, it makes little sense for secondary states to try 
competing with or challenging the primary state militarily. To ensure their security, 
they will have to deal with its power through accommodation rather than opposition, 
that is, to make asymmetrical concessions to the dominant power, reconcile with its 
strategic preferences, and tolerate its illegitimate actions until they are strong enough 
to mount a challenge. Accommodation is the behavior induced by the structural 
imperatives of unipolarity for the secondary states, as is domination for the primary 
state.
BANDWAGONING IN UNIPOLARITY
In the IR literature, bandwagoning appears as the prime strategy secondary states can 
employ in their accommodation with the dominant power. Wohlforth, for example, 
suggests that “The only options available to second-tier states are to bandwagon with 
the polar power (either explicitly or implicitly) or, at least, to take no action that 
could incur its focused enmity.” 40 Yet, although bandwagoning is frequently 
discussed, scholars disagree on its precise meaning or its frequency as a strategic
38 Wohlforth 1999, 29.
39 On the distinction between “balancing” as state behavior and “balance” as a systemic outcome, see Elman 
2003, 8-9.
40 Wohlforth 1999, 25.
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behavior in international politics.41 Moreover, it is almost always narrowly 
conceived of as an alignment decision in conflict situations. Thus, both Waltz and 
Walt take bandwagoning to be the opposite of balancing, their only difference being 
the bandwagoning target: allying with the more powerful side or the more 
threatening side.42 Walt conceives of bandwagoning as a result of coercion obtained 
through the threat of military force by the stronger power—“alignment induced at the 
point of a gun.” 43 Criticizing this definition as too narrow, Schweller defines 
bandwagoning as a strategy whereby an opportunistic state joins forces with the 
stronger side in the expectation of making gains, usually for profit through 
aggression or for the spoils of war.44
Although Schweller usefully points out profit as an important motive behind 
bandwagoning, his definition still seems narrow in light of unipolarity. Three 
problems remain. First, bandwagoning does not just happen in war or through 
aggression. It can take place in times of peace. Indeed, in unipolarity bandwagoning 
is often done willingly, though sometimes it can also be a result of the dominant 
state’s coercion. Second, in unipolarity bandwagoning is not only about joining 
forces with the dominant power to take advantage of a third state. Rather, it is 
primarily about taking advantage of the dominant power itself. It is this exploitative 
nature of the bandwagoning strategy in unipolarity that deserves the most attention.
Third, bandwagoning in unipolarity is about both power and security. It is first and 
foremost a strategy of the weak for survival in the face of preponderant power. Not 
an ideal strategy as it leaves the weak to hope for the mercy of the strong, it is more 
pragmatic and better than other strategies such as balancing and buck-passing at
41 Some realists such as Waltz, Stephen Van Evera, and Stephen Walt believe that balancing behavior 
predominates in international politics, while other scholars, notably Paul Schroeder, Randall Schweller, and 
Robert Powell, argue that bandwagoning is more common than balancing or at least more common than some 
realists think. See Waltz 1979; Van Evera 1990/91; Walt 1987; Schroeder 1994; Schweller 1994; and Powell 1999. 
See also Sweeney and Fritz 2004.
42 See Waltz 1979, 126; and Walt 1987. Eric J. Labs follows Waltz in defining bandwagoning as “joining up with 
the aggressive power to appease it or gain favorable treatment from it”; Labs 1992, 409, fii. 2. The majority o f the 
literature on alliance formation defines balancing as joining with the weaker (in terms of military capability) of 
two alliance choices and bandwagoning as joining with the stronger; Sweeney and Fritz 2004,429.
43 Walt 2005, 187.
44 Schweller 1994.
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ensuring survival in a unipolar system. It stands a good chance of avoiding attack 
from the dominant power by conceding to its demands. Moreover, it may also gain 
secondary states protection from the dominant power against other states. But 
security is not the only .goal. Bandwagoning is also motivated by the prospect of 
increasing power—enriching or strengthening oneself by exploiting the economic 
and military resources of the dominant power. In other words, bandwagoning is a 
strategy whereby secondary states not only hope to ensure survival but also to gain 
power and profit by making productive use of their asymmetrical relations with the 
dominant power. The opportunity of peaceful intercourse with the dominant power 
creates powerful incentives for secondary states to benefit as much as possible from 
such a relationship. For states that are especially weak and vulnerable, this might be 
the best outcome they can get, while hoping that the dominant power will be merciful. 
For other states that have great power potentials and harbor corresponding ambitions, 
however, they will aim at increasing their relative power as a hedge against future 
uncertainties, even though they may not entertain challenging the dominant power in 
the present.
STRATEGIES OF RESISTANCE
Bandwagoning does not exhaust secondary states’ strategies toward the primary state. 
States develop and shape their strategies in interactions with other states. If 
bandwagoning is insufficient to preclude the primary state’s coercion or is 
unacceptable for internal reasons, secondary states may try various strategies of 
resistance depending on the severity of the situation. One is balking—either ignoring 
the dominant power’s requests or doing the bare minimum to carry them out, thereby 
hindering its efforts while attempting to avoid an overt clash.45 Another strategy is 
defying—not only rejecting the dominant power’s requests but also opposing and 
even putting up active resistance against its pressure. At this point the strategy of 
balancing may also be tried—either transforming their latent power into military 
capabilities (internal balancing) or forming alliances against the dominant power 
(external balancing). A further strategy is challenging—competing with the dominant
45 The discussion of “balking” follows Walt 2005, 141-43.
power politically and militarily if their core interests are in fundamental conflict.
Occasionally geography may also give some states the option of isolation. For 
example, if there are large bodies of water in between, the fortuitous state may 
simply isolate itself from the dominate power in the hope that “the stopping power of 
water” can protect it.46 But such options are only available to the extent that 
“structural modifiers” like geography can mitigate the effect of the distribution of 
power. In the case of the historical East Asian system, Japan was able to isolate itself 
from the continent by taking advantage of its island position.
These strategies of resistance are employed primarily when secondary states face 
coercion from the primary state that threatens their interests or when there are 
profound conflicts of interest even without the latter’s coercion. That they may be 
tried does not mean they will be successful. Indeed in unipolarity the failure rate is 
likely to be high. Balancing, for example, is usually ineffective due to coordination 
and collective action problems. The most important cause of balancing failure in 
unipolarity, however, in addition to being “prohibitively costly”,47 is the dominant 
power’s ability to suppress it by, for example, pursuing divide-and-conquer 
strategies.48 If internal conditions permit, bandwagoning is a sensible strategy for 
secondary states to deal with the structural imperative of unipolarity. But if it is 
ineffective and the dominant power continues to press its demands, they will have no 
choice but to balk, defy, balance, and challenge, even if doing so may be futile. In the 
existing literature the strategies of balancing and bandwagoning are frequently 
discussed, balking has received attention recently, while defying, challenging, and 
isolation have usually been overlooked. Balancing and bandwagoning alone, 
however, are unable to capture the dynamics of unipolar politics.
SUMMARY
From a purely structural perspective, the central behavioral tendency in a unipolar
46 On the “stopping power o f water,” see Mearsheimer 2001, 114-19.
47 Brooks and Wohlforth 2008, 23.
48 For an excellent discussion on the hurdles to effective balancing, see Hui 2005, 28-34. For a similar argument 
on obstacles to effective balancing in unipolarity, see Walt 2009, 96.
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system should be one between the primary state’s domination and secondary states’ 
accommodation. Yet structure does not determine behavior and its effects may be 
overridden by unit-level factors such as domestic politics and ideology. As Legro 
notes, “National responses to systemic incentives can rarely be understood by 
reference to external conditions alone.”49 Secondary states’ resistance through 
balking, defying, balancing, challenging, and isolation should therefore be expected. 
Such resistance can become more frequent especially when the dominant power 
applies coercive strategies (war and blackmail). The system then becomes less stable.
Stable or not, there is little variation in the behavior of the primary state, while those 
of the secondary state vary from accommodation to resistance. That domination is 
the only expected behavior of the primary state shows how strong an enabling force 
the unipolar structure is. Victoria Hui argues that international politics can be 
understood as a competition between the “logic of balancing” and the “logic of 
domination.”50 A unipolar system is one in which the “logic of domination” prevails 
over the “logic of balancing.”51
The Identity Motive and Its Implications
That states also try to meet their identity needs is a key constructivist proposition. 
Lebow, drawing on Greek philosophy, has recently argued that the “spirit” is an 
innate human drive, with self-esteem as its goal, and honor, standing, and autonomy 
the means by which it is achieved. Self-esteem is a critical component of identity, 
and is maintained through the quest for honor or standing. This insight is relevant 
for a theory of Chinese primacy. Historically Chinese rulers had a strong conception 
of their identity and an equally strong concern for their honor and standing among 
states and peoples in the vicinity of the Chinese empire. China’s neighbors, such as
49 Legro 2005, 175.
50 Hui 2005.
51 This should not be taken to mean, however, that the primary state can always get its way over secondary states. 
In fact, the overall behavioral pattern of domination versus accommodation and resistance shows that the primary 
state has difficulty in obtaining compliance from secondaiy states. For an argument that in an asymmetric 
relationship the stronger cannot always impose its will on the weaker in an East Asian context, see Womack 2006. 
For a constructivist discussion on this point, see Finnemore 2009.
52 Lebow 2008. On status competition from a realist perspective, see Wohlforth 2009.
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Korea, Japan, and Vietnam, also had conceptions of their own distinct identities. 
These conceptions provided strong motivational sources for their external behavior. 
For example, why China tried to establish tributary relations with its neighbors 
would be inexplicable without reference to its identity. The motive for identity needs 
complements the security assumption just discussed. Both are necessary for building 
a theory of Chinese primacy.
SINOCENTRISM AS A POSSIBLE NORMATIVE STRUCTURE 
To simplify, the literature on the tribute system holds that the rulers of imperial China 
thought of Zhongguo (4 1 S  China, literally “the central state”) as the center of the 
known world and superior to other polities both materially and culturally. They were 
entitled to tribute-paying from the rulers of other states, while the latter were 
required to perform their duties as China’s tributary or vassal states. This is of course 
a generalization. In practice the Chinese did not always think this way, especially 
when dealing with powerful foreign rivals. Some historians, however, tend to reify 
this belief and argue that in a system of profound Han cultural influence, this 
sinocentrism is the key to understanding traditional China’s foreign relations and the 
“international politics” of historical East Asia. More importantly, they imply that 
China’s neighbors, especially Korea, internalized sinocentrism and tended to follow 
China’s rules. These include, most importantly, acknowledging its superiority and 
centrality by paying proper tribute to the Chinese court in the form of local products. 
The Chinese looked upon the tribute “as an expression of acknowledgement on the 
part of these peoples of the right of “universal domain” of the Chinese Emperor. The 
tribute was to serve as a symbol of Chinese ultimate proprietorship and sovereignty 
and as a reminder to the border peoples of their position as lessees and subjects.”53
It is frequently asserted that sinocentrism was not only China’s private belief but was 
also to some degree held by other states and thus produced a hierarchic “Chinese 
world order” in East Asia.54 Whether this claim is true or not is ultimately an
53 Lin 1937, 882.
54 Fairbank 1968b.
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empirical question. A lot of ideological myth-making may be involved in the Chinese 
assumption of superiority. Whether other states followed China’s rule and why they 
did so also have to be determined empirically. But sinocentrism provides an 
interesting way to think about the role of identity and culture in historical East Asian 
politics. It is particularly relevant under conditions of Chinese primacy. Its utility lies 
in helping one conceive of the normative structure as well as evaluate the empirical 
claim of a sinocentric, hierarchic East Asian order itself. If sinocentrism is an 
important structure, it ought to explain state behavior in ways that a theory specifies. 
If empirical studies show that these effects are missing, then one can question the 
role of sinocentrism as a normative force and the claim of a China-centered 
hierarchic East Asian order more broadly.
SINOCENTRISM AND CHINA’S POLITICAL DOMINATION 
Sinocentrism leads to a sinocentric identity on the part of the rulers and elites of the 
Chinese empire—the understanding of Zhongguo as the center of the world 
surrounded by the “four foreigners” (si yi 3§),55 and as the universal empire and 
the superior polity that deserves the submission as its vassals from other states. The 
interests of Chinese rulers lie, therefore, not only in meeting the basic material needs 
of security and welfare, but also in satisfying China’s identity needs as the only 
central, superior, and sovereign entity in the surrounding world. “Sovereign” here 
means that China has the right to determine other states’ policies toward it. Chinese 
rulers will then try to install other states as tribute-paying vassals and make them 
acknowledge Chinese superiority in foreign affairs. This can be seen as a mode of 
domination through China’s political control of other states’ policies toward it,56 to 
be distinguished from the kind of military domination that prevents others from 
achieving threatening advances in relative material power.57 Political domination
55 “Si Y r  has usually been translated into “four barbarians.” But, as Liu (2004) points out, such a translation 
automatically builds in the sinocentric assumption. The Chinese might have simply used yi to mean “foreigners” 
with no pejorative meaning. Translating y i into “foreigners” rather than “barbarians” allows more room for 
different interpretations of the historical meaning of the term and is thus more useful analytically. Hevia likewise 
renders y i  into “the foreign peoples.” See Hevia 1995, 120-21.
56 The historian Gan Huaizhen also thinks that these are relationships of domination and that this domination is 
above all symbolized by a set of rituals China asked foreigners to perform. Yet behind these ceremonies can also 
lie more substantive issues and specific requests that China would expect its tributaries to follow. Gan 2003, 
490-505.
57 Domination in both senses used here is broadly consistent with Max Weber’s notion that “Domination
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will guarantee military domination, because a loyal vassal by definition will not seek 
to challenge its overlord. It should therefore be the highest end of China’s foreign 
policy. But if that is unachievable, we should expect Chinese rulers to try military 
domination when security interests are at stake.
Why, one should further ask, would Chinese rulers want to realize their identity 
through political domination by establishing tributary relations with other states? To 
say that such a realization is in their interests does not tell us much; we need to know 
why this constitutes their interests in the first place. One hypothesis is that the desire 
to do so is rooted in domestic legitimacy. If sinocentrism is entrenched deep enough 
and becomes a political ideology of some sort, we can expect Chinese rulers to 
invoke it as the tradition of China’s role in the world. This would compel them to 
realize a sinocentric world order in order to satisfy the ideological requirement of 
governing China. Its attainment would therefore partly constitute the Mandate of 
Heaven (tianming ^o fr)58—the legitimacy basis of imperial rule.59 If the rulers 
want to claim the Mandate of Heaven in governing China, they must be able to 
demonstrate, among other things, that they are indeed the Son of Heaven (tianzi 
? )  and the “ruler of all-under-heaven” (tianxia zhu or make it seem so. As
rulers of the dominant power in historical East Asia, the external interests of Chinese 
elites are more likely to be constructed by their own historical experiences and 
political discourses than by interactions with other states. Early Ming emperors’ 
desire to initiate tributary relations with its neighbors, for example, was exactly 
informed by their own conception of the “traditions”—receiving tribute missions 
among the most important—in China’s foreign relations.
THE STRATEGY OF PERSUASION
In international politics, persuasion can be understood as “the process by which agent 
action becomes social structure, ideas become norms, and the subjective becomes the
(Herrschaft) is the probability that a command with a given specific content will be obeyed by a given group of 
persons.” Weber 1978, 53.
58 On the Mandate of Heaven, see Loewe 1981.
59 The doctrine of the Mandate of Heaven, together with the ideal o f benevolent rule, provided the basis o f 
legitimation in imperial China. See Chan 1984, 24.
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intersubjective.”60 Because Chinese rulers would want to promote the sinocentric 
norm and convince other states of their centrality and superiority, we need to add 
another salient Chinese strategy of domination: persuasion. Persuasion is a means for 
changing others’ attitudes in the absence of overt coercion. China may try to 
persuade other states to accept its superiority, embrace the sinocentric norm, and 
serve as its vassals through a normative discourse of cultural and ideological 
attraction. In other words, Chinese rulers may try to construct the identity of other 
states as their vassals by promulgating the discourse of Chinese superiority. 
Persuasion is the primary strategy by which China can transform sinocentrism from 
private meaning held by its elites into shared knowledge in the system.
In all, then, in seeking domination, China can employ four principal strategies: war, 
blackmail, inducement, and persuasion. Indeed, the manipulation of material 
incentives (war, blackmail, inducement) and the socialization of leaders in secondary 
states (persuasion) are two basic ways in which a dominant power can exercise 
control over other states.61 Moreover, these four strategies can all find their 
expressions in traditional Chinese strategic thinking: war corresponds with fa  ( tt) ,  
blackmail with wei (&), inducement with li (^ll), and persuasion with wen (JC) or de 
(ffi). Because persuasion can bring the highest benefits to China (political 
domination) with the lowest costs, it should be the preferred strategy of domination 
for Chinese rulers. Yet persuasion may fail to produce its intended outcome. 
Inducement and coercion will then have to be used. Only persuasion, however, is a 
means of constructing other states’ identities and interests for the purpose of political 
domination. Inducement may facilitate persuasion through the promise of benefits, 
but by itself it cannot affect other states’ identities and interests.
THE POSSIBILITY OF SUBMISSION
One must now ask how secondary states will respond to Chinese persuasion and 
political domination. The question is essentially one of how independent their
60 Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 914. Also see the discussion in Johnston 2008, 25-6 and 155-60.
61 Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990, 285.
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identities are from sinocentrism. If Chinese persuasion can overcome the identity
difference between China and other states and convince them of Chinese superiority,
sinocentrism may be internalized by these states. Internalized ideas constitute actor 
* • * • _identities and interests. The behavioral implication of such internalization is that 
these states will take a sinocentric order for granted, and offer submission by serving 
as China’s tribute-paying vassal states voluntarily. They will then regard their 
identity as China’s vassals, and their external interests will lie in maintaining a 
sinocentric order.
The possibility of submission as a strategy on the part of secondary states depends on 
how deep their “social learning” about China’s superiority has gone and the effect of 
such learning. Other states may learn while interacting with China that it is indeed 
the only central, superior, and sovereign polity in the surrounding world. To the 
extent that they internalize this sinocentric idea, submitting to China and following 
China’s rules become normatively taken for granted. This is when the sinocentric 
structure becomes substantiated. Learning can be either self-motivated or out of 
persuasion. Together persuasion by China and learning by secondary states create a 
process of socialization that may eventually change these states’ identity and 
interests.64
What determines the effect of Chinese persuasion and the extent to which other states 
learn the new sinocentric identity? Although a number of factors may intervene in the 
socialization process, two are the most important. First, as already mentioned, 
socialization needs to overcome conflicts between the identity politics that exists 
within China and inside other polities. That is, its success depends in part on these 
states’ prior identification. In the initial stages of interaction they will resist learning 
the sinocentric identity if it conflicts with their pre-existing identities. For ruling 
elites (and by implication, their states) with deep-seated conceptions of independent 
identities and hence strong concerns for autonomy, learning sinocentrism will be
62 Wendt 1999, 259.
63 On “social learning,” see Wendt 1999, 326-35.
64 On the roles of social learning and persuasion in compliance, see Checkel 2001.
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difficult because of its political implications. Second, persuasion is a soft and 
delicate strategy that requires patience, skill, and forbearance. Its effectiveness can be 
easily ruined by the heavy-handedness of its user. As a non-coercive strategy, 
inducement can facilitate persuasion and trigger the socialization process,65 though 
by itself inducement is insufficient for socialization to succeed. Coercion (war and 
blackmail), however, works against socialization because it can quickly change other 
states’ perceptions of China and undermine the claim that a sinocentric order is in 
their best interests.
SOCIALIZATION, ANARCHY, AND HIERARCHY
Successful socialization can lead to the internalization of sinocentrism by secondary 
states and their submission to China. Because internalization means that they accept 
a sinocentric order as legitimate, China will have authority over them and the 
relationship between them will cease to be anarchic. A hierarchic order with China at 
the center can be said to have been established. Hierarchy is then the possible result 
of China’s desire to realize its identity in foreign relations. If the key problem in 
international politics is states’ uncertainty regarding one another’s intention, then the 
internalization of sinocentrism and the establishment of a China-centered hierarchy 
will effectively eliminate this problem.
In international politics, hierarchy can be defined in terms of political authority. Lake 
posits that “A political relationship is anarchic if the units—in this case, 
states—possess no authority over one another. It is hierarchic when one unit, the 
dominant state, possesses authority over a second, subordinate state.”66 Authority, in 
turn, is the condition in which power is married to legitimacy. Blau writes that “We 
speak of authority...if the willing unconditional compliance of a group of people 
rests upon their shared beliefs that it is legitimate for the superior (person or
65 Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990, 284.
66 Lake 2007, 50. Although this definition follows Lake, I differ from him in conceptualizing authority. Lake’s 
idea o f authority is based on contractual theories of the state which see authority as resting on a social bargain; I 
emphasize more perceived legitimacy as a defining criterion of authority. Lake’s social-contract based definition 
of hierarchy has been criticized for being “overly narrow”; see MacDonald and Lake 2008, 171. For recent 
discussions on Hierarchy in international politics, see also Hobson and Sharman 2005; Keene 2007; Wendt and 
Friedheim 1995; Donnelly 2006; and Hurd 1999 and 2007.
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impersonal agency) to impose his will upon them and that it is illegitimate for them 
to refuse obedience.”67 In the context of domestic politics, governments that are 
legitimate “have the ‘right to rule’, to demand obedience from their citizens or 
subjects.”68 Political legitimacy can be defined “as the quality of ‘oughtness’ that is 
perceived by the public to inhere in a political regime.”69 Interstate hierarchy is then 
a relationship in which one state’s rule over another state is accepted as legitimate by 
the latter state.70
Persuasion is the only strategy through which China may shape other states’ 
identities and interests according to the sinocentric norm and thus establish authority 
or hierarchy over them. When Chinese authority is established, other states will 
accept a sinocentric order and their places within it not because of Chinese coercion 
or their self-interest, but because they see them as legitimate. If this happens, China 
will have the right to control their policies towards it, and they, in turn, will have an 
obligation (the quality of “oughtness”) to obey China’s rules and pay proper tribute 
to the Chinese court. Chinese authority, therefore, arises through the instantiation of 
the sinocentric normative structure—a shared belief that a sinocentric order is in the 
collective interests of both China and other states.
This argument has important implications for empirical research. To claim that 
historical East Asia is a China-centered hierarchy, one must be able to find evidence 
that other states followed China’s rules as their obligation—out of a sense of 
“oughtness” by virtue of their perception of the legitimacy of these rules. This is 
what I have defined as their submission to China—willingly paying tributes to the 
Chinese court, serving as its loyal vassals, and following China’s rules voluntarily 
without calculation of their self-interest. Chinese authority is indicated not by 
secondary states’ behavioral compliance per se, since compliance may arise out of
67 Blau 1963, 307.
68 Flathman 1995, 527. David Beetham writes that “Where power is acquired and exercised according to 
justifiable rules, and with evidence of consent, we call it rightful or legitimate.” See Beetham 1991, 3.
69 Merelman 1966, 548.
70 Put slightly differently, hierarchy “is a relationship between two (or more) actors whereby one is entitled to 
command and the other is obligated to obey, and this relationship is recognized as right and legitimate by each.” 
Hobson and Sharman 2005, 69-70.
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China’s coercion or these states’ self-interest. Instead, it must emerge from other
• •  • 71states’ perception of the legitimacy in China’s rule.
The historical East Asian system is anarchic if China did not possess authority over 
other states; it is hierarchic if it did. This seems to put the logic of international 
politics into a sharp dichotomy between anarchy and hierarchy. Indeed this has been 
the customary understanding among many theorists. Yet, anarchy, as Wohlforth 
points out, “is a variable, not a constant”; it has to be understood “as a matter of 
degree.”72 Pure anarchy or hierarchy is an ideal type. In practice, the organizing 
principle of international politics is a mixture of them.73 In a system like historical 
East Asia under Chinese primacy, it is possible that anarchy was attenuated, that 
China as the preeminent power was able to enforce agreements among its neighbors 
to some degree, and that secondary states were willing to accept Chinese authority in 
some areas but not others.
THE CO-CONSTITUTION OF AGENCY AND STRUCTURE 
We can now see more clearly the process of the mutual Constitution of structure and 
agency in historical East Asian politics under Chinese primacy. If, through 
socialization—persuasion on the part of China and social learning on the part of 
other states—other states internalize sinocentrism, then it becomes the shared idea in 
the system. A sinocentric normative structure is therefore instantiated as a result of 
these practices between China and other states.74 These states will submit to China 
as its vassals, creating hierarchic relationships between them. Hierarchy as the deep 
structural level takes causal priority over the “surface-level” structure of the 
distribution of power.75 Because this is so, China’s preponderant power will no 
longer be seen as threatening by secondary states, nor will the increases in their
71 See Hurd 1999; and Wendt 1999, 268-73.
72 Wohlforth 2008, 45. See also Lake 2007.
73 Thus, it is argued that “anarchy and hierarchy have always coexisted.” Hobson and Sharman 2005,92.
74 The co-constitution of agency and structure occurs in and through practice. Adler 2005, 12.
75 As Ruggie points out, Waltz conceives of three (or, internationally, two) components o f structure to be thought 
of as existing at successive causal depth levels: ordering principles, differentiation, and distribution of capabilities. 
Ordering principles constitute the “deep” structure of a system. The impact o f the distribution of capabilities, the 
“surface level” structure, magnifies or modifies the opportunities and constraints generated by the deep level of 
ordering principles. Ruggie 1998, 141, 152. See also Buzan, Jones, and Little 1993, 37-46.
power be seen as threatening in the eyes of Chinese rulers. It will no longer be 
necessary for China to apply the strategies of war, blackmail, or inducement, because 
once authority is established, Chinese domination will be guaranteed. This is the 
hierarchic end of historical East Asian politics under Chinese primacy.
A hierarchic structure with Chinese authority will be highly stable, though not easily 
achievable. A clear set of rights and obligations between China and its vassal states 
will be observed because of their perceived legitimacy and appropriateness. Neither 
coercion on the part of China nor self-interested strategies on the part of other states 
will be necessary, because a Chinese hierarchy will be one in which all participating 
states develop collective identities and common interests among themselves. 
Specifically, all of them will find a proper place in the sinocentric order and take as 
their obligations to protect this order. Chinese persuasion will be met by other states’ 
submission in a process of stable interaction. These are the logics of a Chinese 
hierarchy.
If, however, secondary states have distinctively independent identities and strong 
concerns for autonomy, sinocentrism may well be successfully resisted. Under such 
circumstances it is useful to assume that these states will act according to their 
self-interest to ensure security. States are predisposed to define their objective 
interests in self-interested terms, as constructivists acknowledge and social identity 
theory shows.76 The structure will then primarily be a material one defined by the 
unipolar distribution of power and will be anarchic because no one state can have 
authority over others. Chinese rulers will likely employ war, blackmail, or 
inducement against other states to achieve domination since persuasion has proved 
ineffective. Because persuasion does not work, other states will not internalize 
sinocentrism unless they learn about its attractiveness and legitimacy by themselves. 
When internalization does not occur, the sinocentric structure fails to be instantiated, 
and other states will try a variety of strategies from bandwagoning to challenging to 
deal with Chinese power. Anarchy between them is thus reproduced. This is the
76 Wendt 1999; and Mercer 1995.
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anarchic end of historical East Asian politics under Chinese primacy.
SUMMARY
The theoretical principles explaining the dynamics of Chinese primacy in historical 
East Asia can now be stated. The central behavioral tendency in the system is one 
between Chinese domination and other states’ accommodation and resistance. 
Domination includes two salient dimensions: political and military. Politically, 
Chinese rulers will try to maintain a normative sinocentric order; militarily, they will 
try to maintain China’s relative power position. They will employ the strategies of 
war, blackmail, inducement, and persuasion to seek such domination. Other states 
will accommodate China by either submission or bandwagoning. Submission takes 
place when they internalize sinocentrism as a result of socialization in their 
interactions with China. By submission they regard it legitimate for them to be 
China’s vassal states and maintain the sovereign-vassal relationship in a sinocentric 
order. Bandwagoning takes place when they reject the sinocentric idea and instead 
try to exploit their relationships with China for security and power. They will resist 
Chinese demands through the strategies of balking, defying, balancing, challenging, 
and isolation, however, when their interests fundamentally conflict with those of 
China.
The theory shows patterns of interaction as well as the motivations behind state 
strategies. From its logic we see more clearly the nature of the system that forms 
when China and other countries establish tributary relations. Chinese motivation 
behind tributary relations can be legitimacy and/or security. Recruiting tributaries can 
enhance rulers’ legitimacy, and in some cases might also help solve China’s security 
problems with these countries. This applies, for example, to early Ming China’s 
relations with Korea. Other states’ motivation in accepting tributary arrangements 
may be their internalization of sinocentrism embodied in the strategy of submission 
or the concern for security, profit, and power embodied in the strategy of 
bandwagoning. Yet, even while accepting formal tributary relations, these countries 
may still balk at or defy China’s requests. China, while granting them tributary status,
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can also persuade, induce, or even blackmail them to comply with more of its wishes. 
This gives a more sophisticated picture of what' may be actually involved in the 
tribute system, conceived of as a “system” of tributary relations between China and 
its neighbors.
Yet the theory’s logic also shows that much more is going on in the relations between 
China and its neighbors than the tribute system so conceived. Many of the strategies 
identified above are employed when no tributary relations are established. Although 
tributary relations seem distinctive in East Asian history, non-tributary relations may 
be equally impressive and should not be slighted in our overemphasis on the tribute 
system. The range and diversity of these strategies deconstruct the tribute system 
while giving a fuller and more sophisticated picture of historical East Asian politics.
Hypotheses
The above explanation is presented as an alternative to models organized around the 
central concept of the “tribute system” in explaining historical East Asian politics 
under the condition of Chinese primacy. Five hypotheses about state behavior can 
now be generated. Testing these hypotheses is' the best way to see whether things 
work in the way the theory suggests.
Hypothesis 1. Political domination occurs as a result of Chinese rulers’ perception of 
their identity as the overlord of the surrounding world and their perception that such 
domination will enhance their domestic political legitimacy.
Hypothesis 2. Military domination occurs as a result of the failure of political 
domination and Chinese rules’ recognition of their superior power and their 
perception of the need for security by conquest or preventive war.
Hypothesis 3. Submission to China on the part of secondary states’ rulers occurs as a 
result of their internalization of sinocentrism through the socialization process
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triggered by Chinese persuasion and these rulers’ social learning.
Hypothesis 4. Secondary states’ bandwagoning toward China occurs as a result of 
their rulers’ recognition of their inferior power and their motivation for buying 
security, gaining profit, and increasing power by exploiting their cooperative 
relationships with China.
Hypothesis 5. Secondary states’ resistance against China occurs as a result of their 
rulers’ perception that their core interests such as security and autonomy are 
undermined by Chinese demands and actions.
Testing these hypotheses will also enable us to say whether the historical East Asian 
system is more anarchic or hierarchic. Following the conceptual discussions above, it 
is clear that only when secondary states submit to China and follow China’s rules out 
of a sense of perceived legitimacy does the system become hierarchic. Their 
bandwagoning and resistance indicate the anarchic nature of the system. In practice, 
however, it may be difficult to ascertain whether the relationships between China and 
other states are characterized by either hierarchy or anarchy. Hierarchy is a matter of 
degree or extent; so necessarily is anarchy. It is entirely possible that secondary states 
will willingly accept some of the rules laid down by China while rejecting others, 
and choose between the strategies of submission and bandwagoning. To say with 
some confidence whether historical East Asian politics is more anarchic or hierarchic, 
one must carefully examine the motivations behind secondary states’ strategies 
toward China. When they comply with China, it is particularly important to assess 
whether the compliance is a result of their perception of the legitimacy of China’s 
rule, their self-interest, China’s coercion, or some combination of these elements.
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Chapter 3 
Early Ming China and Korea
Historical Sino-Korean relations have generally been understood as a relationship of 
remarkable amity and harmony.1 Korea’s alleged submissiveness to China is 
reflected in the label “model tributary.” Chinese historical documents, such as the Da 
Ming Hui Dian (Collected Statutes of the Ming Dynasty), extolled Korea for being 
the most reverent and careful among Ming China’s tributaries.2 Contemporary 
international relations scholars often regard Sino-Korean relations as a classic 
example of hierarchy in international politics. In this chapter, I evaluate these claims 
while testing the theory developed in the preceding chapter by examining 
Sino-Korean relations during the early Ming dynasty. Since it has been customary to 
approach this relationship from the standpoint of China, I shall redress the 
imbalance by placing equal weight on both the Chinese and Korean sides of the 
story.
Chinese and Korean policies and strategies toward each other are examined in the 
first two sections. The third section puts the historical evidence in analytical 
perspectives. The evidence shows that early Ming emperors tried to control Korea’s 
policy toward the Ming in general and its security policy in Manchuria in particular, 
while in most cases Korean rulers tried to accommodate Chinese power by 
bandwagoning with the Ming for buying security, gaining profit, and increasing 
power. At times they also resisted Chinese wishes when these were seen to 
undermine their core interests.
That bandwagoning rather than submission should be seen as the primary Korean
1 It is said that “Embracing the sinocentric view of the world wholeheartedly, the Koreans historically regarded 
their country’s close ties with China as a mark of distinction and remained loyal and submissive to the Middle 
Kingdom. Many Chinese rulers considered the peninsular state as their model tributary and traditionally accorded 
it the foremost place within their empire.” Kim 1980, 3.
2 It praised Korea for the fact that: (1) Chos6n kings requested investiture regularly; (2) Korean envoys observed 
proper decorum and ritual; and (3) Korea’s tribute was paid promptly. See Walker 1971,269.
Bruce Cumings said that “non-Koreans have had trouble taking Koreans seriously, in understanding Koreans as 
actors in history.” Cumings 2005, 20.
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strategy of accommodation also indicates the more anarchic nature of Sino-Korean 
relations during this time. Compared with other countries, Choson Korea (1392-1910) 
was indeed as close to a model tributary state as China ever found. But the label 
“model tributary” can obscure the real nature of Sino-Korean relations, particularly 
as it was during and before the early Ming period. At times the Koreans may have 
felt it appropriate for them to follow China, yet at other times their accommodation 
was motivated by very pragmatic considerations of power realities.4 At least in the 
early Ming, Korean loyalty and submission seemed more fiction than reality.
Chinese Attempts at Domination
THE HONGWU REIGN: INITIATING TRIBUTARY RELATIONS 
In January 1369, the Hongwu emperor (r. 1368-1398) dispatched an envoy to Korea 
to proclaim the founding of his regime. In the rescript the emperor laid claim to 
authority over all former Yuan (1279-1368) territories and tributaries. The Yuan had 
lost Heaven’s legitimation to rule Zhongguo, while he had succeeded in restoring 
government in accordance with Heaven’s Will:
In the first month of this year, having recovered the former territories of 
Zhongguo, We ascended the imperial throne at the head of Our subjects, 
calling Our dynasty the Great Ming and taking “Hongwu” as Our reign name.
Not yet having let this be known to the Four Foreigners (Si Yi) We have 
prepared this letter and sent it across the sea to Korea for the King’s 
information. Throughout history the emperor has been associated with your 
king and ministers by reason of our adjoining territory; and generally your 
king has submitted (chen) to the emperor due to their admiration of Chinese 
custom. Heaven has taken note of this and you have been blessed with long 
[years] on the throne. [Now] however much We may fail to come up to the 
virtue of the sage kings of antiquity so long revered by the Four Foreigners, 
we cannot fail to make [the founding of the Ming] known throughout the
4 Larson 2008, 32.
67
world (tianxia).5
The central message of this rescript is twofold. First, it emphasizes the transfer of the 
Mandate of Heaven, the basis of imperial legitimacy, from the Yuan to the Ming. 
Second, it points out the historical precedent in Sino-Korean relations and implies 
that Korea should continue the “tradition” of tributary submission to the Chinese 
emperor.
Clearly, Hongwu wanted to obtain the same submission from Korea as his imperial 
predecessors had been able to do in the past. This is important because he must 
substantiate the claim that he had now inherited the Mandate of Heaven to rule 
Zhongguo. The best evidence in the external realm was foreign states’ submission, 
since, according to him, previous dynasties with Heaven’s Mandate to rule had all 
obtained this submission. Submission from foreign regimes would supposedly 
demonstrate his superiority and authority in the tianxia, and confirm that he was 
indeed the Son of Heaven. Ming investiture of foreign rulers would also show that 
they were the Ming’s vassals and thus part of the Chinese imperial order. At a time 
when the Ming was still trying to consolidate its imperial gains and when a large 
swath of territory (including Sichuan, Yunnan, and Liaodong) had yet to be 
conquered, the legitimacy perceived from foreign submission would be particularly 
useful.
Indeed, as Huang Zhilian points out, the most urgent task facing Hongwu at this 
point was how to build up legitimacy for his new rule, having just seized power by 
force from the Yuan.6 Having his regime widely acknowledged and supported 
internally as well as externally thus became the paramount task. Domestically, he had 
initiated a series of moves to identify himself with the tradition of legitimate 
Confucian political authority by cultivating the symbols—ceremony, language, and 
dress—of Confucian rule and by suppressing the remnants of the heterodox origins
5 The English translation is adapted from Clark 1978, 36-37. The original text can be found in MSLCXZLJL, 3 s 
MS, 6669; and CXLCSL, 13-14.
6 Huang 1994, 185.
68
of the Ming regime.7 Externally, he wanted from foreign rulers the symbolic 
acknowledgment of China’s cosmological centrality and the legitimacy of his
o
succession to the authority of the great dynasties of China.
Although legitimacy was the main concern behind the first mission,9 Hongwu’s later 
rescripts revealed an increasing concern with security in the northeast. The rescript 
for the second mission of September 1369, when the Koryo (918-1392) King 
Kongmin was invested as “King of Gaoli [Koryo],” was considerably more specific 
on Korea’s obligations to China. While renouncing any intention of governing Korea 
directly, Hongwu expected Korea to behave as a submissive tributary (fan Sr) and to 
help maintain security for the Ming’s eastern frontier.10
The emperor’s concern for security in the northeast was well founded. The Ming was
unable to annex the Liaodong region until 1387 when it finally pacified Naghachu,
the Mongol chieftain based in the area. Liaodong, therefore, would be a security
problem for the Ming for nearly two decades after the fall of the Yuan. Korea’s
geographical location, meanwhile, means that it always had vital security interests in
the region, and had indeed historically played an important role there.11 Korea could
damage Ming’s security interest in the region either by directly challenging Ming
power in Manchuria or allying with the Mongols or the Jurchens or both to balance
against it. After all, in the last days of the Yuan dynasty Naghachu attempted, albeit
unsuccessfully, to forge an anti-Ming alliance with the Koreans. Fear of such an
alliance was surely one motivation behind Hongwu’s first few missions toward 
12Korea. He seemed to have hoped that having Korea as a tributary would enable 
him to divide and conquer the other two threats in the northeast: the Mongols and the 
Jurchens.
7 Dreyer 1982, 66.
8 Wang 1991, 112. See also Wang 1998, 303.
9 Another task of the first mission was to persuade Korea to sever ties with Naghachu, the Mongol leader in 
Manchuria. DMB, 1083.
10 MSLCXZLJL, 4.
11 For a good discussion on Korea’s historical role in Manchuria, see Ledyard 1983.
12 Clark 1978, 46.
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TURNING TO HOSTILITY
Legitimacy as well as security motivated Hongwu’s policy toward Korea in 1369-71.
He tried to persuade the Koreans—by dispatching envoys, evoking historical
precedents, and bestowing Chinese gifts—to submit to his authority, thereby
establishing political domination over Korean policies toward the Ming. But the hope
was damaged by Koryo’s 1370-71 campaign into Liaodong. Now perceiving Korea
as a potential security threat and apparently having lost faith in persuading it to be a
loyal vassal, Hongwu began to extract Korean compliance by repeatedly
blackmailing the Koryo court. In 1373 he was angry at the poor quality of Korean
tribute horses—Korean horses were an important source of the horse supply for the
Ming army in their wars against the Mongols. In 1374 he reduced the frequency of
Korean missions to once every three years, perhaps as an attempt to gain Korean
11concession and cooperation in its northeast security.
The relationship worsened when King Kongmin was murdered in 1374 and Hongwu 
withheld the investiture of the new king U. Hearing the killing of Ming envoys while 
in Korea, the emperor jailed all the Korean envoys who came to Nanjing (the Ming 
capital) in 1375-77. After this point, the amount of Koryo’s tribute apparently fell 
short of expectation as he repeatedly increased demand for tribute. Yet he rejected 
Korea’s tribute five times in 1373-83 for alleged Korean dishonesty and arrogance. 
In 1383 he ordered the Ministry of Rites to reprehend the delay of tribute and the 
lack of humility on the part of Korean envoys, requesting that future tribute would 
only be accepted with full payment of all the tribute due in the past five years.14 
Hongwu also rejected Koryo’s request for a posthumous title for King Kongmin in 
1377. Because the request came three years after the murder, Hongwu suspected that 
the new Koryo court was trying to use him for domestic political purposes.15 When 
in the winter of 1377 another Korean delegation came to congratulate the New Year, 
the emperor explicitly questioned the legitimacy of King U. He even threatened war
13 Langlois 1988,166.
14 MS, 6670-71.
15 MSLCXZLJL, 18.
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should the Koryo court fail to clarify the matter.16
By 1380, Hongwu had become so suspicious that he “was incapable of seeing Korea 
as anything but a wayward border state which had to be intimidated in an effort to 
head off trouble.”17 Korea was now regarded as a real security threat in the northeast. 
Moreover, Hongwu said that Korea had historically been a trouble for Chinese 
dynasties. Korean rulers had not been grateful to “Chinese benevolence” ever since 
the Han. Ming generals in Liaodong were ordered to reject Korean tribute after 
1380.18 It was only in 1385 after seeing Korean “sincerity” that the emperor finally 
accepted Koryo’s tribute, invested King U, and granted the murdered King Kongmin 
his posthumous title.19 He relented in 1385 partly because he had seen the high price 
the Koryo had paid to regain full tributary status and partly because he saw less a 
danger of a Korean-Mongol alliance as the Koryo had been barring incoming 
Mongol envoys at the border. Moreover, he needed Korean neutrality in his 
upcoming campaign against Naghachu.
Yet Ming-Koryo relations were to have its worst crisis in 1387-88. After pacifying 
Naghachu in 1387, the Ming laid territorial claims to areas north, east, and west of 
Tieling. Hongwu claimed that these areas, previously part of the Mongol Kaiyuan 
district, now belonged to the Ming and began to incorporate it into its Liaodong 
• garrison network.21 Whether he also claimed territories south of the Yalu River is not 
clear, and historians disagree on the exact location of Tieling in 1388.22 The main 
purpose of incorporating the Tieling areas seemed to pacify the Jurchens and the 
Mongols rather than to drive back the Koreans.23 The latter nevertheless interpreted 
the claim as Chinese demand for the northern third of their peninsular and challenged 
it accordingly.24 Hongwu responded by warning that Korea should accept the Yalu
]6 MS, 6671.
17 Clark 1978, 163.
18 MS, 6671. See also Huang 1994, 234-8.
19 MS, 6670-72.
20 Clark 1978, 82.
21 MS, 6672; and MSLCXZLJL, 24.
22 See Clark 1978,91.
23 Huang 1994, 244.
24 Clark 1978,91.
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River as its border and stop molesting the Chinese frontier, indicating that he 
actually did not want territories south of the Yalu. Yet the Koryo court still seemed to 
have misunderstood this as an attempt to define its northern boarder and decided to 
send an army into Liaodong. The abortive campaign proved so disastrous that it 
eventually led to the Koryo’s downfall by bringing about General Yi Song-gye’s 
coup d’ etat in 13 8 8,26
When Yi Song-gye formally ascended the throne (King T’aejo of the Choson or Yi 
Dynasty, r. 1392-98) in 1392 and sent his envoys to Nanjing, Hongwu’s first concern
» • • * 77was still security in the Ming-Korea frontier. His withholding of Yi’s investiture 
was perhaps an attempt to extract Korea’s promise of Ming’s security in the northeast. 
In 1393 he accused the Koreans of spying in the Zhejiang coast, bribing Ming 
military officers in Liaodong, enticing Jurchen households back over the Yalu into 
Korea to join an attack on China, continuing to present tribute of poor quality, and 
failing to offer prompt thanks for his magnanimity in bestowing a new name (Choson)
• o o  7Qon their kingdom. He was, in effect, requesting proof of total fealty from Korea. 
This was most likely because of his concern about a potential Korean-Jurchen 
alliance. Ming officials were convinced that Yi Song-gye was inviting Jurchen 
settlers to populate the Korean-controlled borderlands and that the settlers were using
• • • • 7ftKorean temtory as a staging area for raids mto China. Hongwu repeatedly asked 
Korea to establish a fixed border with walls and fortifications, not only because he 
wanted to keep the Koreans from threatening Ming emplacements but also because
7 1he wanted to reduce or eliminate Korean-Jurchen contacts.
0 7
Ming intelligence kept close track of Korean-Jurchen collaboration. In 1393 it was 
reported that Korea had enticed five hundred Jurchen households to settle in Korea’s
25 MS, 6672.
26 For the above chain of events, see also DMB, 1600-1.
27 MSLCXZLJL, 29-30; and MS, 6673.
28 These are not empty charges. The Veritable Records recorded the Korean piracy problem along the Chinese 
coast, activities of Korean spies in Liaodong, and Korean enticement of the Jurchens to attack China. See 
MSLCXZLJL, 31-32; and MS, 6673.
29 Clark 1978, 136.
30 Lee 1984, 277. See also Huang 1994,267-9.
31 Clark 1978, 134-5.
32 Lin 1935, 18.
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northern reaches in preparation for an attack on Liaodong.33 Hongwu froze relations 
with Korea and ordered military preparation.34 He agreed to restore relations after a 
successful Korean embassy to Nanjing in 1394, but was soon irritated again—the last 
time before his death in 1398—by the Koreans’ improper use of language in their 
petitions.
SUMMARY
Hongwu’s policies toward Korea show his desire for domination over Korean policy 
in Manchuria. Initially stimulated by the need for legitimacy, he had grown 
increasingly obsessed with Korea as a trouble-maker in the northeast security order. 
Security became the overriding concern because he saw the danger of the Koreans, 
the Mongols, and the Jurchens colluding together and was therefore determined to 
divide and rule them. He tried, impatiently, the strategy of persuasion to socialize 
Korea into a loyal vassal state before 1371. As this failed, he resorted to blackmail in 
the hope of gaining Korean concessions by manipulating tributary politics. His 
obstruction of Korean tributary missions and withholding of investiture were two 
notable examples of this strategy. He was, however, never completely satisfied with 
the Koreans throughout his reign. His mistrust of them ran deep, and he was always 
able to find fault in Korea’s tributary missions once Korea was implicated in the 
northeast security order or when its domestic politics became erratic.
Why did Hongwu not try to conquer Korea and eliminate the Korean problem once 
and for all, as the Han, Sui, and Tang dynasties had tried to do? He declared several 
times that he had no intention of governing Korea directly, but the military option 
was not entirely off the table. He indeed threatened war a few times and with 
increasing intensity when the Jurchen problem became more acute after Yi Song-gye 
ascended the Choson throne. Thus military domination was an option, though it 
was not tried. One reason is surely that the empire’s resources were already spent in 
wars against the Mongols, pacifications over domestic rebellions, and coastal defense
33 MS, 6673; and Clark 1978, 135.
34 Clark 1978, 138.
35 See Huang 1994, 269-70.
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against Japanese pirates. Hongwu must also have in mind the historical lessons of the 
difficulties of projecting Chinese power into the Korean peninsular, as symbolized by 
the failures of Sui and Tang invasions. Perhaps he also thought of Korea as more of a 
security nuisance in the northeast rather than a threat for his empire’s survival: Given 
the vast power disparities between the two, the Ming need not be too concerned 
about Korea’s marginal increase in power. He must also have hoped that his 
blackmail and manipulation could achieve political domination over Korea—indeed 
he never gave up the goal of influencing Korean policy in the northeast. This proved 
illusory, but given the more urgent problems of dealing with the Mongols, Korea 
appeared a bearable irritant.
THE YONGLE REIGN: STABILIZATION AND RAPPROCHEMENT 
With the end of the Hongwu reign, a turning point appeared in Ming-Korea relations. 
Hongwu had frequently tried to pressure and, at times, intimidate the Koreans for 
security reasons. His successors took a much more favorable and relaxed view 
toward Korea. The strategy of persuasion rose to prominence and coercive means 
such as blackmail took a back seat. The Jianwen emperor (r. 1399-1402) invested the 
Korean King T’aejong in 1401 without much hesitation—the first investiture granted 
by the Ming to a Choson King. Jianwen praised Korea for being “a country of rites 
and righteousness” and further affirmed the Ming’s principle of non-intervention in 
Korea’s domestic affairs. He made it clear, however, that it was Korea’s duty to 
declare vassalage, present tributes, and follow the Ming calendar.
Jianwen’s conciliation can be explained by the precarious domestic political situation 
he was in. Because of the political crisis triggered by the rebellion of his uncle Zhu 
Di, the future Yongle emperor (r. 1403-1424), Jianwen needed external legitimation 
as well as military resources to shore up his regime. The Hongwu emperor needed 
legitimation only when the Ming dynasty was first established, and he sought that 
from Korean tributes among other means. With the consolidation of his position, 
Hongwu no longer valued foreign tributes as much he did in the early years of his
36 Ibid., 273-4.
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reign. By contrast, the Jianwen emperor ruled the Ming under constant agony in his 
short reign—above all he had to deal with the military challenge from Zhu Di. In 
such volatile situations he needed to show that he was still the legitimate Son of 
Heaven. From Korean tributes he sought both perceived legitimation for his regime 
and Korean horses for his army. In 1401, for example, he sent an embassy to Korea
• • T7with an imperial requisition for 10,000 horses.
The Yongle emperor sent an embassy to Korea and readily granted King T’aejong 
investiture in 1403 shortly after ascending the throne. Thus the Koreans obtained 
two Ming investitures in two years from two emperors—hardly what they could 
expect in their troubled relations with the Hongwu emperor. Yongle also treated 
Korea favorably, sending back Korean envoys detained in Nanjing during the 
Hongwu reign, bestowing lavish gifts, and even proposing intermarriage between the 
two dynastic houses.39
Yongle was surely pleased by King T’aejong’s prompt acknowledgment of his reign 
and the king’s previous refusal to sell horses to the Jianwen court.40 Because his rule 
was established through a violent struggle with a legitimate heir to the Ming throne, 
Yongle had to face some embarrassing moments in the early days of his reign. His 
paramount task was to build up the legitimacy of his rule, transforming himself from 
a usurper to the rightful heir. His investiture of the Korean king and enthusiastic 
reception of Korean missions were meant to be part of the process in achieving that 
effect. He was not as worried about the Korean threat in Liaodong as Hongwu once 
was, primarily because he waged a successful campaign of peaceful pacification of 
the Jurchens in Manchuria, displacing Korean influence along the way.41
Korean Accommodation and Resistance
37 Clark 1978, 160; and Huang 1994, 277.
38 MSLCXZLJL, 36.
39 Huang 1994, 280.
40 Ibid., 278.
41 Hongwu was unable to devote much energy and resource to Liaodong because he had been preoccupied with 
fighting the Mongols in the north beyond the modem Great Wall and in the northwest. He was thus naturally 
suspicious of events in the northeast.
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KORYO POLICIES: ACCOMMODATION BY BAND WAGONING 
In June 1369, one month after Ming envoys arrived in Korea, the Koryo court 
stopped using the reign title of the Yuan dynasty and sent a returning mission with 
congratulation of the new dynasty’s founding, tribute, and the request for investiture. 
In the petition to Hongwu, the Koryo court elaborately praised the greatness of the 
Ming and expressed its reverence.42 Between 1369 and 1371, it made every effort to 
placate the emperor with every possible symbolic gesture.43 It sent three tributary 
missions in 1369, five in 1370, and three in 1371.
Why did the Koryo agreed to the Ming request of a tributary relationship, having just 
suffered a century of humiliating Mongol rule? What was the nature of this response? 
Was it submission or bandwagoning? Korean historical sources indicate that a court 
meeting was called to discuss relations with the Ming,44 but do not elaborate on why 
the court decided to accommodate Ming requests. The accommodation was not a 
result of Ming coercion, since in this case the Ming, unlike the Yuan, did not use 
force. Two broad explanations are left: either the Koryo submitted to the Ming 
because the court perceived Ming authority or it bandwagoned with the Ming for the 
fear of the Ming threat and the desire to ensure its survival under changing strategic 
circumstances.
A careful analysis of the decision-making process and events around 1368 suggests 
that bandwagoning is a better characterization of Koryo’s strategy than submission. 
To begin with, the Koreans had already started to evaluate their relations with the 
Mongols in the last years of the Yuan dynasty. King Kongmin had decided to break 
the century of Mongol yoke even before the Ming was founded. While uncertain 
about the intention of the Ming, he could reason that accommodating it when 
Mongol power was in precipitous decline and when Ming power had yet to be 
projected into Manchuria represented a rare opportunity for Korea to reassert its
42 CXLCSL, 14.
43 Clark 1978,44.
44 CXLCSL, 13; and Clark 1978, 35.
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autonomy and even regain lost territories in the north. The temporary power vacuum 
in Manchuria could be taken advantage of.
Indeed, this was what Kongmin did. Although his position as Koryo’s king initially 
rested on Mongol support, he waged a decisive anti-Mongol campaign between 1352 
and 1365 to re-establish Korean autonomy.45 He terminated Mongol rule by 
abolishing the use of its reign-title in Korea, driving out Mongol officials, and 
executing pro-Mongol Koreans.46 Most significant of all, he dispatched a military 
force to re-occupy the northwestern part of Korea as far as the Yalu and ordered his 
generals to secure the Hamgyong region against further Mongol and Jurchen 
inroads.47
Kongmin’s anti-Mongol policy was also a result of the changing factional politics in 
the Kory6 court. At one end of the political spectrum was the old landowning 
aristocracy who had wielded real power in Korea through private links with the Yuan 
regime and upheld Buddhism as a political ideology. Often tied to the Mongols by 
blood or livelihood, they would prefer continued Mongol influence in Korea. At the 
other end was an emerging minority of Confucian officials who had become 
increasingly dissatisfied with the existing landowning system and the dominance of 
Buddhism in state affairs. The new Confucian elites were proto-nationalists and 
anti-Yuan, and after 1368, became pro-Ming. Influenced by this emerging Confucian 
group, Kongmin took as his mission to assert his authority and Koryo’s status as an 
independent kingdom.48 Koryo’s break with the Yuan, therefore, had little to do with 
their perception of the rising Ming but everything to do with maximizing their 
interests at a time of Yuan decline.
Accommodating the Ming was strategically imperative. Rejecting Ming request and 
continuing support for the Yuan would put Korea’s own survival in jeopardy, as the 
Ming would probably attack Korea if this was necessary for its conquest of the
45 Clark 1978, 22.
46 Walker 1971, 161.
47 Clark 1978, 26; and DMB, 1598-9.
48 Clark 1978, 19-20.
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Mongols. In any case, it would not make sense for Korea to support the collapsing 
Yuan from which it had decided to break away for years.
Accommodation could also enhance Korea’s security, though it could not solve all 
problems. For twenty years after its founding, the Ming was preoccupied with 
subduing the Mongols in its northern and northwestern frontiers, leaving breathing 
time for the Mongols led by Naghachu in the northeast to reorganize themselves. 
This posed a serious threat to Koryo security. Naghachu raided the Korean border in 
1362. Although he later offered tribute to the Koryo in 1369-70, the Koreans never 
trusted him. Early in 1368, upon the impending collapse of the Yuan, Naghachu sent 
a delegation to negotiate with King Kongmin for a joint defense agreement against 
the Ming. Part of the mission of the Ming envoy in 1369 was to persuade King 
Kongmin to sever ties with Naghachu.49 Fear of Naghachu was another reason why 
the king decided to accommodate the Ming.50 It would make sense to have some 
kind of Ming protection.
Even so, the Koryo could not entirely ignore the Mongol presence in Liaodong. For 
this reason, it tried to maintain contacts with Naghachu while conducting normal 
tributary relations with the Ming.51 Nor did it completely sever relations with the 
Northern Yuan court in exile. Even in 1369 after its first mission to the Ming was 
sent, King Kongmin still sent envoys to the Yuan. This clearly demonstrates that 
Koryo’s accommodation with the Ming, as well as its residual relations with the 
Mongols, was a result of its self-interest in maintaining security. Kongmin acted 
largely in response to the strategic imperatives of a changing environment in 
Manchuria.
Did the Koreans also feel legitimacy in Ming rule? The historical record does not
49 DMB, 1083.
50 Clark 1978,46.
51 Even in 1369 and 1370 when Kory6 sought to accommodate the Ming with all die tributary formalities, it 
maintained regular contacts with Naghachu. See CXLCSL, 13, 15.
52 Huang 1994, 207.
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give one much confidence in the legitimacy explanation.53 The only evidence 
favoring this explanation is KoryS’s calling itself the Ming’s “vassal” and the lavish 
praise of the Ming in formal petitions. Yet petitions to the Chinese emperor are a 
poor indicator of Korean decision makers’ real motives. Languages of such 
officialese as in these petitions were most likely the routine products of 
scholar-officials, not a true reflection of reality.54 Behavioral patterns are a better 
indicator as they enable one to assess alternative explanations. In any case, what the 
Koreans wrote cannot be squared with how they acted. Subsequent events further 
demonstrate Koryo’s bandwagoning with, rather than submission to, the Ming.
KOREAN MOTIVES BEHIND TRIBUTARY RELATIONS
The Koryo wanted not merely autonomy or security; it wanted power and prestige as 
well. By the end of 1369, the court had decided to take advantage of the temporary 
power vacuum in Liaodong caused by the northward withdrawal of the Mongols. 
Their 1370 campaign into Liaodong was a war of territorial expansion—to extend 
the borders of the KoryS into Manchuria to the limits formally held by Koguryo (37 
BC-AD 668) at the height of its power. And it was the Koreans’ long wish to recreate 
the great empire in the north.55
However, although the campaign seriously damaged its relations with the Ming, 
Korea continued to send regular tributary missions to Nanjing, far exceeding the 
frequency of once every three years stipulated by the Hongwu emperor. The 
Veritable Records o f  the Ming Dynasty relates that during the Hongwu reign Korea 
sent a total of 73 missions between 1369 and 1397, averaging 2.5 missions per year. 
Actual missions had surely exceeded that number since Chinese sources only 
recorded those missions that had actually reached the Ming court. Why were the 
Koreans still so enthusiastic about tributary missions even though they were not well
53 Walker argues that “Korea’s recognition of the Ming Empire in 1369 resulted from the weakness and 
indecision of the Kory6 court under King Kongmin, rather than from acceptance of any inherent legitimacy in 
Chinese imperial claims that Korean dependency was part of the natural political order in the world.” Walker 
1971, 168.
54 Huang 1994, 215. For a good discussion on the varied nature of foreign petitions to the Chinese court, see He 
2007b, 223-41.
55 Lee 1997, 76.
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received?
Belief in Ming’s authority does not explain because, first of all, if this was the case, 
the Koryo court would have followed Ming instructions. Moreover, if the Koreans 
really believed in the Ming’s legitimacy in deciding security affairs in Liaodong, it 
would have severed relations with Naghachu and helped the Ming pacify the region. 
The fact, however, is that the Koryo had kept relations with the Mongols while 
conducting tributary relations with the Ming ever since 1369. And after King 
Kongmin was assassinated in 1374 and the new king U ascended the throne, the 
Koryo explicitly adopted a “two-China policy” in the pursuit of an uneasy neutrality 
between Chinese and Mongol power centers in Manchuria. In the early months of 
King U’s reign, the court actually feared Ming intervention. The difficulty of gaining 
the Ming’s favor forced King U’s government to adopt a more conciliatory policy 
toward the Mongols in order to keep Korea secure. It even received investiture from 
the Northern Yuan and adopted its reign-title in 13 76,56 an act indicating a tilt away 
from the Ming once more, and suggesting that U needed external symbols of 
legitimacy rather badly to keep his house in order.
The primary reason for the King U government’s unwavering attempts to make good 
relations with the Ming was to obtain investiture from the Ming in order to boost the 
king’s domestic legitimacy.58 Because of the controversies surrounding King 
Kongmin’s murder and King U’s accession to the throne, the new government had a 
particularly weak political base and authority. As just mentioned, it tried to obtain the 
perceived legitimacy from the Mongols when the Ming’s offer was not forthcoming, 
but the political reality made it clear that the real source of its legitimacy lies with the 
Ming. Between 1379 and 1385 eighteen Korean embassies went to Nanjing in 
attempts to gain favor of the Hongwu emperor and facilitate trade and cultural 
interchanges with the Ming.
56 After a mission to Nanjing in 1378 which saw Ming attitudes softening, the Koryd dropped the Yuan calendar 
and adopted the Ming reign-title Hongwu once again.
57 Clark 1978,68-70.
58 It is worth pointing out that imperial sanction from China through investiture was an important factor in 
propping up Kory6’s weak kingship throughout its dynastic history. See Duncan 2000, 51.
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Why was Chinese investiture able to shore up the legitimacy of Korean regimes? 
Why did King U’s government want the Ming’s investiture even while it was 
adopting a “two-China policy”? That it was courting favor with both the Ming and 
the Mongols demonstrates that it did not believe in Ming authority over its foreign 
policy. And yet it greatly valued and tried hard to obtain Ming investiture. It clearly 
realized the decline of the Northern Yuan, yet it took the latter’s investiture as a 
substitute for that of the Ming, indicating that Yuan investiture was still regarded 
useful even though Mongol power was in rapid decline.
These apparent paradoxes cannot be explained unless one realizes that the historical 
East Asian system is a cultural as well as a material one. Chinese investiture could 
confer legitimacy on foreign regimes because political names and symbols of the 
Chinese style were seen as universal, not just Chinese, concepts in political processes. 
Such perception was fundamentally a result of the influence of Chinese culture. 
Because China was the only source of a highly developed set of political ideas and 
institutions in East Asia, especially before the tenth century, having Chinese 
acknowledgment would boost the legitimacy of foreign regimes. On the other hand, 
Chinese investiture of other regimes could at the same time support the truth claim of 
Chinese rulers as universal emperors and demonstrate their legitimacy to rule the 
tianxia as the Son of Heaven. As the historian Gan Huaizhen points out, investiture 
thus symbolizes a political relationship of ritual exchange.59
Because investiture is fundamentally a cultural phenomenon, the more states were 
influenced by Chinese culture, the more they would value Chinese investiture. 
Conversely, the more they developed their own identities and cultural awareness, the 
less they would appreciate the usefulness of Chinese investiture. Koreans valued 
Chinese investiture because they perceived their politics as embedded in a larger 
political development in East Asia defined by Chinese precepts. As Key-Hiuk Kim 
puts it, “Lacking the cosmic symbols and attributes that made the Chinese emperor
59 Gan 2003, 490-505.
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the Son of Heaven, the Korean ruler needed investiture from the former as the 
ultimate symbol of legitimacy. Although his power as ruler was neither derived from 
nor materially enhanced by the Chinese investiture, the lack of it could not but 
adversely affect his prestige in the eyes of his officials and subjects in a Confucian 
society such as Yi Korea.”60 This shows China’s profound cultural influence, and in 
this area China indeed possessed authority over Korea since the Koreans believed in 
the legitimacy as well as the usefulness of Chinese investiture. Thus, in terms of 
investiture (not necessarily in other areas), Sino-Korean relations can be regarded as 
hierarchic.
More generally, the Koreans had an important economic motive for tributary 
relations with the Ming. Envoys en route to and from Nanjing had opportunities to 
trade along the way and they carried with them trading goods in addition to tributary 
items. Both the Koryo envoys and the court profited as a result. This was revealed in 
a memorial the Imperial Secretariat wrote for the Hongwu emperor in 1370: “The 
Korean tribute envoys are bringing much private merchandise with them when they 
come. They should pay tax on these commodities. Moreover they are carrying back 
with them Chinese goods. We recommend that this stop.”61 Even more illustrative is 
a comment from the Korean historical source on a Korean envoy’s mission in 1386:
In this period, whenever envoys returned [from Ming], the people in power 
took bribes from them and promoted or demoted them in the bureaucracy 
according to the amount. Accordingly, in order to avoid [damage to their 
careers] the envoys were obliged to engage in private trade [along the way].
An Ik [the Korean envoy] lamented, with tears flowing, “As a young man I 
believed that ambassadors went on tribute missions to China for the good of 
the country; but now I know that the rulers send them in order to reap riches 
for themselves.”62
60 Kim 1980, 12.
61 Clark 1978, 55; and MSLCXZLJL, 9.
62 Cited in Clark 1978, 85.
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As Donald Clark put it, “the key to understanding the dogged determination of the 
Korean court to continue tributary travel surely lies in profit, at least for the courtiers 
at Kaegyong [Koryo’s capital] who received the imperial gifts and a good share of 
the proceeds from the envoys’ private trade along the way.” He further speculates 
that “embassies were so profitable to the decision-making ranks of officials in the 
Korean capital that even when the political—and sometimes personal—risks were 
very high the Korean court continued to prize the benefits of the trade and pressed on 
with it despite formidable obstacles.”64
According to accusations made by the Hongwu emperor and his officials, the 
Koreans had another important objective behind their frequent missions to the 
Ming—spying Ming military deployments to prepare for possible conflicts. When 
relations deteriorated, the Koreans were simply using their tributary missions to 
display alleged loyalty and delay any potential conflict. Hongwu believed that 
frequent missions were not a demonstration of Korea’s “serving the great with 
sincerity” but a betrayal of their dishonesty and ambition.65 While the Chinese 
accusations may not be entirely valid, there is little doubt that the Koreans were 
mistrustful and suspicious of the Ming, as the Ming was of them. They were 
particularly worried about Ming deployments in Liaodong, as these could be used 
against them as well as the Mongols. Believing that Hongwu could not be trusted and 
that their relations with the Ming were impossible to improve, they upgraded their 
military deployments to prepare for possible clashes after 1381, even while they were 
still requesting for Ming investiture.66 Spying by way of tributary missions was an 
important means of obtaining military intelligence.
The economic, political, and security motivations behind Koryo’s missions amply 
demonstrate that the Koreans were mostly bandwagoning with the Ming for security, 
profit, and power. Their initiatives in trying to obtain Ming investiture show their 
belief in Chinese authority in this area, though such investiture was also useful in
63 Ibid., 86.
64 Ibid., 164.
65 Huang 1994, 226.
66 Ibid., 241.
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serving their domestic political needs. Self-interest and legitimacy were therefore 
both at play. In general, Korean loyalty to the Ming was very much a fiction as thej 
simultaneously maintained relations with the Ming’s enemy, the Mongols, thus 
undermining a Ming-centered order. In all, then, Sino-Korean relations during this 
period were more anarchic than hierarchic.
Koryo’s relationship with the Ming was brought to an end in 1388 when its court 
decided to wage an expeditionary campaign into Liaodong as a response to the 
Ming’s territorial claim north of Tieling. The Koreans perceived, whether correctly or 
incorrectly, that the Ming was about to invade their territory. This was unacceptable 
even for a “model tributary” like Korea. The Koreans were determined to preserve 
their independence militarily. Even though being a Ming tributary had important 
political and economic benefits, at crucial moments the Koreans valued their 
autonomy and security even more.
CHOSON’S ACCOMMODATIONIST POLICIES
The establishment of the Choson dynasty ushered in a new era in Korean history and 
represented a turning point in Sino-Korean relations. Of the most interest is the new 
dynasty’s policy towards the Ming: King T’aejo and his successors sought to rectify 
Korea’s relationship with China through the so-called policy of sadae, or Serve the 
Great.68 As early as when he was asked by King U to lead the Korean army into 
Liaodong, Yi Song-gye believed that it was wrong for a small state to oppose a large 
one.69 And as he again reasoned before turning his troops back to Kaegyong, the
70way for a small country to protect itself was to serve the great. After founding the 
new dynasty in 1392, he sent three consecutive embassies to Nanjing to lay the
71groundwork for obtaining Ming investiture. The Hongwu emperor, as noted above,
67 As Clark writes, “ ...after years and years of Chinese extortion and abuse the Koreans recognized the 
desperation of their political position vis-£-vis the continent, and perhaps the only way they saw to break out of 
the long-established pattern of relations with Ming T’ai Tsu [Ming Taizu, the Hongwu emperor] was to 
demonstrate, even at horrendous cost, that there were limits which they could not exceed in attempting to find 
peace with the Ming.” Clark 1978, 99-100.
68 Clark 1998, 276; Lee 1984, 189.
69 CXLCSL, 106; Clark 1978,95; and DMB, 1601.
70 CXLCSL, 107; Clark 1978,97; and Huang 1994, 261.
71 MSLCXZLJL, 29-30.
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could not dissipate his mistrust of Korea and reprimanded it again in a 1393 rescript.
This time, even a sadae King T’aejo “was mightily offended by the emperor’s 
sanctimonious attitude.” As he explained to his aids:
The emperor, by having many soldiers and by being strict in his 
administration of punishments at last has succeeded in establishing his rule 
over the world. But he has overdone the killing and many of his best 
statesmen and counselors have lost their lives. In his frequent admonitions to 
our little country he has imposed demands without limit upon us. And now he 
is reproving me even though I have done nothing wrong, threatening me with 
his armies...72
This interesting revelation of the Korean King’s attitudes toward the Hongwu 
emperor clearly demonstrates that he did not believe in the legitimacy of Ming rule 
over Korea. Indeed, he even criticized the emperor’s domestic policy, referring to the 
massive political purges that Hongwu had undertaken since the 1380s. Yet, although 
King T’aejo personally resented Hongwu’s overweening attitudes and demands, he 
nevertheless felt compelled to answer the charges in a defensive manner.
As noted above, Hongwu soon found fault in Korea’s petitions to the Ming court and 
demanded that Korea send over the writers of these petitions. This time Korea balked 
at the request. The writer of the first petition was King T’aejo’s closest advisor. The 
king decided to send two others instead of him. The Koreans were eventually so 
irritated by Ming demands that in 1398 they held a court debate over the efficacy of 
their China policy. A stream of memorials criticized the sadae policy. The Veritable 
Records o f  the Ti Dynasty indicates that the court may have decided on a campaign to 
attack Liaodong, exactly in the same way Koryo government in its last days 
responded to the Ming’s territorial claims. Were it not for the subsequent coup in 
1398 led by Yi Pang-won, King T’aejo’s ambitious fifth son and the future King
72 Clark 1978, 136-7.
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T’aejong, Korea may have again attempted to strike China.
When King T’aejong ascended the Choson throne in 1400, he continued his father’s 
policy and sent an embassy to Nanjing in 1401 to request investiture. Fortunately for 
him, a cordial relationship between the Choson and the Ming was about to develop 
with the coming of the Jianwen and Yongle reigns. As noted, Jianwen and Yongle 
granted the king investitures in 1401 and 1403 respectively. Yet, although the king 
clearly held the sadae principle in his accommodation with the Ming, he tried to keep 
a certain distance from, and limit his relations with, the latter. For example, he 
rejected Yongle’s suggestion of intermarriage between the two dynastic houses. He 
believed that a certain distance would better enable Korea to preserve its autonomy, 
as he learned from Korea’s previous troubled relations with Chinese dynasties. It was 
for his regime’s security and autonomy that he tried to establish a close tributary 
relations with the Ming. Yet he was well aware of the historical lessons for Korea’s 
relations with China: A sensible China policy should eschew the extremes of either 
unconditional dependence or irrational provocation. The Koryo court had gone from 
one extreme to the other in its relations with the Yuan and the Ming. King T’aejong 
was determined to follow a middle course: to accommodate based on sadae yet also 
to maintain a flexible distance so as to avoid unnecessary involvement and conflict.73
King T’aejong, moreover, was not completely free of the suspicion of the Ming. 
When in 1413 he learned that Yongle was hoping to invade Japan, he ordered his 
ministers to prepare a low-key defense for possible Ming invasion of Korea.74 Thus, 
although in the Yongle reign Sino-Korean relations were generally amicable, a 
certain suspicion was still present. Moreover, the Ming court’s often exorbitant 
demands on the Koreans—demands such as large numbers of tributary horses and 
oxen for military use, and even Korean virgins for the imperial harem—irritated the 
Koreans. They bore a heavy financial burden and suffered some humiliation to meet
73 See Huang 1994, 280-4. It might be noted that the Kory6 dynasty also tried to keep a distance from Song 
China (960-1279). Their “officials made it clear that, rather than expressing Korean subjection, participation in 
tribute missions was intended to limit relations with China" Larson 2008,27 (emphasis in original).
74 Huang 1994, 292-7.
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75these demands. Their king reluctantly complied only for pressing political reasons. 
Finally, one should not lose sight of the element of competition in this relationship, 
as demonstrated by the Jurchen problem. Before discussing Ming-Choson
competition over the Jurchens, it is worth considering the nature of the Choson
dynasty’s sadae toward the Ming.
THE NATURE OF SADAE
Confusions arise partly because scholars disagree on the meaning of sadae. For this, 
we need to go into the original sources. According to the Veritable Records o f  the Yi 
Dynasty, Yi Song-gye turned his troops back from Liaodong because he believed that
“yi xiao shi da, bao guo zhi dao In many existing
writings the first phrase is often cited, while the second is usually omitted. Having 
them together will enable one to see the nature of sadae more clearly. The 
controversy is around the meaning of shi, commonly translated as “serve.” Translated 
literally, “yi xiao shi da” is “the small to serve the big.” Yet, what exactly does 
“serve” mean here? Many scholars believe that it means submission in the sense of 
becoming China’s vassal state and observing its tributary obligations. The problem 
with this interpretation becomes clear when one takes “bao guo zhi dao”—literally, 
“the way to preserve the country”—into consideration.
In this case, what Yi Song-gye meant is that the way for the small (Korea) to 
preserve itself was to . “serve” the big (China). Put it in the context, he was arguing 
that to ensure Korea’s survival, it should not challenge the Ming militarily. To 
“serve” the big was to offer deference rather than to offend China. It means that 
Korea must realize the limit of its power and develop appropriate strategies to reflect 
the power disparities between itself and China. Sadae, then, should better be seen as 
a principle in Korea’s relations with China rather than a concrete policy. The 
principle should be reflected in accommodationist strategies, but whether they are of 
a submission or bandwagoning nature have to be decided case by case. The Choson
75 Chan 1988,268-9.
76 CXLCSL, 107.
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dynasty’s sadae after 1388 arose more as a means to preserve the state of Korea than 
out of a perception of Chinese authority over Korean policy. As Park Choong-Seok 
argues, the term sadae “actually referred to the diplomatic means a small nation 
employed vis-a-vis a big power within the context of the military dynamics of East 
Asia...Underlying the concept was the objective of national self-preservation in
•  77foreign relations.” An effective policy based on the sadae principle would also 
lessen the fear of a Chinese invasion or intervention in Korea’s domestic affairs.78 It 
is likely that Yi Song-gye also found the Ming’s territorial claim excessive, but he 
was well aware that going to war with China would almost certainly mean disaster 
for Korea.79 Deference to China was therefore perceived as essential for Korea’s 
survival. Yi Song-gye, one may think, was “informed above all by a timely
OA
realpolitik.” His sadae is a better reflection of bandwagoning for security than 
submission out of Chinese authority.
This interpretation of sadae—as a policy principle meant to ensure the survival of the 
Korean state—has larger historical relevance. It may not be correct to say that 
Korea’s sadae policies were always out of the fear of the Chinese colossus, but 
surely in many cases it was this fear that compelled its policymakers to adopt sadae 
so as to guarantee the survival of Korea. This way of interpreting the sadae principle 
is nicely demonstrated by a 1554 entry in the Veritable Records o f  the Yi Dynasty in 
which the Koreans said that “Mencius said that when the small serves the big it is 
because of fear of heaven. What is meant by fear is nothing other than fearing the 
power of a big country in order to preserve one’s own people, so serving the big
Q 1
country is only to serve the people.” At least to those Koreans, sadae was 
motivated by “a quite pragmatic assessment of the best way to guarantee both
• R7security and autonomy for Korea.”
77 Park 1978,18.
78 Robinson 1992, 96.
79 As he said to his aides when forced to go along with King U’s order, “This is the start o f a great disaster for 
our people.” He later said to his unit commands before turning his troops back, “If we venture across the [Ming] 
border, the Son of Heaven will regard it as a crime and it will spell catastrophe for our royal house and the 
people.” Clark 1978,95, 98.
80 Deuchler 1992,91.
81 Larson 2008, 28.
82 Ibid., 33.
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In the case of Yi Song-gye, sadae would serve his new regime more than buying 
security. Another benefit is much needed Chinese legitimation for his regime. As a 
dynastic founder and, more importantly, as a usurper, King T’aejo particularly 
needed legitimation. Indeed, since he lacked royal lineage, Chinese investiture was 
doubly important as a legitimating symbol.83 He in fact tried to make political use of 
the Ming to obtain authoritative sanction for his regime. His ultimate failure to 
obtain Ming investiture resulted not from his lack of efforts, but the Hongwu 
emperor’s personal suspicion. It must also be noted that Chinese investiture had 
preserved the status and power of the rulers and upper class of Korea at least since 
the Koryo dynasty. Its attainment would appear as a political necessity for any 
Korean ruler.
Moreover, sadae would facilitate the Koreans to gain economic benefits from their 
tributary relations with the Ming. Indeed, one can argue that profit was among the 
driving forces that sustained Korea’s enthusiasm in tributary relations with China 
historically. The travel to and from China was a huge opportunity for trade. Between 
1392 and 1450, the Choson court dispatched 391 envoys to the Ming: on average, 
about seven each year. Not all went to the Ming capital; some went only to Liaoyang 
to conduct business relating to border affairs.85 Although tributary trade was not part 
of the Korean economy, it was indispensable to Korea’s overall social and cultural 
life, particularly when such Chinese products as books, medicines, and textiles are 
concerned. This explains in an important part Koreans’ desire for more missions to 
the Ming (and, in the Hongwu reign, despite Chinese complaints), many of which 
were surely private trading trips rather than official tributary missions sent by the 
court. The Chinese were clearly aware of this profit motive, so much so that, 
according to Korean ministers, Chinese officials in the Jiajing period (1522-1566) 
scolded Korean envoys for “coming only for trade.”87
83 Clark 1978,130; and Clark 1998, 276.
84 Lee 1984, 189.
85 Clark 1998, 280.
86 Huang 1994, 384.
87 Ibid., 392.
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THE NATURE OF CONFUCIANIZATION IN KOREA
Hugh Walker suggests that Choson’s sadae was a result of the confucianization of 
Korea, and it constituted a radical departure from the actual nature of Sino-Korean 
relations under previous Korean dynasties.88 According to him, the sadae thought 
was “an inevitable by-product of Korea’s Confucianization”, with its obvious 
corollary of King T’aejo’s “policy of deference” toward Ming China.89 I shall briefly 
evaluate the claim.
There is little doubt that Chosdn Korea underwent a process of confucianization, 
which was an epochal change in Korean history. In fact, Neo-Confucianism had 
become the major intellectual force in Korea since the late Koryo, ushering in the 
“Confucian transformation of Korea.”90 But one must ask what had caused this 
transformation. Was it due to Ming. China’s socialization efforts through persuasion 
and cultural influence, or Korea’s domestic political impulse? The evidence points to 
the latter answer.
As we have seen, throughout his entire reign, the Hongwu emperor was never 
enthusiastic about relations with Korea except for the first two years. He showed 
interest in Korea, but that was mainly limited to security issues in the northeast 
frontier. Most importantly, he used a great deal more blackmail than persuasion, 
repeatedly intimidating and threatening the Koreans with economic and military 
sanctions. The Koreans would hardly find this heartening. Chinese cultural 
attractions could surely be displayed through gifts to Korea such as books, silks, and 
musical instruments. But these were marginal compared with Koreans’ own efforts to 
emulate Chinese culture and institutions. And for the most part, Hongwu took a 
passive attitude toward spreading Chinese culture in Korea. The frequency of 
Chinese embassies to Korea was far less than that of Korean embassies to China. 
Thus the Ming, as Hae-Jong Chun wrote with regard to Sino-Korean relations during
88 Walker 1971, 204-5.
89 Ibid., 217.
90 Deuchler 1992.
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the Qing, did not intentionally exercise any purely cultural influence on Korea.91
The confucianization of Choson Korea was therefore principally an effort by the 
reformed-minded Koreans to transform the eight-hundred-year old Buddhist order in 
their society.92 John Duncan argues that their objective was to create a centralized 
bureaucratic polity in Korea.93 Walk himself hints that it was not confucianization 
per se that led to Choson’s sadae but rather the complex conditions of the late Koryo 
period that had led to both the confucianization of the Choson and the explicit sadae 
principle in its policies toward the Ming. Indeed, the adoption of Neo-Confucianism 
in Korea was largely intended to rectify the evils of Koryo society94—a very 
pragmatic domestic political objective on the minds of the Korean reformers that had 
little to do with foreign relations with Ming China.
No clear causal link exists between Korea’s adoption of Neo-Confucianism and its 
sadae toward the Ming. Even the correlation is imperfect. When one realizes that the 
sadae principle had been present at least since the times of the United Silla (668-935), 
the link between Neo-Confucianism and the Chos6n court’s sadae policy further 
weakens. This is not to deny that ideological affinity would make it easier for Korea 
to adopt sadae toward China. Korea’s perception of China as the source of higher 
civilization made sadae justifiable in cultural terms. Confucianization would also 
make Koreans comfortable to offer ceremonial obligations to China as its tributary. 
Yet it would be a mistake to believe that this is the whole story while ignoring the 
fact that sadae is simply the most sensible policy principle for Korea under Chinese 
primacy. The longevity of the sadae idea shows Korea’s historical recognition that 
accommodation with China was the best guarantee for its security and autonomy.
Moreover, the Koreans adapted the Chinese doctrine to suit their own needs.95
91 Moreover, “It may be said that the tributary system was not designed for direct cultural influence, although one 
should not disregard the fact that tribute missions played an important role in Korea’s cultural development.” 
Chun 1968, 110.
92 Concurring is Huang 1994, 317.
93 Duncan 2000.
94 Deuchler 1992, 26.
95 As Bruce Cumings puts it, “Koreans made Confucius their own just as Renaissance thinkers made Plato and 
Aristotle their own... The real story is indigenous Korea and the unstinting Koreanization of foreign influence, not
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Confucianism would provide the ideological foundation for the Choson regime 
because it was the only viable alternative for the new ruling elites to reform Korea 
domestically. Yi Song-gye took a personal interest in importing Confucianism not 
because he was a fervent Confucian believer, but because he knew that the 
confucianization of Korea was necessary for legitimizing his usurpation and his new 
regime’s rule.96 Indeed, the adoption of Neo-Confucianism as official philosophy 
gave Choson Korea a metaphysical justification for kingship and for society 
organized in a pattern of well-defined social positions. The new rulers also brought in 
the Confucian idea of “heavenly mandate” as a means of emphasizing its 
legitimacy.97
What was the consequence of Korea’s confucianization for Sino-Korean relations? 
Because of the confucianization of Korea, which had led to similar values between 
Korea and China, the Choson must have created common foreign policy interests 
with the Ming and their relations must therefore be very harmonious. The statement 
is false, for common values do not automatically translate into common interests, 
though the former may make the latter easier to emerge. From King T’aejo to King 
T’aejong, Korean rulers wanted to make their regime a “Confucian dynasty,” yet this 
was to be something different from Ming China. The Koreans learned their 
Confucianism from Confucius to Zhu Xi, not from Hongwu or Yongle. From the 
early Ming emperors they had little to learn. In fact, they criticized their policies in 
private. Hongwu was criticized for his massive political purges and was regarded as 
untrustworthy; Yongle was criticized for his usurpation and his worship of Buddhism. 
Indeed, at times the Koreans considered their regime, not Ming China, as the model 
of Confucian virtue. On these occasions, they hardly perceived any legitimacy in 
Chinese rule over them. A real consequence of the confucianization of Korea is that, 
for the Ming to have authority over Korea, its rulers must exemplify Confucian 
virtues as understood by the Koreans and must act in Korean as well as Chinese
vice versa.” Cumings 2005,20. See also Huang 1994, 321.
96 Huang 1994, 321-2.
97 DMB, 1601.
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interests.98 Since this was often not the case during the early Ming, we should expect 
sadae to be mainly Koreans’ self-interested principle in dealing with Chinese power, 
rather than a reflection of their real submission due to Chinese authority.
MING-KOREA COMPETITION OVER THE JURCHENS
Although the amity of Sino-Korean relations during the Yongle reign was 
unprecedented in all previous history, the two had not yet reached common interests 
in areas of major importance. Indeed in Manchuria where both the Ming and the 
Choson had important foreign policy objectives, their interests diverged sharply. The 
triangular relationship among the Ming, the Choson, and the Jurchens during the 
Yongle reign nicely illustrates the conflict of interests between Ming China and 
Choson Korea. For most of their histories the Koryo and the Choson bandwagoned 
with the Ming. At times, however, they also tried to oppose Ming demands. The 
competition for influence over the Jurchens is one prominent example of this 
resistance and challenge.
The Jurchens were a tribal people living in Manchuria. Ming China wanted to control 
them for security in the northeast, but it was unable to do so militarily. Ming rulers 
usually sought through peaceful means to initiate diplomatic and economic contacts 
with them, since their preoccupation with the Mongol threat precluded the possibility 
of military conquest. The Hongwu emperor did not take consistent efforts to pacify 
the Jurchens. He in fact feared competition from Korea for influence and control of 
the Jurchens.99 By the end of his reign, the Ming had failed to inaugurate relations 
with Menggetimur and Ahachu, the two most powerful chieftains among the 
Jurchens.
Korea also wanted to control the Jurchens for the same reason—security on its 
northern border.100 The Koreans and the Jurchens were in regular conflict when the 
Yuan dynasty declined. Jurchen tribes frequently raided Korean territory. Meanwhile
98 Huang 1994,300-3.
99 Rossabi 1975, 52.
100 Robinson 1992.
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the Koreans had another long-held goal—to expand their power and territory in the 
north. They had tried for about thirty years since the reign of King Kongmin to 
recover territories that the Koryo had previously lost to Chinese dynasties such as the 
Liao (907-1125), Jin (1115-1234), and Yuan. They were therefore always looking for 
opportunities to pressure the Mongolian and Jurchen tribes in Manchuria.
The Koreans began to seriously consider the Jurchen problem after the Choson 
dynasty was established. During the 1390s, most of the Jurchen tribes or subtribes 
along the Korean borders had in an ever increasing degree come under the influence 
of the Koreans. But Korea’s fortune was soon reversed by the Yongle emperor, who 
was determined to undermine Korean influence over the Jurchens and to bring the 
latter firmly under Ming control.101 Yongle first courted the Jianzhou Jurchens, the 
most congenial of the various tribes. He used people of Jurchen origin and recently 
surrendered Jurchens as envoys in his missions. In 1403 he dispatched an embassy to 
Ahachu, who responded favorably to Ming overture. The Jianzhou commandery was 
then established in the same year. In early 1405 the emperor sent a second mission to 
Menggetimur. But the Jurchen chieftain rejected the Chinese proposal at first on the 
grounds that he was invested by Korea as “myriarch of Odoli” in 1404.
The Chinese penetration into Jurchen territories set off alarm bells in Korea. The 
Koreans mounted a serious challenge to Chinese encroachment on what was believed 
to be Korea’s “sphere of influence.” As Menggetimur refused to acknowledge 
Chinese authority, the Koreans at short interval sent three missions with instructions 
and presents for him and other Jurchen tribal leaders. Meanwhile another Chinese 
mission arrived in April 1405 to invite Menggetimur to go to Nanjing with presents 
and promise of Chinese ranks and rewards. The Koreans immediately sent an official 
to persuade him not to yield to Chinese pressure, and the Korean king spoke of 
Menggetimur as “a bulwark in the northeast.” A Korean mission also went to 
Nanjing in June 1405 to inform the Ming court that Menggetimur had declared that 
he was not able to leave his territory and that he and other Jurchen chieftains whom
101 Clark 1998,286.
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the Chinese envoys had tried to win over lived on Korean territory, in effect asking 
the Ming to leave Menggetimur alone. Meanwhile the Koreans tried to forestall the 
Ming’s invitation to Menggetimur with a mission in August 1405. Yet all of these 
intensive etforts were eventually to prove futile: Menggetimur finally went to the 
Ming capital in October 1405 and was rewarded with the Left Jianzhou commandery 
under his direction. By 1406 it seemed that the Ming had won the competition with 
the Choson over the Jurchens.102
Given the vast power disparities between Korea and China, Korea’s failure is not 
surprising. What is most interesting, however, is that the Koreans, despite their 
alleged sadae toward the Ming, displayed an impressive determination to counter 
Chinese penetration into Manchuria. One must wonder what “vassal” or “tributary” 
status actually entailed in Korea’s relations the Ming. As Henry Serruys wrote, what 
the Chinese did with regard to the Jurchens (such as taking them into their service, 
receiving tribute and giving presents and rewards for the tribute and for the service 
rendered) the Koreans did too.103 The Koreans considered the Jurchens as living on 
their soil. Their border officials saw Chinese penetration as a threat.104 In July 1407 
a Korean statesman even spoke of “the threat from Jianzhou in the north.”105 How 
much Korea resented Chinese advance into Jurchen land, so close to its borders, was 
expressed by a Korean official in a report to the king in October 1406:
The King has done his utmost to serve the Ming faithfully, but when the 
emperor founded Jianzhou in the eastern comer (of the Ming empire), this 
amounted to strangling our throat and holding our right arm; outside (of 
Korea the emperor) establishes vassal states to entice our people, and inside 
(of Korea) favors us with special gifts to make us relax our watchfulness!106
102 One important consequence o f this competition is that it helped to regularize Sino-Korean relations in the 
Yalu-Tumen border. Although China displaced Korea as the dominant influence in Manchuria, it “abandoned 
forever any scheme to penetrate south of the Tumen. At the same time, Korea’s effort to assert its influence north 
o f the river was nipped in the bud.” Lin 1935, 19.
103 Serruys 1955, 50-58.
104 Ibid., 47.
105 Ibid., 56.
106 Quoted in ibid.
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Strategies and Structure in Sino-Korean Relations
How well does the theory developed in the preceding chapter perform against 
evidence of Sino-Korean relations during the early Ming? Three questions must be 
answered. First, does the relationship display a behavioral tendency between Chinese 
domination and Korean accommodation? Second, what are the respective Chinese 
and Korean strategies toward each other? Third, what are the motivations behind 
these strategies?
CHINESE STRATEGIES OF DOMINATION
The idea that China tried domination over its neighbors, especially over a “model 
tributary” like Korea, might seem counterintuitive to those who believe that China 
has always been a peaceful country. The historical evidence, however, suggests that 
political domination was indeed the Ming’s objective in its Korea policy. Indeed, the 
tributary relations it tried to establish with Korea and other polities are themselves 
evidence of Chinese desire to control these polities’ foreign policies in areas where 
Chinese interests were at stake. The Ming wanted to have Korean acknowledgment 
of Chinese suzerainty, that is, its right to form a sovereign-vassal relationship with 
Korea and have Korea observe its obligations as a Ming vassal or tributary state. It 
did not want control in Korea’s internal affairs, as the Hongwu, Jianwen, and Yongle 
emperors made clear. The Ming emperors primarily wanted two things from Korea: 
observance of its tributary obligations (in most cases, regular tribute presentations 
according to Ming regulations), and Chinese control over Korean security policy in 
Manchuria. Surely the Ming did not try to dominate Korea by conquering it, but 
these two aspects of Ming policy toward Korea are political domination nonetheless. 
In effect, what it sought were superiority and authority in foreign affairs.
Two motivations underpinned early Ming emperors’ attempts at political domination 
in this form. First, having Korea submit as a tributary state and thereby creating a 
sinocentric relationship was useful for meeting their identity needs as the Son of 
Heaven and the “ruler of the tianxia” and buttressing their claim of legitimacy to’rule
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Zhongguo. Second, the Hongwu emperor’s concern for security in the northeast first 
prompted him to obtain Korean loyalty so as to divide and rule the other two threats 
in the region, the Mongols and the Jurchens, and then to blackmail Korea in the hope 
of extracting Korean security cooperation in the northeast when persuasion failed to 
bring about Korean loyalty. Legitimacy and security were therefore two primary 
motivations behind Chinese efforts to obtain Korean compliance, whether in terms of 
meeting tributary obligations or offering security cooperation. Chinese emperors’ 
identity as well as security needs imply that with a strong China in place, some form
1 A«T
of Chinese domination was almost inevitable.
The early Ming emperors employed two primary strategies for domination toward 
Korea: persuasion and blackmail. The Yongle emperor also used the strategy of 
inducement to create political domination over the Jurchens. All three emperors tried 
to persuade the Koreans to accept Chinese superiority. Hongwu, however, used a 
great deal more blackmail than persuasion—he liked coercive threats (including the 
threat of force) and intimidation if these could help obtain desired compliance from 
Korea. He tried to politically and economically coerce the Koreans into accepting his 
demands by manipulating tributary politics and downgrading Korea’s tributary status. 
At various times he withheld the investitures of both King U of the Koryo and King 
T’aejo of the Choson, reduced the frequency of Korean missions, increased his 
demand for Korean tribute, jailed Korean envoys, rejected Korean tribute, accused 
Korea of wrongdoings, and threatened the use of force.
It is worth noting that Hongwu was far more interested in coercing the Koreans into 
accepting his demands regarding security in the northeast than converting Korea 
culturally into “a little China.” Chinese embassies went much less frequently to 
Korea than Korean embassies to China. The available evidence indicates that Korea’s 
large-scale adoption of Neo-Confucianism and Chinese institutions from the last 
decade of the fourteenth century was primarily due to Korea’s own efforts. Ming
107 For an argument that the late Qing (1850-1910), an empire already in decline in the face of Western 
encroachment, tried to aggressively project its interests into Korea, see Larson 2008.
97
China did not actively promote the confucianization of Korea or exercise pure 
cultural influence. Quite on the contrary: Assuming their cultural superiority, the 
Chinese took a passive attitude and waited for the Koreans to come and submit.
KOREAN STRATEGIES OF ACCOMMODATION AND RESISTANCE 
That the main behavioral pattern in Korea’s relations with Ming China is 
accommodation is amply demonstrated by the prominence of the idea of sadae 
during this period. Both King Kongmin and King T’aejo (Yi SSng-gye) refer to 
sadae as their foreign policy principle toward Ming China. The notion of sadae 
indicates that Korean rulers understood the strategic reality they had to face and 
came to the conclusion that the best way to ensure Korea’s security and autonomy is 
to accommodate China’s demands. When these demands became too excessive, 
however, they chose to ignore, resist, or even oppose them.
The principle of sadae can be embodied in two strategies: submission and 
bandwagoning. This chapter argues that Korean accommodation generally reflects 
more bandwagoning for buying security, gaining profit, and increasing power than 
submission out of a perception of the legitimacy in Chinese rule over them. King 
Kongmin’s decision to comply with Hongwu’s wish by sending tributary missions, 
for example, reflects his appreciation of the strategic environment. Compliance was a 
political necessity. To preserve Korean independence under the shadow of the rising 
Ming power, it made sense to offer tribute. Yet because security could not be entirely 
guaranteed by the Ming as the Mongols were still active in Liaodong, the Koreans 
maintained contacts with the Mongols as a cushion. In this case, accommodation was 
a means of self-preservation and ensuring security. It could also afford Korea the 
opportunity to expand its own power and territory in the north, as demonstrated by its 
1370 campaign into Liaodong. Moreover, it was essential for Korea to gain 
economically from tributary missions to the Ming.
Many scholars routinely assert that Korea accepted Chinese suzerainty especially
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during Ming times.108 A real Chinese suzerainty, rigorously defined, would mean 
Korean perception of Chinese authority at least over certain aspects of their foreign 
policy. Yet, in all the cases of Korea’s response to the Ming, evidence showing 
Korean belief in Ming authority is surprisingly limited. There are few cases in which 
the Koreans felt that they “ought to obey” instructions from the Ming. This is, 
however, not surprising. The theory developed in Chapter 2 suggests that the 
emergence of authority requires China’s persistent and patient use of persuasion as 
well as Korea’s learning of Chinese superiority. The emergence of Chinese authority 
depends on two crucial Korean perceptions. First, Chinese rulers were the true 
upholder of the highest Confucian virtue. Second, they acted for Korean as well as 
Chinese interests.
Yet the early Ming emperors could not be the sources from which the Koreans learn 
about the Confucian virtue. Hongwu blackmailed Korea more than he tried to 
persuade it. Yongle’s aggressive efforts to displace Korea as the dominant force in 
Manchuria could only feed Korea’s resentment. Indeed, mutual suspicion 
characterized Sino-Korean relations during the Hongwu reign. How could Chinese 
persuasion work and the Koreans learn of Chinese superiority under such 
circumstances? The Koryo court’s fear and suspicion of Hongwu and the Choson 
court’s disapproval of Yongle’s usurpation and Buddhist worship are, of course, 
themselves a demonstration of the lack of Chinese authority over Korea. The 
Koreans’ learning of Chinese superiority had hardly taken place. Accommodationist 
policies based on the sadae principle would be the most likely case for the claim of 
Ming authority over Korea. Yet in sadae one finds essentially self-interested motives 
for survival, profit, and power. Even in the one area where the Koreans genuinely 
perceived Ming authority—investiture, self-interest was by no means absent as Ming 
investiture was a hugely useful legitimating symbol in Korean politics.
Indeed, if the Ming had unproblematic authority over Korea, the Koryo would not 
have sent an army into Liaodong in 1370 to compete with the Ming for influence
108 A recent example is ibid., 31.
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over the Mongols. It would not have kept relations with the Mongols while 
conducting normal tributary relations with the Ming ever since 1369 or adopted a 
“two-China” policy after 1374. Korea would not have decided twice in 1388 and 
1398 to attack Liaodong which was by then under Chinese control. It would not have 
continued to send missions frequently to China despite the Ming’s displeasure. It 
would not have tried to compete with the Ming for influence over the Jurchens. It 
would not have felt fear and suspicion of China. In short, if Sino-Korean relationship 
during the early Ming was largely an authority relationship, it would not have been 
so unstable.
The claim that Ming China constructed a hierarchical relationship with Korea 
therefore cannot be sustained. Apart from investiture, Ming China in fact only had 
limited control over Korean policy in the area of tributary formalities. But even here 
the control was not absolute, as the Koreans frequently ignored Chinese demands in 
the frequency of tributary missions. Many missions were sent out of Korea’s own 
initiatives rather than Chinese requests. Of course, one cannot claim with absolute 
confidence that Korean responses to China were all motivated by self-interest rather 
than Chinese authority. States seldom choose a strategy unconditionally or without 
mixed motives. The Koreans may on occasions have felt the weight of Chinese 
authority. They regarded China as the most powerful country and Chinese culture the 
embodiment of higher civilization. In terms of their respective places in the world, 
they would also, unlike the Japanese, put China at the center and Korea in the 
periphery. Yet this belief in Chinese centrality did not always translate into the belief 
in Chinese authority over their foreign affairs.
As far as the early Ming evidence indicates, Korean elites had only partially 
internalized sinocentrism identified in the previous chapter—the idea that China was 
the only central, superior, and sovereign entity with a right to determine other 
countries’ policies toward it. They believed in Chinese centrality in the world, but not 
always its superiority and authority in foreign affairs. The historical record indicates 
the relative importance of self-interest over perceived legitimacy in Korean policies
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toward early Ming China. If China were the international sovereign, the system 
would be hierarchic. In general, however, Chinese “sovereignty” over Korea was 
very limited and anarchy was more impressive than hierarchy in Sino-Korean 
relations during this period.
This is further demonstrated by the fact that accommodation was not the only Korean 
response to Ming China. Korean rulers also resisted Chinese demands when they 
perceived that these were too excessive or that these would undermine their core 
interests such as security. Their strategies of resistance fall into two categories: 
balking and challenging. Balking occurred when Korea ignored Chinese requests and 
instead pursued policies in its own best interests. For example, King T’aejo decided 
to ignore the Hongwu emperor’s demand of sending the writer of the first “insulting” 
petition and sent two other writers instead. The Koreans consistently ignored the 
Ming’s request for reducing the frequency of its tributary missions. They also balked 
at Hongwu’s repeated requests for selling horses to the Ming army, perhaps 
attempting to preserve their own horse supply for use in possible future conflicts in 
Manchuria.109 More generally, the Koryo court had chosen to ignore the Ming’s 
security demand in the northeast. In each of these examples, the Koreans balked at 
Chinese requests because they decided that this would best serve their interests, 
whether in terms of retaining their most valued statesman, maximizing economic 
profit and obtaining military intelligence, or maintaining security in the north.
Korea challenged Ming China when the latter’s demands impinged on its crucial 
interests, usually survival and independence. Thus, believing that the Hongwu 
emperor was demanding Korean territory and that a Ming invasion was imminent, 
King U ’s government decided to wage a preemptive strike against the Ming in 1388. 
The Choson court decided to attack Liaodong in 1398 in the face of China’s 
unrelenting demands. Finally, the Koreans waged a spirited challenge to Chinese 
penetration into Jurchen lands because these were believed to be Korea’s sphere of 
influence that would closely affect its security interests. The Koreans probably
109 Huang 1994, 373-5.
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realized that challenging China would be counter-productive and even disastrous. 
They nevertheless endeavored to do so because doing otherwise would signal 
subservience in fundamental conflict with an independent Korean identity and incur 
even greater political costs in the domestic front.
Conclusion
The Sino-Korean relationship in the early Ming is a highly asymmetric one with 
disproportionate power concentration in Ming China. Early Ming emperors tried to 
politically dominate Korea’s foreign policy to demonstrate their legitimacy to rule 
Zhongguo and to obtain Korea’s security cooperation in Manchuria. The Koreans 
accommodated yet at times also challenged Chinese power. They valued their 
independence, security, and power, but it made little sense to challenge China unless 
vital interests were at stake. Their bandwagoning with China was meant to preserve 
independence, achieve security, and occasionally expand power under Chinese 
primacy.
The evidence also shows that Sino-Korean relations during this period were more 
anarchic than hierarchic. This is not to assert that the structure of this relationship is 
an unproblematic anarchy any more than that it is an unproblematic hierarchy. China 
possessed authority, for example, in terms of investiture in Korea’s domestic political 
process. Elements conducive to Chinese authority, particularly Chinese culture, were 
always present in the relationship and arguably became stronger after the Yongle 
reign when Korea became thoroughly Neo-Confucian and the acrimony and hostility 
between China and Korea were finally left behind. It is possible that the relationship 
would become more hierarchic in later periods. During the early Ming, however, the 
evidence points to the more anarchic nature of this relationship.
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Chapter 4 
Early Ming China and Japan
In this chapter I examine Sino-Japanese relations in the early Ming dynasty to further 
evaluate the theory of Chinese primacy. It should be recognized, however, that 
neither China nor Japan were unified political systems at the start of the Ming. Rulers 
on both sides were trying to consolidate their regimes; and in the case of Japan, a 
single ruler did not emerge until 1400. The relationship is not one between two 
“unitary actors” but is part of the way in which the two political systems have 
mutually constructed each other in the process of becoming unified states. I therefore 
focus on individual political leaders on both sides, as I have done with regard to 
Chinese emperors and Korean kings in the preceding chapter on Sino-Korean 
relations. This is also consistent with the theoretical proposition that the real agents 
in international politics are not states, but leaders and decision makers of these states.
The patterns of Sino-Japanese interactions sire broadly similar to those of 
Sino-Korean relations. Early Ming emperors tried to politically dominate Japanese 
foreign policy in areas of tributary relations as well as policies regarding Japanese 
piracy for essentially the same reasons: the need to demonstrate legitimacy in order 
to consolidate their political regime and a concern with security along the Chinese 
coast. To this end, they employed the strategies of persuasion, inducement, and 
blackmail. The Japanese accommodated the Ming, but also resisted Chinese wishes 
with more frequency than the Koreans. In Ashikaga Yoshimitsu’s accommodation 
with the Yongle emperor, the concern for legitimacy to consolidate the Muromachi 
bakufu also appeared as an important motive. Yet the evidence does not enable one to 
claim for sure whether Yoshimitsu’s accommodation was more of the nature of 
submission or bandwagoning. Japanese rulers’ frequent resistance against the Ming, 
however, further discredits the view of a hierarchic East Asian order centering on 
China.
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Chinese Attempts at Domination
When the Ming dynasty was founded in 1368, China and Japan had lost official 
contact for about five hundred years. The Heian court (794-1185) in Japan ceased to 
send official missions to China in 894, ending a two-hundred-year period of 
remarkable cultural borrowing and institutional imitation from Tang China.1 Song 
China had neither the will nor the means to bring Japan under Chinese influence. 
Although the following Mongol Yuan dynasty did possess a strong will and a 
remarkable military machine—demonstrated by its historically unprecedented 
conquest of the Eurasian landmass, both of its invasions of Japan (in 1274 and 1281) 
failed. These invasions, however, affected Sino-Japanese relations in ways more 
subtle and consequential than the Chinese and Japanese at the time could appreciate. 
They deeply affected subsequent Japanese perceptions of China. If previously China 
was the source of higher civilization to be emulated, it was now seen as a strong 
power to be feared as well. But perhaps more importantly, because Japan had 
repelled the mightiest army in the world, the fear would also stir a sense of Japanese 
myth and pride, and would develop into something akin to “nationalism” during 
Ming times. Historically the Japanese had been reluctant to show subservience 
towards China. The failure of the Mongol coercion in the thirteenth century gave 
them even less reason to do so afterwards. This is the immediate political context o f  
Sino-Japanese relations during the Ming dynasty.
THE FAILURE OF THE HONGWU EMPEROR
The Hongwu emperor probably sent his first mission to Japan in February 1369, anid 
a second one a month later. Announcing the founding of the Ming, Hongwu wanted 
to command Japan’s respect for his enthronement. According to his rescript, 
Chinese emperors had benevolently ruled the tianxia in the past. With Zhongguo and 
the “four foreigners” (si yi 0 j i |)  each occupying their proper places in the world, 
peace and order had been maintained. Now that the Great Ming had swept away the
1 Borgen 1982, 1-2.
2 Historians disagree on the exact timing. For the original historical source, see MSLLZ, 419. For historians’ 
interpretations, see Wang 1953, 26, fn. 2; and Cheng 1981, 149.
3 Cheng 1981, 149. .
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foreign Yuan dynasty, peace could again be enjoyed—provided that the rulers of the 
“four foreigners” could understand the historical precedent and offer proper tribute to 
the Ming. The emperor was in effect asking for Japan’s acknowledgment of his 
superiority and tribute to his court. Thus, this rescript to Japan, like those to Korea, 
was an attempt to revive the sinocentric order believed to have been created by such 
great dynasties as the Han and the Tang in the past. And essentially for the same 
reason: Making Japan a tributary state of the Ming would help demonstrate his 
legitimacy to rule China.
The Japanese never replied to Hongwu’s first mission. This was probably because the 
mission failed to reach Japan.4 In the same month, news of Japanese pirates (Wako) 
pillaging China’s Shandong peninsula reached the Ming court.5 The second rescript 
of March 1369 was far harsher in tone and the Wako problem now occupied a central 
place.6 Hongwu demanded that Japan offer a proper petition to the Ming court and 
that the Japanese authorities rein in the Wako. To that end, Hongwu threatened Japan 
with invasion—“to bind their kings with ropes,” as he vividly described. He tried to 
blackmail Japan into accepting his demands so as to control the Japanese pirates who 
were beginning to create massive security problems in his coasts. Thus, although it 
is not entirely correct to say that Sino-Japanese relations were established as a result 
of the Wako problem,8 that problem did critically affect the development of the 
relationship during the Ming dynasty.9 Hongwu’s subsequent Japan policy would 
stem more from this security concern than his desire to demonstrate legitimacy from 
Japanese submission.
4 Wang 1953, 10. Kawazoe Shoji writes that the Chinese envoys were killed en route by pirates. Shoji 1990, 425. 
Cheng Liang-Sheng, however, believes this mission was never sent. According to him, this was only the decision, 
rather than the actual mission, to send envoys to Japan. The first mission therefore only started in the second 
moon of 1369. Yet it would be odd for the Hongwu emperor not to first send an edict proclaiming the founding of 
the Ming to Japan, as he did to Korea and Annam. Cheng 1981, 150.
5 MSLLZ, 419; and MS, 6725.
6 MSLLZ, 419.
7 On this point, see also Sansom 1961, 167; and Cheng 1985,142.
8 Shoji 1990, 398.
9 The Wako problem started in the 1220s. Since the 1350s, Japanese pirates pillaged the littoral of East Asia with 
renewed intensity and frequency, first engulfing Korea then overflowing into China. China’s Shandong Peninsula 
was the most severely affected. But the Wako also struck further south, at Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, and 
Guangdong. They caused considerable damage and instability in the Chinese coast during the Ming dynasty. For 
brief accounts of the Wako problems, see Takeo 1977,161-2; Elisonas 1991, 239-45; and Hazard 1967.
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Carrying this rescript, the envoy Yang Zai and his mission arrived at Dazaifu in
northern Kyushu. Since Nara times (710-784), Dazaifu had been an office of the
Japanese central government with authority over foreign relations and trade.10 It
would thus be the natural place to start Sino-Japanese relations under normal
circumstances. But in 1369 the political situation in Japan was anything but normal.
The country was in the middle of a bitter struggle between two imperial houses, the
so-called Northern Court at Kyoto buttressed by the newly established Muromachi
bakufu (Ashikaga shogunate, 1338-1573) and the Southern Court at Yoshino
supported by regional barons. The sixty-year civil war, known as the Nambokucho
period (1333-92) in Japanese history, means the lack of central authority in Japan.
For a long time Kyushu was under the control of Prince Kanenaga (1329-83), the
Southern Court’s Seisei Daishogun (Generalissimo for the Subjugation of Western
Japan) in western Japan, who made Dazaifu his headquarter in the struggle against
the Northern Court. Rather than represent the central government, Dazaifu had
instead become the personal power base of Prince Kanenaga.11 Ignorant of the real
situation in Japan probably because of the lack of official intercourse, Yang Zai
approached Dazaifu and handed in Hongwu’s rescript to Prince Kanenaga, mistaking
him as “king of Japan.”12 This was to be a disastrous mission. Yang Zai was
11
imprisoned for three months and five other envoys were even executed.
Hongwu was nevertheless willing to try diplomacy once more. In April 1370, he sent 
Zhao Zhi to Japan with a new and longer rescript. The rescript recounts the events 
surrounding the emperor’s enthronement—how he had, in accordance with Heaven’s 
will, successfully displaced the previous Mongol Yuan dynasty, pacified the northern 
frontier, and managed to obtain tributes from various polities. With “carrots and 
sticks”, the emperor at the same time advised the desirability of peaceful 
Sino-Japanese relations and warned about the serious consequence should Japan fail 
to comply with his requests. At first he admonished that a unified China had 
abundant resources to punish Japan. In fact, he mentioned that the Ming was about to
10 Hall 1990,205.
11 For Japan’s political situation at the time of Yang Zai’s mission, see Hall 1990; and Sansom 1961.
12 Cheng 1981, 151-2.
13 Wang 1953, 11; Cheng 1981,152; and Takeo 1977, 163.
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construct invasion ships. Then, after this intimidation, he adopted a softer tone, 
saying that he had ordered to halt the construction of ships upon hearing that the 
pirates were not sent by the Japanese king. He wanted to get across the message that 
he was willing to give Japan one more chance of peaceful relations.14 Meanwhile, he 
again sent Yang Zai to Japan with fifteen Japanese pirates captured in China.15 The 
good gesture was meant to persuade the Japanese to become a loyal tributary by 
showing his benevolence. This time Kanenaga responded favorably and sent a return 
mission in 1371. The Chinese documents record that Kanenaga’s envoys paid tribute 
to the Ming court.16
Hongwu must have been pleased somewhat, though he was more impressed by the 
priestly nature of the first Japanese mission to his court. Kanenaga’s mission was 
composed of Buddhist monks. The emperor apparently concluded from this that he 
could influence—or “seduce” (you $ |), to use the word in the Official History o f  the 
Ming Dynasty—Japanese rulers by sending Chinese monks in return. Religious 
persuasion might be more effective than either coercive threats or symbolic gestures 
such as returning Japanese pirates. He thus ordered Zuchan and Keqin, two 
prominent Buddhist priests in China, to head another mission with an Imperial 
Calendar and silk fabrics as gifts for Kanenaga in 1372.17 Buddhist monks had thus 
become official ambassadors for Sino-Japanese relations on both sides. The Japanese 
sent monks probably because they were among Japan’s most knowledgeable people 
about China at the time. Ming rulers did so primarily because they wanted to carry 
out an effective strategy of persuasion toward Japan. As we shall see later, monks 
played their most critical part in Sino-Japanese relations under the Yongle emperor 
and Ashikaga Yoshimitsu (1358-1408), the third shogun (1368-94) of the Muromachi 
bakufu.
Zuchan and Keqin were, however, detained by Kanenaga for one year after arriving 
at Hakata in northern Kyushu in July 1372. While there, they gradually learned of
14 MSLLZ, 419-20.
15 Wang 1953, 11.
16 MS, 6726; and MSLLZ, 421.
17 MS, 6726; and MSLLZ, 421.
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Japan’s real political situation. Clearly Kanenaga was never the “king of Japan” and, 
after 1372, he even had difficulty holding ground in Kyushu. Keqin then wrote a 
letter to the Tendai zasu in Kyoto, claiming that Ming China had been attempting to 
establish contact with “Emperor Jimyo” of the Northern Court from the start and that
1 ftthey were kept from going to Kyoto by Kanenaga in Kyushu. Yoshimitsu was 
surprised and immediately sent envoys to receive them. Zuchan and Keqin 
eventually reached Kyoto in July 1373. This was the first time that a Ming mission 
had had direct communication with the Ashikaga shogunate.
Yoshimitsu then sent three Japanese monks to the Ming court in 1374, but the 
Hongwu emperor refused to receive them on the grounds that they bore only a letter 
to the Grand Secretariat but no petition to the emperor.19 This was a violation of 
Chinese tributary norms, which required above all a proper petition to the emperor 
with accompanying tributary goods. Moreover, the emperor was confused by 
Japanese politics. He wanted to deal with the legitimate ruler of Japan, yet quite 
unable to tell which one was. In any case such a ruler had not yet emerged in Japan, 
as it was not until 1392 that the Ashikaga shogunate finally ended the civil war
between the two imperial houses. For the moment Hongwu was content in dealing
00with Kanenaga until events proved it otherwise. He therefore reprimanded 
“illegitimate” missions from all other political actors in Japan, including one from 
the powerful Shimazu Ujihisa of southern Kyushu in 1374.21
Meanwhile, the emperor’s attitude towards Japan steadily soured. As a result of 
continuing Japanese piracy along the Ming coast,22 several “improper” or 
“illegitimate” Japanese missions to his court, and the perception of the political 
chaos in Japan, what little favor Kanenaga had gained in the eyes of Hongwu for his 
brief “submission” in 1371 was completely lost. After receiving an “insincere”
18 Wang 1953, 13; and Cheng 1981, 161.
19 MS, 6726; and MSLLZ, 422.
20 Wang 1953, 15.
21 MS, 6726; and MSLLZ, 422.
22 MS records Wako activities every year from 1371-74. MS, 6726.
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mission in 1376,23 the emperor threatened Kanenaga with possible invasions, 
implying that Japan could not rely on its unassailable position because it would only 
take five days for the Ming army to reach Japan.24
In 1379 the emperor received a mission from Kanenaga, but refused to receive a 
following one in 1380 on the grounds that it lacked a petition. He also rejected a 
mission from Yoshimitsu in 1380 because the shogun’s envoys bore not a petition to 
the emperor but a letter to the Prime Minister.25 Then, in January 1381, he became 
so annoyed by erratic Japanese missions and the worsening Wako problem that he 
felt obliged to draft a letter of reprimand for the “king of Japan.” The letter called the 
Japanese “stupid eastern foreigners,” and warned them against inevitable disaster if 
they continued to act improperly and disturb neighboring countries.26 After rejecting 
another mission in 1381, the emperor ordered the Ministry of Rites to draft two 
strong letters of reprimand, one for Kanenaga and the other for Yoshimitsu. The letter 
to Kanenaga asked the Japanese prince to examine Sino-Japanese relations in history 
and to understand that a Japan not submissive to China would inevitably court 
disaster. The letter to Yoshimitsu asked the shogun to examine who was the stronger 
side between the Ming and Japan. In both letters, the threat of war was explicit.27
But Hongwu did not execute his threat. Kanenaga replied with an extraordinarily 
provocative document that challenged the fundamental assumptions of Ming foreign 
policy (see below). Statements such as “the world is the world’s world; it does not 
belong to a single person” were surely the best kind of insult to the emperor. Even so, 
Hongwu did not attack Japan, primarily because the Mongol experience just a 
century ago still remained alive 28 If he ever had to invade Japan, it would probably 
not be so much due to Japan’s intransigence as because of the threat to the empire’s 
security posed by the Wako. But during the entire Hongwu reign, the emperor was 
preoccupied with pacifying the north and the west, rather than the south and the east.
23 Ibid.
24 MSLLZ, 424.
25 MS, 6726; and MSLLZ, 425.
26 MSLLZ, 425-6; and Wang 1953, 17.
27 MSLLZ, 426-7; and Wang 1953, 18.
28 MS, 6727.
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At times Korea and Japan frustrated him, but it was the Mongols that posed the real 
threat to his empire and drained much of its resource. After abolishing the Office of 
Merchant Ships in 1374, he increasingly resorted to coastal defense against the Wako, 
adopting an increasingly defensive policy of haijin, or maritime prohibition.
After 1381 Sino-Japanese relations were beyond repair. The Ming court treated 
Japanese missions badly in 1382, 1384, and 1386. Hongwu’s antipathy toward Japan 
finally turned into outrage after the discovery of Prime Minister Hu Weiyong’s 
alleged conspiracy to kill him. The Official History o f  the Ming Dynasty relates that 
Hu had sought the help of Japan for his attempted coup. The emperor was furious 
upon learning the plot and, after executing Hu and his followers, decided to 
completely break off relations with Japan in 1387. The Hu Weiyong case was quite 
probably a fabricated one, and Japan might have been used in elite Ming politics to 
discredit possible rivals to the emperor. Hongwu had a long-time distrust of Japan; 
this case provided the final catalyst as he now had reason to fear the domestic linkage 
of the Wako problem. Long before the case, the surviving forces of his erstwhile 
rivals Fang Guozhen and Zhang Shicheng had linked up with the Wako along the 
coast in an attempt to revive their influence. Hongwu thus had a powerful domestic
'X1political motive to enforce maritime prohibition and cut off relations with Japan.
HARMONY AND DISCORD DURING THE YONGLE REIGN 
Although he had to deal with a precarious and ultimately destructive domestic 
political situation, the Jianwen emperor was fortunate at least with regard to Japan. In 
1401 Ashikaga Yoshimitsu sent a mission to his court with a proper petition. This 
mission signified the beginning of official Sino-Japanese relations during the Ming 
dynasty. Jianwen sent a return mission in 1402. His rescript called Yoshimitsu “king 
of Japan,” stipulated the relationship between China and Japan as that between the
29 The Hongwu emperor issued his first order of haijin in February 1372. A more stringent haijin edict was 
issued in 1394. The Wako pillage also forced the Ming government to move the most vulnerable coastal residents 
to inland areas. In order to prevent the intermingling of merchants with pirates in an effort to stamp out the Wako, 
the emperor decided to abolish maritime commerce altogether. The only form of trade that was officially allowed 
was that under the tributary framework. Cheng 1985,21.
30 MS, 6728.
31 Shoji 1990, 430.
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ruler and the subject, and asked Yoshimitsu to adopt the Chinese imperial calendar 
and keep his mind on obedience and loyalty.32 Having the “king of Japan” as his 
vassal would be a boost, however trivial, to his already besieged domestic rule.
Within a year Jianwen was dethroned by the Yongle emperor, having lost the civil 
war to his uncle. But before the Yongle emperor even sent out his envoys to 
announce his victory, a Japanese mission arrived in Nanjing in November 1403. 
What is more, the envoys carried a petition written in perfect Chinese literary style in 
which Yoshimitsu explicitly called him a “vassal” of the Chinese emperor. This 
extraordinary and yet unexpected mission pleased Yongle greatly. As a usurper of the 
Ming throne through an internecine civil war, Yongle needed external legitimation as 
much as Hongwu or Jianwen. He sent a return mission headed by Zhao Juren one 
month later. This ended more than thirty years of discord and enmity in 
Sino-Japanese relations. Under the Yongle emperor and Ashikaga Yoshimitsu, 
Sino-Japanese relations entered a short period of unprecedented harmony.
During this mission, Zhao completed a novel commercial agreement with the 
Ashikaga shogunate in 1404. This is the so-called official “tally” (Chinese: Kanhe; 
Japanese: Kango) trade between China and Japan. The Japanese were permitted to 
send periodic trading ventures to China under the guise of tribute-bearing missions. 
Tallies were used to verify the legitimacy of the missions going both ways between 
the two countries. By establishing such an elaborate system, the Chinese could be 
sure that they received only bona fide representatives of the Ashikaga, thus 
contributing to its aim of suppressing the Wako; and the shogunate, for its part, could 
monopolize or at least control all trade ventures to China. The system therefore 
temporarily satisfied the Japanese desire for trade with China and the Chinese desire 
that its superiority over Japan should be recognized and the Wako problem managed. 
The agreement stipulated that Japan was permitted to present tribute only once every 
ten years. But in practice this limitation was completely ignored during the first
32 Cheng 1981,244-5; and Wang 1953, 22-23.
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several years of the successful operation of the agreement.33 The tally system 
worked remarkably well between 1404 and 1410. In fact, for almost a century and a 
half—from 1404, when the first official tally mission departed for China, to 1549, 
when the seventeenth and last returned to Japan—the system provided the 
framework for largely peaceful relations between the two countries.34
The Yongle emperor was surely primarily motivated by his desire to control Japanese 
piracy in extending tally trade privileges to Japan, as the use of tallies gave him a 
system whereby official Japanese envoys could be readily distinguished from 
unauthorized traders and pirates.35 But it must also be said that he was much more 
active and flexible in maritime policy than the Hongwu emperor had ever been, 
though he also continued his father’s haijin. He was willing to meet the Japanese 
halfway. One example will help to illustrate this. When a Japanese mission arrived in 
1403, the Minister of Rites memorialized the emperor that the Japanese had brought 
with them not just tributary goods for the court but also articles of a commercial 
nature and therefore recommended that these be confiscated according to Ming 
regulations. Yongle, however, clearly aware of the Japanese profit motive, 
nevertheless allowed them to do so on the grounds that they came a long way to 
China at a great expense and therefore must be treated benevolently. This is 
quintessential^ what the Chinese mean by “tenderly cherishing men from afar” (huai 
rou yuan ren If A). In short, Yongle was willing to use material incentives to 
win over foreign countries. His objectives with regard to Japan were no different 
from his father’s: both wanted to make Japan a tributary state and control Japanese 
piracy. The difference lies in their strategies. Yongle’s flexible approach, particularly 
his political and economic inducements, must have contributed to the initial success 
of his Japan policy.
This remarkable harmony in Sino-Japanese relations ended in 1408 with the death of 
Yoshimitsu. Yongle was particularly concerned whether Yoshimitsu’s successor and
33 On the tally trade, see Wang 1953, 37; Sansom 1961, 170; and Takeo 1977, 165-167.
34 Elisonas 1991, 236-7.
35 Wang 1953, 38-9.
36 MS, 6728; and MSLLZ, 438.
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son Yoshimochi would be as loyal and cooperative. For a short while Yoshimochi 
played the role due a Chinese vassal. But in 1411 when a Ming envoy arrived in 
Japan, Yoshimochi not only declined to give him an audience but also blocked his 
return to China. This was the end of Sino-Japanese cordiality during the early Ming 
period. The Official History o f the Ming Dynasty relates that Japanese tribute failed 
to come for a long time afterwards.37 In fact, it was not until twenty years later when 
the Xuande emperor and Ashikaga Yoshinori resumed the tally trade in 1432 that 
Sino-Japanese relations normalized.
For the next six years between 1411 and 1417, official contact between China and 
Japan was nonexistent. Then in 1417, Chinese troops captured a number of Japanese 
pirates and brought them to the capital. Yongle’s courtiers, indignant at the 
interruption of Japanese tributary missions, demanded their execution. The emperor, 
however, still hoping to win Japan over by generous treatment, decided to send the 
captured pirates back to Japan. He then dispatched a mission condemning 
Yoshimochi for failing to restrain the pirates and asking him to repent and change his 
attitude. He further ordered Yoshimochi to release those Chinese who had been 
captured and imprisoned in Japan. Six years of waiting had made Yongle impatient 
with the Japanese detachment from the Ming court. Now like his father, he warned 
Japan to change its policies and rein in the Wako. In December 1418 he prepared a 
severe rescript for Yoshimochi. This rescript was in fact the longest one ever sent by 
a Ming ruler to Japan, demonstrating Yongle’s increasing frustration with the 
Japanese isolation from China. It read in part:
You have not sent tribute, and from time to time you have dispatched persons 
to invade and pillage our borderland. Is this the way to serve one’s superior?...
We will instruct you plainly. Your land is very close to the Middle Kingdom.
As for our forces, on the sea they are masters of ships and oars; on land they 
are skilled at riding and shooting. Nothing is too strong to be broken; no 
place is too unassailable to be entered. They are not like the forces of the
37 MS, 6729.
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Yuan in the past, which were strong in riding and shooting but weak in 
seamanship. The reason why we have been so patient and have not been 
aroused at you is because we are so magnanimous...Recently pirates came 
again to raid our coast...Should you continue to create disturbances, you will 
inevitably call forth upon yourself our expeditionary forces...If you reform 
your former behavior and dispatch persons, together with our envoy, to 
repatriate [those Chinese who] have been captured on our coast...; if you let 
envoys pass back and forth; if you keep within your borders and give peace 
to your people and banish calamities so that you may succeed to the grandeur 
of your late king, then the spirit of Heaven will look on you with satisfaction 
and will enable your sons and grandsons to enjoy boundless good 
fortunes...If you are unable to reform your behaviour, then, when our envoy 
arrives in your country, either arrest him or execute him just as you please,
o o
and do not send envoys to us...
The rescript, as Wang Yi-T’ung put it, is “a mixed product of harsh and mild tones, 
of threats and cajolery, of praise for the noble deeds of Yoshimitsu and condemnation 
of the acts of Yoshimochi.” As such it perfectly illustrates the dilemma of Yongle’s 
policy towards Japan. On the one hand, he was still hoping to resume normal 
tributary relations with Japan so long as the latter complied with his requests. On the 
other hand, he threatened to invade Japan with an “expeditionary force” should it 
continue to tolerate the pirates. His boast about the superiority of the Ming navy over 
the Mongol navy had some credibility, especially in light of Zheng He’s overseas 
voyages that he was sponsoring at the time. Yet in the end he was, like the Hongwu 
emperor in the 1380s, prepared to break off relations and adopt a defensive policy. 
These options show the rescript’s contradiction, beneath which lies Yongle’s 
frustration.
Japanese Accommodation and Resistance
38 Wang 1953,49-51.
39 Ibid., 51.
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DISCORD AND ENMITY BEFORE 1400
When Prince Kanenaga met Yang Zai’s mission in 1369, he was greatly annoyed at 
the Hongwu emperor’s rescript. As noted above, he imprisoned Yang and executed 
five other envoys. Wang Yi-T’ung speculates that because Kanenaga had never seen 
the first rescript sent by Hongwu a month earlier, he was consequently offended by 
the harsh tone of the second one.40 Cheng Liang-Sheng believes that Kanenaga’s 
harsh reaction only demonstrated his inability to control the pirates. He might have 
felt humiliated by the Ming request to control the Wako, whose existence simply 
exposed his impotence.41 The Official History o f  the Ming Dynasty records a new 
wave of Wako activities along China’s coast shortly after Kanenaga’s mistreatment 
of Ming envoys, linking the resurgence of Japanese piracy with Kanenaga’s 
non-compliance.42 Yet Kanenaga was merely a warlord fighting for his survival 
against the encroaching Ashikaga forces and had no control over the pirates. Even 
the Muromachi bakufu at the time could do little to influence them. In serious 
military actions, or the staffing of important bakufu offices, the Ashikaga relied 
heavily on provincial constables (shugo) to whom they delegated much local 
authority.43 Action against pirates therefore depended on the bakufu’s control over 
the western warlords, and before 1400 Yoshimitsu had not yet consolidated his power 
in western Japan.44 In any case, Kanenaga had no particular reason to follow 
Chinese requests. Hongwu’s conception of world order failed to appeal to him.
The Prince, however, changed his attitude during Zhao Zhi’s mission in 1370 and 
sent a return mission to China in 1371. This might seem surprising since the rescript 
of this mission was more threatening in tone than the 1369 one. Chinese documents 
attributed Kanenaga’s about-face to the brilliance of the envoy Zhao Zhi. Zhao was 
trying to simultaneously threaten and seduce Kanenaga by describing Ming military 
prowess and contrasting Ming benevolence with Mongol aggressiveness. To the
40 Wang 1953, 11.
41 Cheng 1981, 152.
42 MS, 6725.
43 Hall 1990, 189.
44 Sansom 1961, 178.
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extent that he tried to persuade Kanenaga with Ming benevolence, he succeeded 
more in demonstrating Ming prowess. Thus, one cannot attribute Kanenaga’s 
about-face to Ming authority or his perception of legitimacy in Ming instructions if 
he was merely compelled by Ming military capabilities. Some historians even doubt 
whether Kanenaga would assume such a grave diplomatic responsibility of sending 
tribute to China.45 But given that by 1371 the Prince was under attack by Imagawa 
Ryoshun of the Northern Court and was already hard put to maintain himself in 
Kyushu, it might indeed make sense for him to turn to the Ming 46 Contact with 
China would strengthen his position in western Japan, thus increasing his odds in the 
increasingly hopeless struggle against the Northern Court.47
Whatever motives might lie behind his tribute to the Ming, Kanenaga soon found 
reason to change his attitude again. In 1372 he detained Chinese envoys for one year 
in Kyushu. His swift violation of “tributary” obligations was probably due to his 
desire to prevent contact between the Ming and the Northern Court. At the time the 
political situation was becoming desperate for the Southern Court. By 1372 the 
commanding position Kanenaga held in Kyushu had been lost. He was driven out of 
the Dazaifu region by Imagawa Ryoshun, and the latter was to eventually conquer 
Kyushu in 1381.48 Kanenaga wanted to monopolize Japan’s relations with Ming 
China, if that could help his struggle against the Ashikaga. Concern for his own 
political survival thus lied at the heart of his opposing attitudes toward China. The 
Ming’s lack of authority over him was further demonstrated by his frequently defiant 
letters to the Ming court in later years.
Kanenaga sent another mission to the Ming court in 1376 to apologize for frequent 
Wako raids along China’s coast.49 But the Hongwu emperor regarded this mission as 
“insincere” and issued a stem warning. This must have angered Kanenaga, as he
45 Elisonas 1991,241.
46 Shoji 1990,425.
47 Cheng 1981,158.
48 Hall 1990,206; and Sansom 1961, 109-13.
49 MS, 6276.
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ceased to send missions for three years.50 Then he sent three missions to the Ming 
court in 1379, 1380, and 1381 respectively.51 But Hongwu was greatly annoyed by 
the failure of these missions to observe Ming tributary regulations. After rejecting the 
1381 mission, he ordered the Ministry of Rites to draft a strong letter of reprimand 
for Kanenaga with an explicit threat of war. Yet much to his frustration, Kanenaga 
replied with an extraordinarily provocative document no later than 1382. The letter 
perhaps shows the deep-rooted Japanese attitude towards China when threatened. It 
is thus worth quoting in length:
I have heard that the Three Emperors established order and the Five 
Emperors came to the throne each in turn. How should only the Middle 
Kingdom (.Zhonghua) have her master while the barbarians did not have their 
rulers? Heaven and Earth are vast; they are not monopolized by one ruler.
The universe is great and wide, and various countries are created each to have 
a share in its rule. Now the world (tianxia) is the world’s world; it does not 
belong to a single person...
I have heard that the Celestial Court is making plans for war. This small 
country too has a plan for meeting the enemy...I have also heard that Your 
Majesty has selected your best generals and called forth your crack soldiers 
to invade my territory...We shall meet them with our troops. How could we 
be willing to kneel down on the road and pay respect to them?52
This is an extremely defiant reply. George Sansom notes that “the Japanese, despite 
their respect for Chinese culture, had a fierce national pride, stiffened by their defeat 
of the Mongols. They were not likely to submit to Chinese pressure.”53 In this letter, 
however, the Japanese not just refused to give in; they went on to challenge the very 
notion of the Chinese conception of world order. They asserted that the world could 
not be sinocentric, monopolized by the Middle Kingdom. On the contrary, the world
50 Sansom 1961, 168.
51 MS, 6726; and MSLLZ, 424-6.
52 The original text can be found in MS, 6727; the English translation follows Wang 1953, 18-9.
53 Sansom 1961, 167.
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needed to be shared by countries large and small. The idea looks intriguingly 
“modem,” yet it was neither idiosyncratic nor unique in Japanese history. It in fact 
reflects a larger historical pattern of Japanese attitude toward China.
The provocation of this letter effectively ended Sino-Japanese relations during the 
Hongwu reign. But the Japanese, though adamantly defiant of the Chinese demand 
for submission, nevertheless continued to send envoys to the Ming court in 1382, 
1384, and 13 86.54 The most plausible explanation seems to lie in their motive for 
commerce with China. This interpretation can be strengthened by the fact that even 
after 1387 when the Hongwu emperor broke off relations with Japan, Ouchi 
Yoshihiro of western Honshu, who was in control of much of the Inland Sea and the 
sea-routes to China and Korea before 1400, still sent envoys to China.55 Since 
official relations were impossible, one can only surmise that these missions were 
sent primarily for the purpose of trade.
UNPRECEDENTED HARMONY, 1401-1408
In 1400 Ashikaga Yoshimitsu crushed his last powerful rival Yoshihiro in western 
Japan. Eight years earlier he had ended the civil war between the Northern and 
Southern courts. Now he was in firm control of Japanese politics and ready to 
assume responsibility of foreign policy. Indeed, Yoshimitsu was to preside over “the 
most flourishing era of the Muromachi bakufu.”56 With the political consolidation in 
Japan, Sino-Japanese relations also entered a remarkable though brief period of 
harmony. Good bilateral relations depended on having a stable domestic political 
situation on both sides.
In 1401, Yoshimitsu sent a mission led by the monk Soa and the merchant Koetomi 
to the court of the Jianwen emperor. He had apparently learnt lessons from his failed 
attempts to open relations, with the Ming in 1374 and 1380. This time the envoys
54 MS, 6727; MSLLZ, 429; and Wang 1953,19-20.
55 Wang 1953, 21-22.
56 Hall 1990, 189.
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bore a deferential petition appropriately addressed to the Ming emperor. Yet more 
dramatic gestures of loyalty were still to come. When the Jianwen emperor’s envoys 
arrived in Japan in September 1402, Yoshimitsu went to Hyogo, the present Kobe, to 
visit the ship that carried them. Moreover, when he received the envoys in his 
Kitayama Residence in Kyoto, he placed in front of the main hall a high table on 
which the imperial rescript was placed beside a container of burning incense, and
» co
bowed three times before he took the rescript and read while still kneeling. When 
Jianwen’s embassy left Japan in 1403, Yoshimitsu ordered Kenchu Keimi of the 
Tenryuji and two other monks to accompany them to China. When the Yongle 
emperor’s first mission to Japan arrived in 1404 and a later mission came in 1406, 
Yoshimitsu went to Hyogo to meet the envoys on both occasions. When another 
Ming embassy came in 1407, Yoshimitsu, dressed in a Chinese costume and seated in 
a palanquin carried by several Chinese, accompanied the envoys to a maple-viewing 
party at the Jozaikoin near Kyoto. When the envoys left Japan the next spring, he 
went to Hyogo to see them off.59 Yoshimitsu’s exceptional treatment of Chinese 
envoys was quite unusual in Japanese history.
The shogun’s most dramatic show was his 1403 memorial to the Yongle emperor. 
The memorial opened with the declaration: “Your vassal {chert E ), the King of 
Japan {riben guowang 0  ^  HI 3E), petitions (biao ^ ) . ”60 It was the first document 
in which a Japanese shogun had called himself a “vassal” of the Chinese emperor. 
Indeed, never before had the expressions “King of Japan” and “Your vassal” been 
used in Japan’s foreign documents. Their use in this case deviated from the country’s 
customary diplomatic practice.61
Yoshimitsu kept his words of obedience very well. When the Chinese envoy Zhao
57 Cheng 1981,233-4; and Wang 1953, 22.
58 Cheng 1981, 239; and Wang 1953, 22-3, 62.
59 Wang 1953,41-2; and Cheng 1981, 334-5.
60 Cheng 1981, 250-1. Wang (1953, 24) translated chen as “subject” and biao as “submit”. This is misleading 
especially in our context. Biao is better translated as “petition” or “memorialize” to retain its original meaning. 
Since I reserve the term submission for special use in cases where other states have internalized the sinocentric 
norm and voluntarily become China’s vassal states, I prefer “petition” to “submit” in translating biao. Moreover, 
whether the fact that Yoshimitsu petitioned also means he submitted still has to be empirically examined.
61 Takeo 1977, 165.
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Juren left Japan in August 1404, he sent the monk Meishitsu Bonryo to accompaiy 
him to China. Four months later, another mission led by Eishun reached the Ming 
court to extend congratulations on the investiture of the Crown Prince of the Ming 
ruler.62 In December 1405, a delegation led by Minamoto Michiyoshi arrived at the 
Chinese court with twenty Japanese pirates. Yoshimitsu was thus the first Japanese 
ruler, perhaps the only one in a substantial way, to have met the Chinese request of 
suppressing the Wako. Indeed, he may have taken steps to suppress piracy before the 
dispatch of the 1401 mission or at least have shown readiness to take action. In any 
case he issued his first recorded order in 1402 to the Constables of the western 
provinces, instructing them to inflict drastic punishment upon the raiders.64 In 1406 
Yoshimitsu sent a mission headed by Kenchu Keimi to China to give thanks for the 
Ming emperor’s generosity. He sent two further missions, both headed by Kenchu 
Keimi, along with captured pirates, in 1407 and 1408 respectively.65 Thus in the 
eight years between 1401 and 1408, Yoshimitsu sent at least eight missions to the 
Ming court, all of which were well received by the Chinese. It is no wonder then that 
his death in 1408 should have greatly concerned the Yongle emperor.
THE NATURE OF YOSHIMITSU’S ACCOMMODATION
Yoshimitsu was a colorful figure in Japanese history. With regard to China, the 
puzzle historians have tried to answer is: Why was he so seemingly loyal to Ming 
China in the last eight years of his life? Was his accommodation with the Ming 
submission or bandwagoning? His obedience was all the more puzzling when one 
considers the fact that Japan was invaded by the Mongol Yuan dynasty just over a 
century before. If the defeat of the Mongols had stiffened Japan’s national pride, why 
would this pride fail to impact on Yoshimitsu’s policy toward China? After all, this 
pride was part of what stimulated Kanenaga and Yoshimochi’s hardline policies 
towards China before and after Yoshimitsu’s rule. One must also note that 
Yoshimitsu’s opening to China in 1401 was purely his own initiative, not compelled 
by Chinese threat, lured by Chinese inducements, or persuaded by Chinese diplomats.
62 MS, 6728; and MSLLZ, 440.
63 MS, 6729; and MSLLZ, 441.
64 Sansom 1961, 169.
65 MS, 6729; and MSLLZ, 443-5.
120
The answer, therefore, must be sought in Japan’s domestic and international 
environments at the time.
The most frequently cited cause behind Yoshimitsu’s accommodation is his motive 
for trade and profit. The Ashikaga shogunate’s domestic economic base was shaky. 
According to Cheng Liang-Sheng, the bakufu only owned landholdings around 
Kyoto, though in practice it may have had a wider resource base.66 Maintaining a 
balance of payments was hard for the bakufu, yet Yoshimitsu lived a life of 
extravagance far surpassing that of any shogun of the previous Kamakura bakufu 
(1185-1333).67 His most well-known personal project is the Kitayama villa and its 
centerpiece, the Golden Pavilion, built between 1397 and 1407. Logically, the 
bakufu would need overseas source of revenue to compensate its domestic financial 
weakness.
Moreover, the fact that Koetomi, a Hakata merchant who had just returned from 
China, was deputy envoy of the first mission in 1401 demonstrates the commercial
• •  / : onature of the mission. The demand for trade from merchants in western Japan was 
strong. Koetomi had advised Yoshimitsu on the desirability of commercial relations 
with China. The shogun must have found the suggestion very appealing. The 
bakufu’s treasury was almost empty. According to Sansom, Yoshimitsu was in such 
financial difficulty that he would sink his pride for a handsome cash revenue from 
trade. “[I]n all likelihood he had learned from monks and traders thirsty for renewed 
intercourse that the way to get concessions from Chinese dignitaries was to pour out 
supplications and flattery.”69 Sansom thus concludes that Yoshimitsu’s humble style 
does not mean he regarded himself as a tributary of China. He might have simply 
thought that “a little polite fiction was a fair price to pay for the benefits of peaceful
7fttrade.” As for wearing Chinese dress and lighting incense before an imperial 
rescript from China, it was the kind of theatrical performance that Yoshimitsu
66 Cheng 1981, 355; and Hall 1990, 219-225.
67 Sansom 1961, 151-3.
68 Grossberg 2001,.35-6.
69 Sansom 1961, 172.
70 Ibid., 173.
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71enjoyed.
Indeed, Japan could gain considerably from “tributary” trade with China. The terms 
of tally trade China and Japan concluded in 1404 were very favourable to Japan. It 
could take to the continent various tributary and “supplementary” articles. In return 
for bringing tribute, Yoshimitsu received from the Chinese emperor such valuable 
gifts as silver, copper coins, silk fabrics, household utensils, and bedding.72 The 
“supplementary” articles were the real substance of trade. They were sold to Chinese 
buyers by merchants and also by officials who travelled in the ships. The most 
important item was sulphur, the remainder consisting of the products of Japanese 
craftsmanship, such as swords, lacquer chests, bronze vessels, and fans. These were 
purchased by Chinese merchants and private persons, payment being either in kind or 
in copper coin. Certain Chinese goods, especially silk fabrics, books, drugs, and 
porcelain, brought an especially good profit when sold in Japan.
The Japanese particularly welcomed Chinese copper coin. Japan had not minted its 
own currency since 958, but from the twelfth century, with the growth of the 
economy, Chinese money started to circulate in Japan. From the thirteenth century 
onwards it was used increasingly in domestic tax payments. Japanese merchants had 
started to import Chinese coins since the 1170s.73 Thus, in addition to the enormous 
profits derived from it, the tally trade gave the bakufu monopoly control over the 
Chinese coins imported into Japan and thereby a status equivalent to that of a central 
mint.74
The benefits of the tally trade were not just economic, but also political. Ronald Toby 
observes that Yoshimitsu’s control of the tally trade “gave him a powerful tool with 
which to control recalcitrant shugo and religious institutions.” Above all, this 
means reining in the recalcitrant local power houses in Kyushu. This is in turn related
71 Ibid., 172.
72 Wang 1953, 35.
73 Verschuer 2002, 419. On Japan’s importation o f Chinese coins, see also Shoji 1990, 408-9; Yamamura 1990, 
358-60; Totman 2005, 109, 155; and Hurst 1999, 836-7.
74 Hall 1990,223.
75 -Toby 1977, 331-2; see also Grossberg 2001, 36-7.
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to the second major cause behind Yoshimitsu’s accommodation, namely, his need for 
legitimacy in Japanese politics.
Although by 1400 Yoshimitsu was clearly the dominant figure in Japan and had 
overcome all major oppositions, he was not able to reconcile every regional force. He 
needed to convince the shugo of the legitimacy of his position and the benefits he 
could bring to them. Kenneth Alan Grossberg argues that Yoshimitsu’s main 
objective was “the establishment of his family’s dynastic power on the basis of a 
legitimacy far broader than the one he had inherited.”76 To this end, he “adroitly 
balanced the society’s conflicting forces to his own advantage by pitting shugo 
against shugo, Northern against Southern Court, and new mercantile elements eager 
for trade against hardline conservatives who took umbrage at Japan’s new status as a
77tributary of the Ming empire.”
Relationship with China would enhance his prestige and boost his legitimacy in 
Japanese politics. As Bruce Batten argues, Chinese goods were desired not just for 
their economic value but also because they conferred prestige on those who had 
access to them. Differential access to foreign goods could improve Yoshimitsu’s 
position vis-a-vis his domestic rivals. Batten claims that “the desire for prestige 
and/or political legitimacy was the primary motivation for most foreign 
relations—diplomatic, military, and commercial—initiated by Japanese leaders 
during premodem times.”78 Surely monopolization of the relations with China itself 
would be a sign of authority in a decentralized political system, not to mention 
investiture by the Chinese emperor as “king of Japan.”
Yoshimitsu may have also sought legitimation from China for a more intriguing 
reason. Sansom suggests that the title “king of Japan” would be a major step for 
Yoshimitsu to depose the Japanese emperor and usurp the Japanese throne for
76 Grossberg 2001,28.
77 Ibid.
78 Batten 2003, 147 (emphasis in original).
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himself.79 This did not happen, not for his lack of effort, but for his lack of luck. 
Some Japanese scholars have argued that “Yoshimitsu endeavoured to mobilize all of 
his power, will, and wile to supplant the imperial lineage so that a new Ashikaga 
dynasty could be begun. His grand design was foiled only by his death.”80 If this 
was his plan, then his opening to China may indeed have been a well-intended design 
to obtain external legitimation for his future emperorship. Yoshimitsu reached the 
end of the domestic legitimation process when he became Chancellor in 1394, having 
appropriated imperial prestige and the remaining vestiges of court authority. But as 
Grossberg observes, “the more he adopted traditional imperial authority, the less 
effective was the puppet emperor as guarantor of shogunal legitimacy, until 
eventually Yoshimitsu found it expedient to seek other sources of legitimation. 
Foreign relations between the Muromachi Bakufu and the Ming empire should 
initially be viewed in this domestic context.”81 To be called “king of Japan” may be 
exactly what Yoshimitsu had wanted. He could at least demonstrate that “the shogun 
was to be Japan’s head of state and could rule in his own name if  he so desired.”82
Historians have speculated a third cause, related to Japan’s international standing, 
behind Yoshimitsu’s accommodation. Since the 1220s, Japanese pirates had pillaged 
the littoral of East Asia. The Wako problem not only destabilized the coasts of Korea 
and China, but affected Japan’s international position as well. In effect it contributed 
to Japan’s political isolation in the region, making it the “orphan of East Asia.” To be 
a legitimate and effective ruler, Yoshimitsu needed to do something about this. 
Tanaka Takeo believes that Yoshimitsu’s investiture as “king of Japan” was “not 
simply a whimsical or wilful act by an upstart military dictator, but rather an 
important step in the establishment of Japan’s position in East Asia.” John Whitney 
Hall and Jurgis Elisonas concur. Trade with China was a conscious effort by 
Yoshimitsu to project Japan into the mainstream of East Asian affairs, an effort to 
gain recognition as a member of the wider East Asian community. Within Japan, the
79 Sansom 1961, 172.
80 Akira and Yamamura 1992,48.
81 Grossberg 2001,34.
82 Ibid., 36.
83 Takeo 1977, 177.
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relationship with China was meant to demonstrate that the shogun, as chief of the
• 84military estate, also had full control of Japan’s foreign affairs.
Strikingly, all of the three explanations above demonstrate Yoshimitsu’s self-interest 
in accommodating the Ming; none of them shows any perception of Chinese 
authority on the part of the shogun and his bakufu. If they are valid, then 
Yoshimitsu’s strategy should be more properly characterized as bandwagoning for 
economic profit, political legitimacy, and international status. Can we then conclude 
that even having a ruler as cooperative as Yoshimitsu failed to bring Chinese 
authority over Japan? Not yet. Yoshimitsu’s obedience, particularly his prompt 
missions to China and suppression of Japanese piracy, could just as well result from 
his perception of legitimacy in Ming overlordship. Since he was so consistent in 
accommodating China, and since his real motive cannot be known for sure, one 
cannot easily tell whether this was a result of his self-interest or Ming authority.
I shall suggest, however, that even if Yoshimitsu acted out of self-interest, that 
self-interest would be heavily diluted by his real admiration of Chinese culture. He 
may not have found that he “ought to obey” Chinese instructions, but equally he 
could not have felt repulsion against China. His admiration of, or at least remarkable 
respect for, China can be seen from his exceptional treatment of Chinese envoys in 
Japan. He usually went as far as Hyogo to greet and to bid farewell to them, on 
which occasion he dressed himself in a Chinese costume and, seated in a palanquin, 
was carried by several Chinese bearers. The admiration was a direct result of the 
influence of Buddhist monks in Japan. Yoshimitsu even studied certain Chinese 
classics under the monk Gido.85 These monks were not just ambassadors between 
China and Japan, but also architects of the relationship itself. Monks on both sides 
strongly desired a normal relationship between the two countries that they could 
enjoy to the advantage of their faith. Many Japanese monks, like Kenchu Keimi, had 
made three or four visits to China, dominating and carrying out indispensable work
84 Hall 1990, 193; and Elisonas 1991, 242.
85 Sansom 1961, 160-1.
125
in Japan’s communication with China.
Many scholars have noted the ubiquity of Buddhism in medieval Japan.86 Since the 
introduction of Buddhism into Japan in the sixth century, Buddhist monks had been 
key figures in the importation of Chinese culture to Japan. After the introduction of 
the Zen sect in the second half of the twelfth century, Buddhists became increasingly 
the men of letters of Japan, and their monasteries the sole centers of learning.87 In 
Yoshimitsu’s time, Buddhist monks, especially those of the Zen sect, exercised an 
immense influence over Japanese society and culture in general and the shogunate in 
particular. Some of Yoshimitsu’s closest advisors were monks.88 Thus it is not 
surprising at all that monks should be Japan’s ambassadors to China. One Japanese 
author even goes so far as to suggest that the correspondence between Japan and 
China was all entrusted to monks because Japanese generals of Yoshimitsu’s time 
were all unlettered and could not understand the Chinese language.89
The origin of Zen’s great success in Japan lied of course in its role as a carrier of 
Chinese culture. It was perfectly suited for this role because since Song times, it had 
been intimately associated with Chinese court life and with its elite scholarship and 
arts. Upon the decline of the Southern Song and its overthrow by the Mongols in the 
late thirteenth century, Zen masters willingly traveled to Japan in the quest for more 
favorable conditions to work and propagate their faith.90 Eventually they created a 
remarkable Buddhist culture in Japan. Because they were all well versed in Chinese, 
and many of them were ardent admirers of the Chinese civilization, this culture was 
also very much “Chinese”. Cheng Liang-Sheng even assertsa that in Yoshimitsu’s 
time the Japanese court was brimming with a kind of “China worship.”91
86 For general discussions, see Kazuo 1990; and Collcutt 1990.
87 Wang 1953, 3.
88 This phenomenon was not limited to the Muromachi bakufu. In fact, the Ashikaga merely continued and 
extended a pattern started in the Kamakura bakufu. During the Kamakura period, a great number o f priests from 
both Japan and China crossed the sea to stay in the other country. Approximately eighty Japanese priests studied 
in China in the period between 1168 and 1280, and more than thirty Chinese priests arrived in Japan between 
1250 and 1350. The major Kamakura leaders each had their favourite Chinese adviser. See Verschuer 2002, 421.
89 See Wang 1953, 34.
90 Varley 1981,465.
91 Cheng 1981, 240.
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That Yoshimitsu believed in Chinese cultural superiority was in little doubt. To what 
extent his learning of it was able to socialize him into accepting Chinese overlordship 
and eventually believing in the legitimacy of this overlordship is a more contentious 
question. After all, early Ming rulers did not spend a great amount of time sending 
envoys to carry out a persuasion strategy towards the Japanese shogun. The work 
was instead done largely by Japanese monks, who injected Chinese culture into 
Japan, and persuaded Yoshimitsu, together with merchants, of the desirability of 
opening tributary relations with China. Since the issue of how much authority Ming 
China possessed over Yoshimitsu’s Japan cannot be settled definitively, we may 
simply leave at the thought that Sino-Japanese relations under the Yongle emperor 
and Ashikaga Yoshimitsu were more hierarchic than any other period in the early 
Ming.
ISOLATION AFTER 1411
Yet the goodwill Yoshimitsu gained from the Ming was quickly squandered by his 
son Yoshimochi. At first, Yoshimochi followed the tradition set by his father. He sent 
a mission to the Ming court to announce Yoshimitsu’s death in January 1409.92 
When the Chinese envoy sent by Yongle arrived to offer consolation and investiture, 
he went to Hyogo to meet him. In 1410, he sent Kenchu Keimi to the Ming court 
with tribute of native products and a petition expressing his gratitude for the 
posthumous name given his father and Chinese imperial approval of his own 
succession to the Japanese “throne.” He also turned over to the court pirates captured
Q ' Xby the Japanese. Yet this mission proved to be the end of Sino-Japanese harmony 
in the early Ming period, probably also the last official Japanese mission during the 
Yongle reign. When Yongle sent Wang Jin to Japan in 1411, Yoshimochi not only 
declined to give him an audience but also blocked his return to China. His change of 
attitude toward the Ming was abrupt yet firm. The shogun ceased to send tribute for 
the remaining years of the Yongle reign.
92 MS, 6729; and MSLLZ, 445.
93 MS, 6729; and MSLLZ, 446.
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No official contact existed between China and Japan for the next six years. In 1418, 
it is recorded in Chinese sources that an envoy sent by Yoshimochi appeared at the 
Ming court. The envoy was the governor of Hyuga, osumi, and Satsuma, Shimazu 
Hisatoyo. Asking the Yongle emperor to pardon Yoshimochi, Hisatoyo bore a 
petition couched in most humble terms. In it Yoshimochi explicitly called himself a 
vassal of the Ming, attributed Japan’s failure to pay tribute to the excessive activities 
of the pirates, and asked for permission to present tribute as before.94
It is, however, quite doubtful whether Hisatoyo could have been sent by Yoshimochi. 
To begin with, given Yoshimochi’s strong attitude toward China in the past six years, 
it would be improbable for him to send such a humble embassy to China all of a 
sudden. Second, Hisatoyo was in firm control of the three south Kyushu provinces of 
Hyuga, 5sumi, and Satsuma at the time. Such a powerful shugo would not have gone 
as Yoshimochi’s envoy to China. The Ashikaga had trouble controlling regional 
barons, a difficulty compounded in Kyushu by the fact that the region had a historical 
separatist tendency and that the dominant military houses there tended to form local 
coalitions to ward off outside interference.95 The mission, therefore, most likely 
came from Hisatoyo himself. The shugo and merchants in Kyushu had long sought to 
trade with China thanks to geographical convenience. The humble memorial may 
have been written at the instigation of the Chinese envoy Lii Yuan in a desperate 
effort to minimize the gravity of the failure of his 1417 mission.96 That the Wako 
activities in no case abated and that Yoshimochi never sent a tributary mission 
afterwards give further credence to this interpretation.
Yoshimochi did send a reply to the Yongle emperor’s frustrated reprimand of him in 
1418. In it he refused to open relations with the Ming, and denied all responsibility 
for Japanese piracy. While preferring an isolationist strategy toward the Ming, he 
also challenged Chinese superiority by articulating Japan’s national myth and a kind 
of proto-nationalism. It read in part:
94 MS, 6729; and MSLLZ, 452-3.
95 Hall 1990,201.
96 Wang 1953,49. Cheng Liang-Sheng concurs; Cheng 1981,353.
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When my late father was sick, the fortuneteller said: “The gods have cursed 
him.. .At that time sacred gods said through the agency of a man: “Ever since 
antiquity our country has never called itself a vassal of a foreign land. Of late, 
you have changed the way of the former sage sovereigns; you have accepted 
the [Chinese] calendar and [Chinese] seal and have not declined them. This is 
why you have incurred illness.” Thereupon, my late father was greatly 
frightened and vowed to the bright gods that henceforth he would never 
receive envoys or orders from foreign countries. Accordingly, he passed on to 
his sons and grandsons this admonishment to be strictly observed and never 
to be forgotten.
That I neither received the envoys nor sent a single person is not because I 
dare rely on the unassailable [position of this country] to refuse submission. I 
am doing this merely in conformity with the will of the bright gods and in 
respect of the instructions of my late father. Of old, when the Mongol forces 
came a second time with one million soldiers aboard their ships, they were 
entirely without success and drowned in the sea. What was the reason for this? 
It was not only human strength; in reality the divine soldiers invisibly helped 
us in our defense. Those who have heard of this afar must deem it incredible. 
Yet how could we not be in awe of this manifestation of the divine spirits of 
our country since antiquity. These matters are detailed in our national 
histories.
Now we hear that [the Chinese] are going to send troops to smite us on the 
pretext that envoys have not been coming. They have told us to heighten our 
walls and deepen our moats. We do not need to heighten our walls or to 
deepen our moats; we will merely open our roads and meet them.
We do not intend to execute their [the Ming’s] envoy; we only want him not
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to come, and ours not to go and each of us to preserve our fixed territory.97
This is a clear policy statement toward China, outlining both its strategy and motives. 
The strategy is isolation, the suspension of communication with the Ming. The 
motivation is Japanese pride, expressed as a belief in the country’s divinity. The 
Japanese had long asserted the divinity of their country in the expression that “Japan 
is the land of the gods.” The rejection in 1270 of Khubilai Khan’s demand that Japan 
submit to Mongol overlordship, for example, was predicated on it. They further 
attributed the defeat of the Mongol invasions to the aid of the “wind of the gods” 
(kamikaze).98 The successful resistance against the Mongols had stimulated a sense 
of Japanese nationalism. Now the Japanese were no longer ready to submit to China, 
if  they ever were.
There is a remarkable contrast in Japanese policies toward the Ming from 1400 to 
1424. Between 1401 and 1408, Yoshimitsu not only accommodated the Chinese, but 
also acted like a loyal vassal of the Ming. At least on the surface, he dutifully 
performed his obligations as the ruler of a Chinese tributary state. In contrast, 
between 1411 and 1424, Yoshimochi firmly resisted Chinese wishes by adopting an 
isolationist strategy toward the Ming, all the while challenging Chinese superiority 
by evoking Japanese divinity. Clearly rulers’ personalities played a great role in these 
contrasting strategies. Japan’s option of isolation, however, was also offered by its 
felicitous geographical position vis-a-vis the continent.
Strategies and Structure in Sino-Japanese Relations
The same questions can be asked to evaluate the theory developed in Chapter 2 
against evidence from Sino-Japanese relations during the early Ming. Does the 
relationship display a behavioral tendency between Chinese domination and Japanese 
accommodation and resistance? What are the respective Chinese and Japanese
97 Wang 1953, 52-3.
98 Toby 1984,213-5.
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strategies toward each other? What are the motivations behind these strategies? The 
answers broadly support the theory’s propositions. Japanese resistance, however, 
appears as a more prominent response to the Ming than in the case of Sino-Korean 
relations. The difference is largely explained by the factor of geography as well as 
Japanese rulers’ national pride and historical memory.
CHINESE STRATEGIES OF DOMINATION
Early Ming China’s strategies toward Japan as well as the motivations behind them 
were remarkably similar to those toward Korea. As in the case of Korea, Ming rulers 
wanted to control Japanese policies in two areas: tributary relations with the Ming 
and policies toward the Wako. And for the same reasons: legitimacy and security. 
Japan’s submission as a tributary state would help demonstrate the emperors’ 
legitimacy as the Son of Heaven and thus help consolidate their regime. Control over 
its Wako policy would help maintain security and stability in the Ming’s east coast. 
Of course, obtaining Japanese loyalty as a vassal state would guarantee the solution 
of the Wako problem (provided that Japanese rulers were able to suppress piracy), 
since a loyal vassal had to perform its obligations toward the superior.
As with Korea, the Hongwu emperor adopted two primary strategies toward Japan: 
persuasion and blackmail. Each corresponded roughly to the early and late periods of 
his reign. In his first few rescripts, he hoped to persuade Japan to enter tributary 
relations with the Ming and, by extension, to place upon it a normative obligation of 
suppressing piracy. Thus, in his February 1369 rescript, he evoked historical 
precedents to remind Japan of the historical pattern in East Asian politics. He tried to 
emphasize the benevolence of China, and the benefits his empire could bring if other 
countries willingly submitted. In his 1370 rescript, he recounted his success in 
creating a new Chinese dynasty and obtaining tributes from other countries, all in an 
effort to persuade Japan that submitting to China was both morally correct and 
practically imperative. In a show of benevolence, he sent some captured pirates back 
to Japan in 1370. The most conspicuous act of his persuasion strategy was the 
decision to send the monks Zuchan and Keqin to Japan in 1372 after receiving a
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Buddhist mission from Prince Kanenaga one year earlier.
But the emperor grew steadily impatient with Japan’s “intransigence.” As early as in 
March 1369, after hearing news of Japanese piracy, he sent a threatening rescript to 
command Japan’s obedience. In the 1370 rescript, he warned the Japanese “king” to 
be cautious so as to “prolong the line of succession.” In 1376 he threatened with an 
invasion. In 1380 he started calling the Japanese “stupid eastern foreigners.” Finally, 
in 1381, he issued his last threat of war to Kanenaga as well as one to Yoshimitsu. 
These were all instances of his blackmailing Japan to force it to suppress piracy. In 
these years he seemed to have become disillusioned with bringing Japan into 
tributary relations and did not even bother to try persuasion anymore.
In his later years, Hongwu apparently realized that the Japanese were either too 
“stupid” or too recalcitrant to be transformed. He could manipulate tributary politics 
to extract concessions from Korea as the Koreans valued tributary relations with the 
Ming greatly. But he lacked any effective leverage over the Japanese because Japan 
was not in proper tributary relations with the Ming in the first place. Partly for 
reasons of geography, Japan, unlike Korea, had no distinct idea of sadae. Cultural 
borrowing had not produced a truly deferential view toward China. On the contrary, 
the Mongol invasions increased Japanese hostility toward the continent. Moreover, 
Japanese rulers did not perceive as much usefulness from Chinese investiture as their 
Korean counterparts did. In the early Ming, the leverage of investiture was 
completely lacking because Japan was in a civil war and had no single ruler in need 
of external legitimation.
Persuasion may create Chinese authority over Japan, but again, Hongwu was less 
enthusiastic with persuasion than he was with blackmail. Interestingly, he failed to 
use another conceivable strategy—inducement by granting Japan favorable material 
benefits—to win it over. He had a particular antipathy towards trade, or anything 
with a commercial nature in relations between China and other countries. Trade was 
regarded as an annoying aspect of tributary relations, to be limited as much as
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possible. His son, the Yongle emperor, however, willingly adopted the strategy of 
inducement, which made a difference in subsequent Sino-Japanese relations.
Because Yoshimitsu actively sought tributary relations with the Ming and was very 
loyal, Yongle did not need to persuade him to accept Chinese overlordship. He 
needed only to induce the Japanese with material benefits in the early years of this 
reign. This he readily did with the installation of the tally trade in 1404. He also 
allowed Japanese missions to carry both tributary and trading goods to China, well 
aware of their profit motive. Moreover, he either gave a great amount of money and 
other gifts to Japanese envoys bearing tribute to his court or asked his own envoys to 
carry these to Japan, gifts whose lavishness often amazed the Japanese.
But when Yoshimitsu died in 1408, Yongle felt obliged to persuade the shogun’s 
successor and son Yoshimochi to accept the same role Yoshimitsu had played. That 
was most often done by evoking the model behavior of Yoshimitsu. In his three main 
rescripts to Yoshimochi in 1408, 1417, and 1418, he praised the deceased shogun’s 
great virtue and asked Yoshimochi to follow his father’s example. When Chinese 
troops captured some pirates in 1417, Yongle, like Hongwu in 1370, decided to 
return them to Japan. He was hoping that his benevolence might move Japan’s 
stubbornness.
In the face of Japan’s continued isolation, however, Yongle also resorted to 
Hongwu’s favorite strategy: blackmail. Coercive threats were obvious in his 1417 
and 1418 rescripts. He may indeed have had the idea of attacking Japan. In a 1413 
rescript to Korea, for example, Yongle said that he wanted to punish the Japanese by 
a military campaign." But like his father, he could not really execute the threat. In 
the end, he had to accept Japanese isolation.
JAPANESE STRATEGIES OF ACCOMMODATION AND RESISTANCE 
As with the Koreans, the Japanese accommodated as well as resisted Chinese wishes.
99 Huang 1994, 292.
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What distinguishes the Japanese response from the Korean one, however, is that the 
former more readily resisted the Ming than the latter, partly due to the opportunity 
afforded by Japan’s geographical position but also because Japan had a more 
distinctive sense of national identify and pride. Their strategies of resistance include 
balking, defying, and isolation.
The Japanese balked at Ming requests and ignored Chinese tributary norms, but 
nevertheless continued to send missions to the Ming in order to make full use of such 
an intercourse. They frequently exploited the Hongwu emperor’s desire to establish 
tributary relations with Japan. This can be seen from Hongwu’s complaint and 
reprimand of many “improper” or “illegitimate” missions from Japan. Kanenaga 
exploited “tributary” relations, in his five or six missions to China after 1376. So did 
Yoshimitsu in 1374 and 1380, Yoshihiro after 1387, and Shimazu Hisatoyo in 1418. 
These were not instances of bandwagoning, as the Japanese were not accommodating 
the Ming but rather seeking profit from trade by violating Ming regulations.
Defying is a strategy whereby Japan not only refused to accommodate Chinese 
wishes, but also opposed or resisted them with boldness.100 Conceptually, it falls 
between the strategies of balking and challenging.101 When Kanenaga imprisoned 
and executed Chinese envoys in 1369 and detained them in 1372, he was openly 
defying the wishes of China. His most defiant act was his 1382 reply to the Hongwu 
emperor, in which he challenged the Chinese notion of a sinocentric world order. 
Similarly, Yoshimochi defied the Yongle emperor’s assertions in a 1418 letter, 
refusing submission by evoking Japanese divinity. He further warned the Ming that 
Japan would be ready to meet Chinese invasion by force.
Isolation is a strategy whereby Japan tried to break off relations with China. Most 
clearly this was the policy of Yoshimochi. It was tried, however, both before and
100 Lake notes that “Defy is an interesting word to use within the context o f international relations. It implies an 
inequality in status between actors and that the subordinate is renouncing the authority o f the dominant party.” 
Lake 2003, 318.
101 In balking, states would not be bold enough to openly oppose the wishes o f the strong. They just try to ignore 
what the strong tells them to do. In challenging, states go beyond mere opposition or resistance, and take up arms 
against the strong.
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after Yoshimochi’s time. Isolationism was evident after 894 when Heian Japan
ceased formal relations with China, though private trading with the continent
•  102intensified and generated a wealth of revenues for the Heian court. To some 
degree, it was also the conscious policy of Tokugawa Japan after the 1620s. Japan’s 
geographical position, separated from the Asian continent by the sea, made such a 
strategy possible in the first place.
These strategies of resistance demonstrate the Ming’s lack of authority over Japan. 
Sinocentrism met stiff resistance from the Japanese. What about the Japanese 
accommodation with the Ming? Kanenaga briefly paid tribute to the Ming court in 
1371, if we can believe the accounts in Chinese sources. But even so, his 
accommodation was instrumental, as he swiftly changed his position afterwards. 
Yoshimitsu’s accommodation between 1401 and 1408 is a much more complicated 
and interesting story. Even though I have listed all the major reasons historians have 
contemplated for Yoshimitsu’s obedience, it is not clear whether the shogun was 
socialized into believing Chinese superiority. It seems, however, that a certain degree 
of authoritative politics was at work in Sino-Japanese relations during this short 
period.
Conclusion
The evidence presented in this chapter shows that the behavioral pattern in 
Sino-Japanese relations in the early Ming dynasty is one of Chinese domination 
vis-a-vis Japanese accommodation and resistance. Early Ming rulers tried political 
domination for broadly the same reasons in their attempts at domination over Korea: 
the need to demonstrate legitimacy and maintain security along the Chinese coast. 
Japanese rulers tried resistance more than their Korean counterparts, thanks primarily 
to Japan’s island position as well as its national identity and pride.
For a short period between 1401 and 1408, Yoshimitsu may have submitted to the
102 Hurst 1999, 632-3.
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Ming. The mechanism of socialization suggested by the theory of Chinese 
primacy—Chinese persuasion and Japanese learning—were both present in this case. 
Indeed, Yoshimitsu, in addition to being influenced by his Buddhist advisors who 
were true believers of the superiority of the Chinese civilization, also learned 
Chinese culture himself. The question is whether his learning was deep enough to 
produce a perception of the legitimacy in Chinese rule over him. The answers given 
by historians tend to be “no,” and they have identified Yoshimitsu’s self-interested 
motives in opening tributary relations with the Ming. If they are right, then 
Yoshimitsu’s accommodation with the Ming should also be seen as bandwagoning 
for profit, legitimacy, and status. This controversy aside, the Japanese strategies of 
balking, defying, and isolation show that Sino-Japanese relations during this period 
were much more anarchic than hierarchic.
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Chapter 5 
Early Ming China and the Mongols
This chapter further evaluates the theory of Chinese primacy by examining 
Sino-Mongol relations in the early Ming dynasty. As with Sino-Korean and 
Sino-Japanese relations, this relationship cannot be viewed as a relationship between 
two unitary states or political entities with fixed boundaries. Both the early Ming and 
the Mongols were “moving”: The Ming was expanding and consolidating its empire 
not only in the north, but also in the south and the west; the Mongols, needless to say, 
were again on the march as nomads since they had by then been ejected from China 
proper.
The evidence shows that domination over the Mongols was the Ming’s strategic 
objective in the north, an objective necessitated by, in the minds of early Ming 
emperors, consolidating the legitimacy of their rule and achieving security on the 
northern frontier. To this end, they practiced the classic Chinese grand strategy of 
“wei de jianshi” or “gang rou bingji” (I^JIfl^SF), that is, “might
combined with virtue”. War, blackmail, inducement, and persuasion were the 
embodiment of this grand strategy. The Mongol objectives, on the other hand, ranged 
from mere survival to steppe hegemony. For a variety of purposes, they defied, 
bandwagoned, and challenged the Ming. These strategies demonstrate the more 
anarchic nature of Sino-Mongol relations in the early Ming.
Chinese Attempts at Domination
THE HONGWU REIGN: EXPANSION AND CONSOLIDATION 
When Zhu Yuanzhang enthroned himself as the Hongwu emperor of the Ming 
dynasty in Nanjing on 23 January 1368, his regime had only consolidated its base in 
the lower Yangtze. The vast territories to the north and south had yet to be 
incorporated. The year 1368 saw intensive Ming campaigns against Yuan loyalists
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and regional rebels in both the South China coast and the North China plain. 
Naturally, Hongwu sent his best generals—among them the celebrated Xu Da and 
Chang Yuchun—to wage the northern campaign (beifa iU%) and deal a final blow 
to the crumbling Yuan dynasty.1 Only after the Yuan was overthrown could Hongwu 
claim the Mandate of Heaven to rule Zhongguo. Xu Da took the Yuan capital Dadu 
(the present Beijing) on 14 September. The Yuan emperor, Toghon Temur (r. 
1332-70), and the crown prince, Ayushiridara (r. 1370-8), escaped with some of the 
court barely in advance of the Ming armies and fled first into Shangdu (Kaiping) and 
then into Yingchang in Inner Mongolia.2 The Yuan dynasty remained only in name, 
later to be called the Northern Yuan as it was in exile in Mongolia.
Yet the security threat from the Mongols was a paramount concern for the early Ming 
rulers. Although the capture of the Yuan capital symbolized the transfer of the 
Mandate of Heaven to the Ming, it failed to eliminate the Mongol threat. The Yuan 
emperor fled north, with a sizeable number of his officials and soldiers. Toghon 
Temur’s temporary court at Yingchang became a natural center of attraction for 
Mongol refugees and other Yuan loyalists. Yuan rule certainly had not ended as 
Toghon Temur and his successors continued to proclaim their own reign titles and 
pose a rival legitimacy claim to Ming rule. More ominously, Koko Temur, the best 
Yuan general at the time, and lesser Yuan regionalists like Li Siqi controlled all of 
Shanxi and Shaanxi upon the fall of Beijing. They thus had a common frontier with 
Ming Sheng, the ruler of Sichuan, another important region yet to be conquered. The 
Ming’s northern campaign of 1368 achieved more at driving out the Mongols than at 
eliminating or incorporating them.
To further expand and consolidate the empire, Ming generals conquered Shanxi and 
Shaanxi by 1370. Hongwu, now determined to eliminate the Mongols, ordered a 
two-pronged offensive against them. Li Wenzhong and Feng Sheng would attack the 
Yuan emperor at Yingchang through the Juyong Pass, while Xu Da would march
1 MS, 14-5.
2 MS, 18, 6831; Dreyer 1982, 63; and Dreyer 1988, 97.
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from Xi’an in search of Koko Temur.3 This was an offensive strategy of conquest 
driven by security considerations in the north.4 Chinese sources explicitly single out 
the elimination of the “frontier worry” (bianhuan as the motive behind the
1370 campaigns.5 The success of these campaigns established Ming rule in eastern 
Inner Mongolia and the Gansu corridor.
Defeating the recalcitrant Mongols with military might, Hongwu wasted no time in 
showing his benevolence to the captured and surrendered. While seizing power from 
the Mongols, Hongwu acknowledged the legitimacy of the Yuan, announced that “no 
difference exists between the Chinese and foreigners” (Hua yi wu jian  ^ 5 K lX l) , 
and promised favorable treatment of those who came to surrender.6 After the 1370 
campaigns, Hongwu granted Maidiribala, Ayushiridara’s young son captured by Li 
Wenzhong, the title “Marquis of Chongli,” gave the deceased Yuan emperor the 
posthumous title of “Shundi,” and drew up a eulogy himself. The strategy worked up 
to a point, as several Yuan generals came to offer submission to the Ming.7 Towards 
its primary targets, however, it had little effect. In July and November 1370 Hongwu 
twice sent a rescript urging Ayushiridara to submit. Late in December he sent another 
rescript, this one addressed to the remaining Mongol leaders as well as to 
Ayushiridara himself.8 In the rescripts Hongwu also threatened them with war if they 
did not comply,9 Although many lesser Mongol princes defected to the Ming, Koko 
Temur and Ayushiridara remained adamant.
This compelled Hongwu to continue both war and diplomacy. The Mongols 
remained a serious threat to the Ming in two ways. First, their incursions into the 
Ming frontier constituted a physical security threat. In the 1370s the Northern Yuan 
still vaguely hoped to restore dynastic rule in the south. Second, the Mongol 
pretension to continuing Yuan rule posed a legitimacy threat to the Ming regime.
3 MS, p. 6831; and Dreyer 1982, 72.
4 The Ming might also have wanted to deprive the Sichuan regime of any hope of Mongol assistance, as it made 
diplomatic efforts to induce the Sichuan government to surrender without fighting in 1369-70. Dreyer 1982, 72.
5 MS, 6831.
6 Mao and Li 1994,91-2.
7 MS, 6831.
8 DMB, 16.
9 MS, 6831; Dreyer 1982, 74; and Pokotilov 1976, 7.
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Thus, although the Yuan had been overthrown, the transfer of the Mandate of 
Heaven—the basis of imperial legitimacy—had not been completed, at least not 
voluntarily on the part of Yuan dynasts. As long as the Northern Yuan existed, 
Hongwu’s claim to the Mandate of Heaven could be potentially challenged.
Hongwu thus hoped for a formal acknowledgment of Ming superiority from 
Ayushiridara and a renunciation of the latter’s claim to the imperial throne.10 This 
would not only further fragment the Mongol tribes, help bring them under Ming 
control, and thus alleviate the burden of frontier defense, but also eliminate the 
Mongol threat to the legitimacy of Ming rule. But since Ayushiridara was unwilling 
to surrender, only conquest and domination in the steppe could achieve Hongwu’s 
objectives.
In 1372 the emperor ordered a massive campaign to conquer all three Mongol 
strongholds in Karakorum, the rest of the Gansu corridor, and Inner Mongolia. The 
fact that he ordered Xu Da to attack the traditional Mongol capital Karakorum, as 
Arthur Waldron points out, “suggests that he may have hoped to take that city, win 
submission from the remaining nomads, and thereafter to govern the Mongol steppe 
as part of his empire, just as his Yuan predecessors had.”11 In 1372 the Mongols did 
not pose a visible threat, having just been defeated by the Ming two years earlier. 
Rather, Hongwu was encouraged by the 1370 victory and the 1371 conquest of 
Sichuan, further offended by Ayushiridara’s and Koko Temur’s refusal to submit, to 
attempt a complete conquest of Mongolia and thus eliminate the Mongol threat once 
and for all.
The campaign, however, ended in a major failure for the Ming, and put it on the 
defensive for the next fifteen years. Between 1368 and 1372, the Ming scored every 
major victory against the Mongols, all the while conquering and incorporating 
Shanxi, Shaanxi (including the Gansu corridor), Sichuan, and Liaodong into the
10 Dreyer 1982, 74.
"  Waldron 1990, 74.
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empire. Edward Dreyer argues that in 1372 Hongwu “was attempting to establish 
himself as the heir to the whole Yuan political tradition, in the nomadic areas as well 
as in the areas of Chinese habitation.”12 Between 1372 and 1387, in contrast, the 
Ming adopted a largely defensive posture, establishing a frontier garrison system to 
gain a foothold in the conquered territories north of Beijing. Military expeditions 
were taken primarily to repel Mongol raids.
What drove Hongwu to moderate his ambitions? Certainly the defeat of 1372 was 
crucial, and Koko Temur’s victory over Xu Da, the Ming’s most talented and hitherto 
invincible general, might have daunted the Ming military establishment. A more 
important cause, however, is found in the inadequacy of Ming resources to sustain 
further attacks on the Mongols. By 1372, barely four years had passed since the 
Ming’s founding. Hongwu had to spend resources elsewhere consolidating his 
expanding empire. Rebellions were mounting in newly conquered areas such as 
Guangxi, Huguang, Sichuan, and Shaanxi. Yunnan, ruled by the Yuan Prince of 
Liang, and the far southwest were still unconquered. Japanese piracy was growing 
into serious proportions that required troops to strengthen coastal defenses.13 Even if 
Hongwu had wished to subjugate the Mongols by force after 1372, his military 
muscle would have fallen short as a result of continuous warfare throughout the 
founding of his empire.
For the next several years Hongwu intensified his efforts to win over the Mongols. In 
January 1373 he sent an envoy to the Northern Yuan emperor Ayushiridara. In 
October 1374 he sent Maidiribala back to Mongolia. Dispatching the return of 
Maidiribala with heavy gifts, Hongwu also gave Ayushiridara silk fabric clothes 
along with another summons to him to accept his authority.14 Hongwu probably 
believed that four years of life in the Ming capital would have instilled a pro-Ming 
inclination into the heir to the Mongol throne and hoped that he would persuade his 
people to submit. Ayushiridara, however, once more ignored the Ming offer.
12 Dreyer 1988, 103, 106.
13 Dreyer 1982, 75.
14 MS, 6832; and DMB, 16.
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Hongwu saw another chance of diplomatic settlement when Ayushiridara died in 
1378. The hope, however, was a false one. The Ming’s bet on the successor was 
Maidiribala, but in fact Ayushiridara was succeeded by his younger brother Toghus 
Temur (r. 1378-88/89), presumably because Maidiribala was discredited by his stay 
in Nanjing. Hongwu nevertheless took the chance to show new courtesy to the 
Mongols. He sent a special envoy to attend the mourning ceremonies and deliver his 
personal eulogy.15
The Mongols were unimpressed and the Ming had to resume military expeditions. In 
1379-81, the Ming’s successful expeditions alleviated the Mongol threat in the north. 
In 1387 Hongwu managed to receive the surrender of Naghachu in Manchuria.16 
The whole of Liaodong was now secure, and Hongwu was finally able to sever 
Korea’s relations with the Mongols, a relationship the Koreans had ambiguously 
maintained since 1369. The Northern Yuan’s base in Manchuria and its hope of using 
the Koreans against the Ming were thus completely lost.
Success invites the expansion of war aims. Encouraged by the surrender of Naghachu, 
Hongwu decided to take on the remaining Mongol resistance—that of the Northern 
Yuan emperor Toghus Temur in the Mongolian steppe, the focal point of Mongol 
loyalties. He ordered Lan Yu to take 150,000 men across the Gobi to crush the Yuan 
remnants. The goal was to eliminate the Mongol “frontier worry” once and for all, to 
“exterminate the remaining enemies of the north” and complete the failed missions 
of the 1372 campaigns.17 With perseverance and luck, Lan Yu’s army took the 
Mongol camp near Buyur Lake completely by surprise on the morning of 18 May 
1388. The Yuan emperor escaped and fled into Outer Mongolia, only to be 
assassinated within a year. His death disrupted the always fragile succession 
practices of the Mongol royal house, fragmenting Mongol tribes without effective
15 MS, 6832; and DMB, 1293.
16 MS, 6832-3.
17 MS, 6833.
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leadership for over a generation thereafter.18 The campaigns in 1387-88 destroyed 
the unity of the Yuan dynasty in exile. Thereafter and especially during the Yongle 
reign, the Ming had to contend with a number of Mongol chieftains jostling for 
influence in the steppe.
During the remaining years of his reign, Hongwu sought to prevent the rise of 
Mongol power in the steppe. Hearing that formerly scattered Mongols after Toghus 
Temur’s death were gathering around Nayur Buqa, Hongwu first tried to induce 
Nayur Buqa and his followers and then to attack them. Following their victory, 
Hongwu placed his two sons Prince of Yan and Prince of Jin to manage frontier 
affairs in the north, while sending generals to supervise frontier defense and military 
farming every year.19 Apparently Hongwu wanted to have an enduring foothold in 
the steppe to ward off Mongol raids and destroy any dangerous concentration of 
Mongol power. At least two more campaigns were waged in the remainder of the 
Hongwu reign.
THE YONGLE REIGN: VIGOUR WITHOUT VISION
In the beginning of the Yongle reign, the Mongol world was divided into two rival 
groups competing for power. The Eastern Mongols (dada M U ), led by their 
powerful chieftain Arughtai, dominated central and southern Mongolia. The area of 
the Altai Mountains was the home of the Western Mongols, or Oirats (wala TCf!)), 
led by their three chieftains Mahmud, Taiping, and Batu Bolod.20 The Eastern 
Mongols posed the greater threat because of their geographical proximity to the 
Ming frontier. Holding the legitimate heir of Chinggis Khan, they claimed to rule the 
whole of the Mongolian steppe. Although they had by now abandoned the Yuan reign 
title, their refusal to acknowledge Ming superiority nevertheless posed a problem for 
the Ming. The Oirats, though farther west, were a potential threat as they wanted to 
establish their hegemony in the steppe from the west and were in frequent conflicts 
with the Eastern Mongols throughout the Yongle reign.
18 MS, 6833-4; and Dreyer 1982, 143.
19 MS, 6834.
20 MS, 6861.
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Upon his enthronement, the Yongle emperor sent envoys to both the Eastern 
Mongols and the Oirats with gifts to notify them of his accession. Yongle, like 
Hongwu, claimed that as the “ruler of the tianxia” (tianxia zhu ^ T i ) ,  he would 
make no distinction between the Chinese and foreigners (bufen huayi 
So long as the Mongols could come to submit, both would be regarded as his proper 
subjects. He also allowed trade to flourish freely along the frontier and particularly 
encouraged the trade of Chinese goods for Mongol horses.22 Several missions were 
sent to both the Eastern Mongols and the Oirats, exhorting them to sent tribute and 
open “friendly relations” (tonghao M#?). The relationship between the Ming and the 
Mongols during the Hongwu reign was far from “friendly.” Yongle was showing 
courtesies to his former adversaries in the hope of winning them over through 
inducement and persuasion. One of these missions was, however, detained by 
Guilichi, the khan of the Eastern Mongols.23 Earlier Guilichi had earned Yongle’s 
wrath by poisoning the prince of Hami whom the Ming court had enfeoffed.24 But 
the emperor remained patient. While continuing diplomacy, he also ordered his 
generals to tighten frontier defense as the fighting between the Eastern Mongols and 
the Oirats often extended into the frontier region.25
In 1407, an Eastern Mongol envoy named Eryichi came to the Ming court. This was 
probably not a “tribute mission” as the Veritable Records o f  the Ming Dynasty failed 
to mention any tribute (gong Ja) on the part of the Mongols and the Official History 
o f the Ming Dynasty even omitted this mission entirely. Yongle nevertheless regarded 
it as important and ordered his troops to accompany the envoys on their way back to 
Mongolia. He seemed to be well aware of the nature of Eryichi’s mission. As he told 
his generals in a secret edict: “Eryichi is the master (shi jiff) of Guilichi and is 
possibly sent by him. As Guilichi wants to fight the Wala (the Oirats) westward, he
21 Mao and Li 1994, 92. It should be noted, however, that both emperors made contradictory statements about the 
nature o f Yi. Announcing there was no difference between Hua and Yi was primarily intended to persuade the 
Mongols to submit. At times Hongwu and Yongle also regarded the Yi as having a different nature ffom Han 
Chinese and compared them to “birds and beasts.” See Johnston 1995, 187.
22 Mao and Li 1994, 100.
23 MSLLZ, 4; and MS, 6834-5,6861.
24 DMB, 12.
25 MS, 6835.
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will have to move his families southward but fears the attack of our troops. So he has 
sent Eryichi to delay the march of our troops. It is also possible that Guilichi wants to 
submit but has not yet decided. So he has first sent the envoy to probe our intentions. 
It is also heard that the Mongols would soon raid the frontiers; you should carefully 
prepare for that.”26
This analysis may not be correct, but Yongle demonstrated a certain understanding of 
steppe politics at the time. His acceptance of a non-tribute mission from a rival 
would surely challenge the “tribute system” framework in understanding China’s 
foreign relations. Yet it may not be all that surprising. Because he was still hoping to 
win over the Eastern Mongols by diplomacy, Yongle might have thought that the 
acceptance of Eryichi’s ambiguous mission could be one step toward establishing his 
eventual supremacy over them. After all, the emperor was noted for his flexibility in 
foreign affairs. According to Joseph Fletcher, Yongle was even willing to abandon his 
claim of superiority and address the ruler of the Timurid empire in Central Asia as an 
equal in a 1418 letter.27
Perhaps in an attempt to ascertain his conjectures, in November 1407, Yongle sent a 
rescript to Guilichi seven months after Eryichi’s mission to the Ming. Formally, the 
emperor asked for an explanation of the detention of his envoy. Substantively, he was 
really pressuring the Mongol khan to make a decision about his attitude toward the 
Ming. Guilichi, however, was murdered by Arughtai in 1408. The latter quickly 
started installing a new puppet, a descendant of Chinggis Khan named Bunyashiri as 
khan. Yongle dispatched an envoy in February 1408 to explore Bunyashiri’s 
intentions and sent a long rescript to apply more pressure two months later. In it he 
first tried to persuade Bunyashiri of Ming benevolence and how accepting Ming rule 
conforms to the “Way of Heaven.” He next tried to induce Bunyashiri with political 
and economic benefits that would come with his submission. Finally he warned him
26 MSLLZ, 4-5.
27 Fletcher 1968, 206-24.
28 MSLLZ, 5.
29 MS, 6835.
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1 A
of the consequence of non-compliance. But Bunyashiri sent no reply. The Ming 
was defied by the Yuan royal house, in the Hongwu as well as the Yongle reign.
Good news then came from the Oirats in the west. Yongle’s first envoy to the Oirat 
camp was sent in 1403 but was briefly detained by the Oirat leader Mahmud. The 
emperor, undeterred, again dispatched embassies in 1404 and 1407 with usual gifts.31 
Finally, in October 1408, Mahmud sent tribute horses to the Ming court and asked 
for investiture. Yongle was pleased and in the summer of 1409 granted the titles of 
Shunning Wang to Mahmud, Xianyi Wang to Taiping, and Anle Wang to Batu 
Bolod.32
The timing of this investiture was important. Just days before it, Yongle heard that
'X 'Ihis envoy to the Eastern Mongols was killed by Bunyashiri. Such defiance called 
for retaliation and the furious emperor ordered to intensify frontier defense and 
prepare expeditions against the Eastern Mongols. His investiture of the Oirats was 
most probably meant to keep them on his side so that they could check further 
Eastern Mongol expansion before his upcoming campaign against Bunyashiri and 
Arughtai. In fact, even without Ming efforts reconciliation or even alliance between 
the Eastern Mongols and the Oirats against the Ming were extremely difficult to 
contrive. But the Ming investiture of the Oirats precluded any possibility of the two 
bitter rivals’ uniting themselves and enabled the Ming to deal with the Eastern 
Mongols separately. The Oirats, for their part, quickly defeated the encroaching 
Bunyashiri and Arughtai and drove them to the KerUlen River area. With this 
opportunity in sight, Yongle commissioned Qiu Fu one month later as grand general 
to conquer the Eastern Mongols.34
But Qiu Fu’s defeat incensed Yongle. A month later he was determined to personally 
lead an expedition. In an edict to the crown prince, he said Qiu Fu’s defeat had
30 MSLLZ, 5-6; and MS, 6835.
31 DMB, 1036.
32 MSLLZ, 6; and MS, 6861.
33 MSLLZ, 6.
34 Ibid., 7.
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humiliated Ming authority. Unless the Eastern Mongols were exterminated, their 
aggressiveness will not bring fortune to the frontier.35 He therefore wanted to restore 
Ming military prestige and alleviate the security threat on the frontier by conquering 
Bunyashiri and Arughtai. Meanwhile he bestowed gifts on the Oirats and reminded 
them of the Eastern Mongols’ treacherousness. Presumably this was meant to 
remind them of the need to stand firm against the Eastern Mongols. Thus securing 
the western front, Yongle began his first Mongolian campaign in March 1410. His 
objective, as stated in the campaign edict, was to “clear up the desert” (saoqing 
shamo that is, to wipe out enemies in the Mongolian steppe.37 This
campaign split and weakened the Eastern Mongols for a time, but it failed to capture 
either Bunyashiri or Arughtai, allowing the latter to soon reassemble a large horde.
The defeated Arughtai then sent an envoy to present tribute horses to the Ming court 
in January 1411. The envoy tried to alienate the Ming and the Oirats by pointing out 
that the Oirats’ submission was not “sincere”. Interestingly, two months later when 
Mahmud sent tribute to the Ming, he too tried to persuade Yongle of the 
untrustworthiness of Arughtai.39
It is not clear whether Yongle agreed with either of these men’s assessment of the 
other, but he was surely aware of the Mongols’ varied motives behind their tribute 
missions. From Yongle’s reply to Arughtai’s first mission we know that the emperor 
knew of the Oirats’ “insincerity.”40 In the case of Arughtai, Yongle later said that 
Arughtai’s coming to the court was due to his “lack of strength” (shiqiong not
out of his “true heart” (benxin ^'L>).41 Does it matter whether the Mongols’ 
“submission” was real or pretended? The Yongle emperor did not seem to care much. 
He was more concerned with demonstrating his legitimacy to rule “ten thousand 
directions” and his superiority over the “four foreigners.” And that could be shown,
35 MSLLZ, 9.
36 Ibid., II.
37 Ibid, 10.
38 MSLLZ, 17.
39 Ibid., 18.
40 Ibid., 17.
41 Ibid., 32.
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at least on the surface, by Mongol tribute missions to his court. For the moment, 
therefore, he preferred the status quo of receiving tribute missions, pretended or 
otherwise, from both the Eastern Mongols and the Oirats since this would signal his 
superiority over them. From 1411 until his next campaign against Mahmud in 1414, 
then, Yongle could feel that his rule had extended to the entire Mongolian steppe.
Although Arughtai now sent regular tribute missions to the Ming, Mahmud, 
benefited from years of tributary relations with the Ming and the defeat of Arughtai, 
became restless. In 1412-13, his relations with the Ming court deteriorated. 
Confronted with Mahmud’s increasingly defiant moves such as detaining his envoys 
and sending “arrogant” petitions, Yongle warned in early 1413: “If you can repent 
and apologize, I will treat you as before. Otherwise, I would assemble an army to 
punish your crime.”42 In the same year, both Arughtai’s envoy and a certain Boyan 
Buqa came to the court to complain about Mahmud’s wrongdoings. Yongle decided 
to give Mahmud one more chance, saying that if the Oirat leader did not send envoys 
to apologize in that autumn, he would march against him before it was too late.43
Knowing that a war with the Oirats was probably inevitable—he was not so much 
concerned with Mahmud’s “insincerity”, which he knew all along, as with the Oirats’ 
increasing defiance, growing power, and their capability to do damage to the 
northern frontier—Yongle granted Arughtai the title of Hening Wang in August 1413, 
with additional titles for his mother and wife.44 This was clearly intended to have 
Arughtai on his side in the upcoming campaign against Mahmud, just as he did when 
he invested Mahmud in 1409 before Qiu Fu’s disastrous expedition against Arughtai. 
Finally, when in December 1413 the Ming garrison commander of Kaiping reported 
that Mahmud had led his horde near the Kerulen River preparing to raid the Ming 
frontier, Yongle decided to take a personal campaign against Mahmud.45
He left Beijing in April 1414. The campaign edict reads in part: “Now the four
42 MSLLZ, 19; and MS, 6862.
43 MSLLZ, 20.
44 MSLLZ, 20; and MS, 6836.
45 MSLLZ, 21.
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comers are trouble-free. Only the remaining caitiffs constitute a worry (huan 0 ) ,  
particularly the Wala (the Oirats). Repelling them and Zhongguo will be secure.”46 
The rising power of the Oirats had begun to challenge Chinese dominance in the 
steppe and created a security threat for the northern frontier, which was further 
exacerbated by Mahmud’s defiance. This defiance, of course, challenged Yongle’s 
superiority in the steppe. It is essentially for these reasons that Yongle decided to 
conquer the Oirat Mongols. In June the Ming army defeated but failed to capture 
Mahmud.47
For the next few years Yongle could feel that he succeeded in re-establishing his 
dominance in the steppe. In early 1415, the three Oirat chieftains Mahmud, Taiping, 
and Batu Bolod sent envoys to present tribute horses and offered an “apology.”48 
Although Yongle was not deceived—he called the Oirats’ “apology” “cunning 
language to cover up wrongdoings” (qiao yan wen guo F/llf j t i i ) —he nevertheless 
accepted the mission mindful of the need to show benevolence to his defeated enemy 
and, perhaps more importantly, to demonstrate that he again obtained submission 
from the Oirats.49 Meanwhile Arughtai continued to present uninterrupted tribute 
until 1421. In 1415-21, then, Yongle could again claim to be the overlord of 
Mongolia.
But the emperor soon found himself having to deal with the rise of the Eastern 
Mongol power. The defeat of the Oirats again disrupted the balance of power in the 
steppe. To keep a balance of power among the Mongols was hard enough. To keep 
both of them weak and balanced against each other was even harder. Every time 
when one fell, the other soon rose. The stronger party, whoever it was, would then 
attempt to dominate the other, harass the Chinese, and establish hegemony in the 
steppe.
This was in fact what Arughtai tried to do after 1416. Yongle announced a campaign
46 Ibid., 22.
47 MSLLZ, 22-5; MS, 6862; and Dreyer 1982, 179.
48 MSLLZ, 26.
49 MSLLZ, 26; and MS, 6862.
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to chastise Arughtai in the autumn of 1421. Arughtai’s raids into Xinghe in the spring 
of 1422 strengthened his determination. Between April 1422 and May 1424, Yongle 
launched three campaigns against Arughtai, all without capturing the Eastern Mongol 
chieftain. On 12 August 1424, before reaching the modem Great Wall line from the 
steppe, Yongle, perhaps China’s most famous “emperor on horseback,” died in
50camp.
M ongol Resistance and Accommodation
The larger picture of Sino-Mongol relations during the Hongwu reign is of gradual 
Chinese advance into the steppe, and Mongol retreat and resistance against Chinese 
encroachment. Hongwu, as well as Yongle after him, aimed to establish his 
superiority over the Mongols by both offensive wars and diplomacy. Large numbers 
of Mongols surrendered. According to one account, over 800,000 Mongols 
surrendered to the Ming during the Hongwu and Yongle reigns.51 Most of them were 
ordinary men and, with the exception of Naghachu, petty chieftains, the lesser kinds 
among the Mongol ruling elite. The most prominent ones and surely the primary 
targets of Hongwu’s Mongolian strategies, such as the Yuan royal house and Kokb 
Temur, stood firm in defiance of the Ming’s sustained military and diplomatic 
pressures. The Hongwu emperor could claim to have established Chinese hegemony 
in the steppe. Hegemony, however, is not the same as authority. A Ming authority or 
hierarchy in Mongolia can only be said to have been achieved over petty chieftains 
and their followers. It simply eluded Hongwu when it came to the Yuan royal house 
or its chief ministers and generals.
THE YONGLE REIGN: BETWEEN BAND WAGONING AND CHALLENGING 
In the beginning of the Yongle reign, a rough bipolar order emerged in the steppe. 
Despite frequent fighting, some of which were carried out near the Ming frontier, 
neither the Eastern Mongols under Arughtai nor the Oirats under Mahmud were able
50 MSLLZ, 37-9; MS, 6837; and Dreyer 1982, 182. For an introduction to Ming military campaigns, including 
the ones during the Hongwu and Yongle reigns mentioned in this chapter, see Mao and Wang 1994.
51 Ma 2003,225.
52 MS, 6835.
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to destroy the other. Because of the dearth of Mongol sources, we lack details about 
the struggles in this steppe bipolarity. We know, however, from the Chinese sources, 
that in the early years of the Yongle reign the Eastern Mongols were on the offensive 
against the Oirats. The Veritable Records o f the Ming Dynasty records, for example, a 
secret edict Yongle sent to his frontier generals in 1407 in which the emperor said 
that Guilichi, khan of the Eastern Mongols at the time, were about to move westward 
and fight the Oirats.53
The Eastern Mongol offensive would explain the Oirats’ decision in 1408 to send 
tribute to the Ming court. Few historians have explained adequately why Mahmud, 
after five years (1403-08) of refusal, finally decided to send tribute and ask for Ming 
titles in October 1408. His change of attitude would need a reason. What reason 
could be more powerful than that of ensuring his survival and preserving his power 
against the encroaching Eastern Mongols? Bandwagoning with the Ming by sending 
it tribute would bring more valuable Chinese goods, such as paper money, silver, silk, 
etc., in return. It was therefore first and foremost a self-strengthening move. In the 
volatile nomadic world, Chinese wealth could buy tribesmen’s obedience in times of 
conflict. According to Henry Serruys, Ming titles could also enhance the chieftains’ 
prestige among the Mongols,54 thus giving them a better chance to control their own 
followers in the struggle against the enemy.
That the Oirats were on the defensive is given further credence in an entry in the 
Veritable Records o f  the Ming Dynasty which relates that in the summer of 1409 the 
Eastern Mongols indeed invaded the Oirat tribes. But by then the Oirats had 
apparently been strengthened or encouraged by their tributary relations with the 
Ming, for they defeated the Eastern Mongols and captured their livestock.55 This 
would also challenge the existing interpretation among many historians that Mahmud 
repaid Yongle’s investiture by attacking Arughtai or that Yongle encouraged him to
53 MSLLZ, 4.
54 Serruys 1967, 99.
55 MSLLZ, 7.
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do so.56 Mahmud was in fact on the defensive, and only defeated Arughtai when the 
latter invaded. His victory served Yongle’s purpose of supporting the Oirats to 
weaken the Eastern Mongols, but this was first of all a result of his own defense and 
expansion against Arughtai.
Arughtai defied the Ming until his defeat by the Ming army in 1410. In January 1411 
he sent tribute horses to the Ming court. His motive is easy to think of, and quickly 
confirmed by subsequent events leading up to Yongle’s 1422 campaign against him. 
Severely defeated by the Ming, he now lacked necessary military capability to 
further his defiance. Assembling another horde from the scattered Mongols would 
take some time. Conciliation, or pretended submission, was thus necessary for the 
recovery of his strength. His coming to the Ming court, therefore, was a 
self-strengthening move just like that adopted by Mahmud a little over two years ago. 
Moreover, he was conscious of the consequence of his defeat for the balance of 
power in the steppe. Fearful of Oirat hegemony, he tried to alienate the quasi-alliance 
between his Oirat rivals and the Ming. Thus, his envoy told Yongle that the Oirats’ 
submission was not “sincere,” as they had not handed over the imperial seal of the
7^ •Yuan dynasty to the Ming. Indeed, if Arughtai had not sought some kind of
rapprochement with the Ming, his tribe would probably have been displaced by a
now much stronger Mahmud eager to establish Oirat hegemony in the steppe. Tribute
to the Ming therefore served another crucial purpose: It could potentially bring Ming
protection since he was now nominally Yongle’s vassal, though that protection was
unreliable. This motive could not escape the attention of Chinese scholar-officials,
who pointed out that Arughtai “submitted” to the court because he was pressed by
the Oirats to move southward and needed a breathing time near the Ming frontier.58
«
Arughtai’s tribute missions to the Ming court continued in earnest, and the benefits 
he and his tribesmen accrued from this relationship justified his accommodation with 
the Ming. Between 1411 and 1424, according to Hok-Lam Chan, Arughtai sent
56 Pokotilov 1976, 28; Barfield 1989, 236; and Perdue 2005, 55.
57 MSLLZ, 17.
58 MSLLZ, 32; and MS, 6836.
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twenty-seven missions to the Ming court, more than the court’s normal regulation 
(once every year) allowed; in 1413 and 1414, he sent a total of eleven missions.59 
His tribute consisted mostly of horses. In return, the Ming court rewarded him and 
his envoys with paper money, silver, silk textiles, and supplies, gave them official 
titles, and paid handsomely for the tribute products as well.
In 1413 Arughtai was given the title of Hening Wang by the Yongle emperor. Ming 
titles were useful for the Mongols for both prestige and wealth. As Henry Serruys has 
pointed out, Ming titles or ranks were themselves a matter of prestige, but also of 
material interest, since the higher the Mongols’ ranks the richer also the return 
presents they received for the tribute.60 At the end of the year 1413, Arughtai sent a 
mission to request Ming titles for his 2962 subordinates. Early in 1414, he again 
requested Ming titles for his 129 subordinates; twice in the second half of 1414 he 
made the same requests. On all these occasions Yongle satisfied Arughtai’s needs and 
bestowed titles as well as lavish gifts.61 Apparently Arughtai was helping his 
subordinates and relatives share in the benefits of tributary relations with the Ming, 
thus strengthening the Eastern Mongols’ position in the steppe.
Arughtai, however, revealed his strategic intentions both in the steppe and in his 
relations with the Ming at an early stage. His January 1411 mission with the purpose 
to alienate the Ming and the Oirats from each other has already been mentioned. One
year later, Arughtai requested that the Ming accept him as overlord of the Jurchens
• 62and Tibetans, thus clearly, though carelessly, exposing his intention to dominate 
the steppe. In a 1413 mission, his envoys asked Yongle to send an expedition against 
Mahmud and even offered his men as the Ming army’s vanguard.63 Arughtai was not 
only exploiting tributary relations with the Ming for material benefits, but also trying 
to exploit Ming power to weaken his rival and enhance his own position in 
Mongolia.
59 Chan 1988,265.
60 Serruys 1967, 99.
61 MSLLZ, 21, 25.
62 Mao and Li 1994, 176, 182; and DMB, 13.
63 MSLLZ, 20.
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Yet the Oirats were also deft at exploiting relations with the Ming. Arughtai’s fear of 
Oirat hegemony after his 1410 defeat by the Ming was well founded: Mahmud soon 
moved into the power vacuum in the steppe. To see how the Oirats tried to take 
advantage of the Eastern Mongols’ defeat and exploit their warm relations with the 
Ming, one need only examine the nature of Mahmud’s March 1411 mission, barely 
two months after Arughtai’s first tribute mission to the Ming court. Mahmud’s envoy 
reminded Yongle that Arughtai was obstinate and unruly. Regaining strength he 
would harm the frontier again, and envoys from countries in the northwest would not 
dare to go south. He hoped that the emperor could “plot” (tu @0) actions against 
Arughtai soon.64
Two observations should be made. First, by persuading the emperor of Arughtai’s 
deception and the necessity of further actions against him, the Oirats were hoping 
that the Ming might hand them a cheap steppe hegemony by eliminating Arughtai. 
Second, one Mongol tribe’s accusation of the other reveals an important aspect of 
Mongol relations with the Chinese, namely, powerful Mongol tribes would try to 
monopolize their relations with the Ming and eliminate rivals and potential enemies 
in order to control all tributary and trade relations with the Chinese for their own 
benefits. Intercepting other tribes’ tribute missions, robbing their goods, or 
preventing them altogether from traveling to China: These were the means by which 
powerful chieftains sought to maintain their monopoly of relations with the Ming.
This further reveals why both the Eastern Mongols and the Oirats were so eager to 
establish hegemony in the steppe. Hegemony was, of course, itself desirable as it 
could reduce inter-tribe hostility and instability and demonstrate a chieftain’s power. 
But steppe hegemony would also put the chieftain in a favorable position to benefit 
from China’s immense economic resources, benefits that would not only help the 
nomads to develop a more secure economic base but also enable the ruler to deal 
more effectively with Chinese power and pursue more grandiose adventures. Thus,
64 Ibid., 18.
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the Oirats spoke of the fear of Eastern Mongol control of the steppe’s relations with 
the Ming once Arughtai regained his strength. But, would this not also be the 
preferred action of the Oirats when they were strong?
Indeed it was. Seeing no further Ming action against the Eastern Mongols, Mahmud 
in 1412 moved to kill their khan Bunyashiri, who had been in flight westward as a 
result of Yongle’s 1410 campaign. Installing Delbek as new khan in the old Mongol 
capital Karakorum, Mahmud began to move east against Arughtai, with the obvious 
intent of uniting the Mongols and achieving hegemony in the steppe.65 Then in the 
• summer of 1412 he asked Yongle to destroy Arughtai. The ostensible reason given 
was that he had recovered the Yuan imperial seal from Bunyashiri and wanted to 
present it to the Ming but feared Arughtai’s interception—another good indication of 
intra-Mongol politics in relation with the Ming. Further, Mahmud asked Ming 
rewards and even weapons for his tribesmen.66
Such requests are easily understandable as the Oirat leader was preparing to unite the 
steppe and thus needed Ming resources. Mahmud’s ambition was further revealed in 
the complaint that Boyan Buqa, a certain Mongol who apparently came to submit, 
made to the Ming court in the summer of 1413: “Since murdering Bunyashiri, 
Mahmud has been arrogant and without restraint. He wanted to resist and compete 
with Zhongguo. It is not out of sincerity but for valuable goods such as gold and silk 
that he has sent envoys to the court. He frequently led his warriors into the frontier 
region and intercepted other tribute envoys, thus obstructing the passage in the north. 
It is better to exterminate him by force.”67
Still, this question remains: If Mahmud had been benefiting handsomely from 
tributary relations with the Ming, why should he begin to offend the Ming directly 
even to the point of detaining Ming envoys sent by the Yongle emperor? His 1413 
tribute mission to the Ming court was accompanied by an “arrogant” petition and
65 Chan 1988, 226.
66 MSLLZ, 19; and MS, 6861.
67 MSLLZ, 20.
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requests for many rewards from the Ming. He further asserted that many of those 
who submitted to the Eastern Mongols in Gansu and Ningxia were his relatives and 
asked the emperor to return these to him. Obviously this request was intended to 
expand the manpower of his horde. Finally in December 1413 the garrison 
commander of Kaiping reported that with the pretext of attacking Arughtai, Mahmud 
had led his horde near the Keriilen River and prepared to raid the Ming frontier. In 
the same month Arughtai also reported that the Oirats were preparing to pry into 
Kaiping, Xinghe, and Datong.69
Given that tributary relations with the Ming was a lucrative business for Mahmud 
and given that Mahmud’s strategic priority was to crush the Eastern Mongols and 
establish Oirat hegemony in the steppe, the prudent course for him would be to attack 
Arughtai while continuing good relations with the Ming. Yet he decided to raid the 
Ming frontier while preparing to eliminate Arughtai. The Chinese may be wrong 
about Mahmud’s intention: He was really trying to attack Arughtai rather than the 
Ming; and Arughtai’s report was simply trying to mislead the Ming into war with 
Mahmud. Even so, we still need an explanation for the Oirats’ growing hostility 
toward the Ming.
There are several hypotheses about nomadic responses to sedentary societies 
available in the literature, but they have various problems when applied to this case.
I suggest that Mahmud challenged the Ming because he believed Yongle’s 
Mongolian polices undermined his objective of establishing steppe hegemony. 
Around 1413 was the crucial moment for this objective. Internally, five years of 
tributary intercourse with the Ming had enriched the Oirats. Externally, the Eastern 
Mongols were at their lowest moments. Arughtai in fact had to nestle under the 
protection of the Ming. But ominously for the Oirats, Yongle gradually increased his 
bestowals on Arughtai, making him Hening Wang in 1413. Should the emperor’s 
favor continue, Arughtai would almost certainly regain his strengthen and pose a new
68 MSLLZ, 19; and MS, 6862.
69 MSLLZ, 21.
70 See, for example, Khazanov 1984; Jagchid and Symons 1989; Cosmo 1994 and 2002; and Barfield 1989.
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threat to the Oirats. This was a development that Mahmud was unwilling to tolerate.
Thus, the time around 1413 was really the optimal moment for Mahmud to start an 
offensive against Arughtai—afterwards his relative power over the Eastern Mongols 
would gradually slip away. Yet, his drive for hegemony conflicted sharply with 
Yongle’s objective of preventing any Mongol hegemony in the steppe. Earlier Yongle 
had rejected both Mahmud’s plea for the Ming to eliminate Arughtai and his requests 
for more rewards to strengthen his tribe. Mahmud must have felt that the Ming, as 
well as Arughtai, was an obstacle for him to achieve hegemony in the steppe. In fact, 
eliminating Arughtai while maintaining good relations with the Ming was an 
impossible task. From Yongle’s perspective, Mahmud’s hegemonic intention was 
reflected in his “arrogant” missions, something he was unwilling to ignore. From 
Mahmud’s perspective, the Ming was determined to prevent Oirat hegemony in the 
steppe by protecting and rewarding Arughtai. Hostility or even conflict between the 
two was therefore almost inevitable if neither side was willing to modify their 
objectives. Mahmud turned hostile because he felt that the Ming was not offering 
enough for him to destroy Arughtai and establish hegemony in the steppe. As we will 
see, this hypothesis can also explain Arughtai’s hostility toward the Ming later.
Defeated, the Oirats sent envoys to present tribute horses to the Ming court in early 
1415 to request reopening tributary relations.71 Apparently, they realized the 
difficulty of achieving steppe hegemony in the presence of a strong Ming in the 
south. More urgently, badly weakened by the Ming army, they now had to worry 
about their survival in the face of a reviving Arughtai. Just like Arughtai before them, 
the Oirats had to bandwagon with the Ming and exploit the latter’s economic 
resources and military power to hold their position in the steppe.
With the Oirats defeated and weak, troubles then arose with the Eastern Mongols. 
Arughtai had been waiting quietly to feed his cattle and gather his strength. He 
avoided participating in Yongle’s 1414 campaign against Mahmud, instead preferring
71 MSLLZ, 26.
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to see the Oirats and the Ming weaken each other. Early in 1416 he took advantage of 
the Oirat weakness to plunder their territory. Starting from 1419, Arughtai’s relations 
with the Ming deteriorated. In that year a Ming official reported that Arughtai’s 
envoys in the Ming capital were unruly and even publicly seized Chinese goods by 
force. Meanwhile reports came that Arughtai had attacked and defeated the Oirats.
n'y
On this occasion Yongle remarked that Arughtai was just as cunning as the Oirats. 
Extending his influence westward to the Oirat tribes, Arughtai began to dispute with 
the Ming court about the reception of his envoys and the amount of his rewards. 
Meanwhile his envoys and followers began pillaging even when they were just given 
gifts from the Ming court. A Ming senior official also accused Arughtai of spying, 
presumably with the intention of selecting the best time and place for an invasion. 
His tribesmen frequently came close to the northern frontier to probe into Ming 
military defense.
After February 1421 Arughtai simply stopped sending tribute to the Ming.74 
Meanwhile he sought to expand his influence in eastern Inner Mongolia, subjugating 
the Uriyangqad at this time. The Uriyangqad Mongols had supported Yongle during 
the civil war, and to reward them the emperor had moved the Ming garrison away 
from Daning in the heart of their grazing lands. This left the Uriyangqad in control of 
a large portion of the Inner Mongolian steppe. Overcoming the strategically located 
Uriyangqad territory, Arughtai plundered into Xinghe in the spring of 1422.
The same questions asked of Mahmud can be asked of Arughtai. Why did he 
abandon accommodation with the Ming and turn hostile? Could he not simply 
concentrate on crushing the Oirats without offending the Ming? The same hypothesis 
given above to explain Mahmud’s hostility toward the Ming can also be used to 
explain Arughtai’s. Hostility broke out between Arughtai and the Ming because the 
two sides’ strategies toward the steppe were in fundamental conflict. A strong 
Arughtai bent on hegemony in the steppe was bound to find rewards and profits from
72 MSLLZ, 29-30
73 DMB, 14.
74 MSLLZ, 29-30.
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the Ming insufficient for his cause, while a confident Yongle determined to prevent 
Mongol hegemony in the steppe was bound to find Arughtai’s increasing defiance 
insulting and growing power menacing to his interest in the north.
Strategies and Structure in Sino-Mongol Relations
The theory of Chinese primacy developed in chapter 2 suggests that China would 
employ the strategies of war, blackmail, inducement, and persuasion for domination 
while other polities would accommodate as well as resist Chinese power. These 
hypotheses are borne out in Sino-Mongol relations in the early Ming. One 
discrepancy should be noted, however. Because the Chinese and the Mongols were 
bitter enemies, the Mongols resisted the Ming more than they accommodated it. But 
their resistance is consistent with the hypothesis: Resistance occurred as a result of 
the Mongol perception that their core interests were undermined by Chinese policies.
CHINESE STRATEGIES OF DOMINATION
The policies of the Hongwu and Yongle emperors make it abundantly clear that 
Chinese dominance was their strategic objective in the Mongolian steppe.75 
Dominance for both emperors meant the reception of Mongol acknowledgement of 
Chinese superiority and legitimacy to rule over them politically and maintaining 
Chinese preponderance in the steppe by preventing and destroying the rise of 
Mongol power militarily. In fact, both emperors tried to achieve both political and 
military dominance for the need to demonstrate legitimacy of their rule and to 
maintain security on the northern frontier.
Both Hongwu and Yongle repeatedly tried to receive acknowledgement of their rule 
from the Mongols. They were, however, aware that such acknowledgement was often 
a cover for more self-interested ends such as gaining economic benefits and security 
protection from the Ming. Yongle, in particular, knew full well that Arughtai’s and
75 As Johnston observes, the primary concern of Hongwu and Yongle “was to cripple a still-potent Mongol 
military capability, divide and conquer the numerous Mongol tribes that Occupied the areas along the northern 
border, and push the Ming’s boundary of control as far north as possible, even into the inner Mongolian steppe 
lands.” Johnston 1995, 184.
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Mahmud’s tributary missions to his court were due to their lack of strength and need 
for self-strengthening. He nevertheless allowed the Mongol pretension to continue, 
because the scene of Mongols’ flocking to the capital to honor him was useful for 
demonstrating his prestige and superiority, and, by extension, his legitimacy to rule 
the tianxia.
The Ming strategies of domination fall into four categories: war, blackmail, 
inducement, and persuasion. In his attempts to divide and rule the Mongols, for 
example, Yongle employed all these strategies. These four strategies, however, can 
be subsumed in one grand strategy, the reference to which can be easily found in 
traditional Chinese strategic thinking. The expression “wei de jianshi”, or “might 
combined with virtue”, for example, nicely conveys the Chinese approach to 
dominate others. Wei is awesomeness or military power, embodied in the strategies 
of war and blackmail; De is virtue, embodied in the strategies of inducement and 
persuasion. The Chinese have another apt expression for this grand strategic thinking: 
“gang rou bingji” or hard power combined with soft power.
The early Ming dynasty fought numerous wars with the Mongols. To give just a few 
salient examples: The Hongwu emperor drove the Mongols away from China proper 
and sought to eliminate them until the failure of the 1372 campaigns; in 1387 he 
sought to conquer Naghachu in Manchuria and in 1388 he succeeded in destroying 
Mongol unity; the Yongle emperor personally led five Mongolian campaigns. These 
wars cannot all be regarded as defensive measures intended to ward off Mongol 
attack. On the contrary, they were designed to achieve and maintain Chinese military 
dominance in the steppe by preventing the unity and rise of Mongol power that 
would challenge that dominance. In other words, most wars the early Ming fought 
with the Mongols were either wars of conquest or preventive wars.
The majority of Ming campaigns followed the strategy of blackmail, intended to 
threaten the Mongols into surrender. Blackmail had both military and economic 
dimensions. Militarily, the Ming employed the threat of the use of force to compel
160
the Mongols to accede to a desired outcome; economically, the Ming threatened the 
cutting off of tributary relations and the shutting down of border markets to deprive 
the Mongols of their desired Chinese goods. Hongwu particularly liked warning the 
Mongols of the consequence of non-compliance at the end of his rescripts. Yongle 
could be quite threatening as well when he felt insulted or frustrated by Mongol 
defiance.
Before blackmail, the strategies of inducement and persuasion were also used. 
Inducement had both political and economic components. Politically, the Ming tried 
to induce the Mongols with noble titles and promised positions in the Ming official 
hierarchy; economically, the Ming tried to induce the Mongols with lavish gifts and 
elaborate Chinese products through embassies to Mongolia, tributary intercourse, or 
the establishment of horse markets and trade in the frontier region. The Chinese 
expression “zhaoxiang (fi? P$)”—inducing someone to surrender—conveys the 
essence of the inducement strategy. Persuasion is the strategy by which the Ming 
tried to convince the Mongols of the necessity to submit by ideological discourse, 
that is, the moral superiority of Chinese rule. Theoretically, inducement and 
persuasion are easy to distinguish. Empirically, their boundaries are often blurred. 
We can be sure, however, that in the many rescripts Hongwu and Yongle sent to the 
Mongols both elements were present, because we know that the main task of Chinese 
envoys was to offer gifts while injecting a sense of Chinese superiority into the 
Mongols. We can know, furthermore, that since most Mongol chieftains only offered 
sham submission, economic interests rather than a perception of Ming legitimacy 
must lie at the heart of their tribute and thus that the strategy of inducement had more 
success than that of persuasion.
MONGOL STRATEGIES OF RESISTANCE AND ACCOMMODATION 
The Mongols, like the Koreans and the Japanese, both resisted as well as 
accommodated Chinese power. Their resistance appeared more prominent than 
accommodation. This is not surprising, since the Chinese were their bitter enemies in 
the early Ming. For the Mongols in the Hongwu reign, survival was the more urgent
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goal than anything else. The Eastern Mongols and the Oirats in the Yongle reign had 
the luxury to think about hegemony, but in crucial moments they too had to ensure 
survival first. In terms of the principal Mongol leaders, their strategies toward the 
Ming fall into three categories: defying, bandwagoning, and challenging. They were 
used to serve their objectives ranging from merely ensuring their survival to 
attempting the establishment of steppe hegemony.
In Defying, the Mongols not only refused to acknowledge Ming superiority, but also 
put up active resistance against Chinese pressure. This was essentially what the 
Northern Yuan court had done since their ejection by the Ming army from Dadu in 
1368. Balking at Chinese requests while maintaining friendly relations with them is 
not a good description of their response to the Ming. They went beyond that to defy 
the Ming by openly rejecting its requests or offers, detaining or killing Ming envoys, 
putting up active defense, and meeting and on several occasions defeating Ming 
invasions. The Eastern Mongols and the Oirats in the first few years of the Yongle 
reign also defied the Ming. The former detained Ming envoys and even poisoned a 
nominal Ming vassal, the Prince of Hami, while the latter detained Ming envoys sent 
to request their submission. The defiance of both tribes was further shown at a later 
stage when they became stronger as a result of tributary relations with Ming. They 
not only ignored Yongle’s order that they restrain themselves, but also started to 
detain Ming envoys and bargain with the Ming regarding tributary payments.
In bandwagoning, the Mongols tried to take advantage of tributary relations with the 
Ming in order to enrich, strengthen, or protect themselves, all the while pursuing 
other self-interested goals. Indeed, pursuing such goals was the main rationale behind 
. their exploiting China’s economic and military resources. Bandwagoning by other 
states means making productive use of their tributary relations with the Ming for 
self-interested ends, in a range from survival, economic self-strengthening, political 
legitimation, military protection, to hegemony. Because the exploitative nature of 
bandwagoning can be most clearly seen in Sino-Mongol relations, I shall discuss it 
here with a little more detail.
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The first question to consider is this: What were the motivations behind Mongol 
tribute to the Ming court? The answer of course varies with specific tribute missions. 
On the whole, however, scholars have reached a consensus that it was not so much 
China’s culture or moral superiority as its economic resources that had attracted the 
Mongols to the Chinese court. Henry Serruys, a leading authority on Sino-Mongol 
relations during the Ming, said this:
If in the minds of the Chinese cultural superiority was enough to draw the 
Barbarians within the Chinese orbit, on the part of the foreigners the reason for 
coming to China was quite different. There is not doubt that cultural and 
material superiority was evident to the Barbarians, and that Chinese culture 
always had a certain appeal for them, stronger or weaker according to 
circumstances, but cultural appeal never was the decisive factor for them. 
Profit was. Tribute presented to the Chinese court was always liberally paid for, 
and thus essentially constituted a form of exchange, or trade. Moreover, all 
tribute missions were also trade missions in the more ordinary sense of the 
word, that is, in addition to tribute articles to be presented to the Court, every 
tribute mission carried goods to be sold along the road to Peking or in the 
capital itself...76
Tribute was in reality a particular form of trade no matter how the Chinese 
traditionally stressed its ceremonial aspect.77 As Morris Rossabi points out with 
reference to the Ming’s tributary relations with Inner Asia, Chinese “gifts in reply” 
were simply a euphemism for trade. The Chinese and the peoples of Inner Asia had 
in practice negotiated an exact rate of exchange before engaging in tribute and “gifts
7Rin reply” transactions.
Because tribute presentation was a lucrative business, the Mongols came more and
76 Serruys 1967, 19. For similar views, see also Barfield 1989; Rossabi 1975; and Jagchid and Symons 1989.
77 Serruys 1975, 9.
78 Rossabi 1975,71.
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more frequently to benefit from it, even to the point of forcing the Chinese court to 
regulate and limit both the frequency of the tribute and the size of their tribute 
missions.79 Sometimes Mongol princes were excluded from the tribute because it 
was feared that they might derive too much profit and become too strong! With the 
passage of time, even the Uriyangqad in the northeast, regarded as “friendly” 
Mongols by the Chinese, increased the size of their embassies, demanded additional 
gifts, and staged frequent border raids.80 A tribute mission arriving from Mongolia 
or Central Asia comprised, besides the regular envoys, traders and an assortment of 
followers often totaling hundreds of men. They were entitled to trade not only at the 
borders when they first crossed into China, but all along the road to the capital, at the 
capital itself after the official presentation of the tribute, and finally on their way 
back. Some Central Asian traders even deliberately slowed down the pace of travel in 
order to trade more. Some envoys travelled so slowly (to and from Beijing) that it 
took them more than a year to compete the trip!81
One marvel during the Yongle reign was that as soon as war ended, the Mongols 
swiftly came to the Ming court to present tribute, as Arughtai did in 1411 and 1424
O')
and Mahmud did in 1415. The interruption was never more than a few months at a 
time. The theory developed in Chapter 2 shows that authority or legitimacy cannot 
arise purely out of the use of force. If Chinese authority was not the cause behind the 
Mongol tribute after wars, the real cause must be sought in the benefits that the 
Mongols could derive from sending tribute to the Ming court. From the Mongol 
point of view, they may have simply regarded tribute to the Ming as the routine 
confirmation of a customary right to trade. Indeed, the Mongol chronicles “reflect a 
tradition among the Mongols that return gifts for their tribute were a tribute paid to 
them, non-payment of which was apt to trigger instant retaliation.”83 Serruys further 
remarks that for other nomads as well, “there is no basis to think that they considered
79 A similar pattern can be found in Sino-Jurchen relations during the Ming. For a brief discussion on the 
Jurchens’ abuse of their tribute missions for profit from the Ming, see Crossley 2002, 72-3.
80 Serruys 1967, 6-7, 20,43.
81 Serruys 1975, 15,20,22.
82 This was not a unique phenomenon in Sino-Mongol relations. Tribute missions also came when the Ming was 
in open hostility with some other peoples, such as the oasis state o f Turfan. See Rossabi 1972,206-25.
83 Serruys 1967,25.
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themselves in any way obligated to send tribute as an expression of submission or 
vassality.”84
Although Serruys and many others have pointed out that profit was the overriding 
concern of the Mongols coming to China, they have not specified for exactly what 
ends they were seeking it. Profit might be sought for two reasons. At the most basic 
level, Chinese goods were desired because they were essential for the livelihood of 
the Mongols. This level of economic explanation, however, cannot explain the 
Mongols’ coming to the Chinese court regularly, that is, their exploitative 
bandwagoning. If their wish was simply to obtain essential Chinese goods to meet 
their livelihood requirements, they did not need to send tribute too frequently. But we 
have abundant evidence that the Eastern Mongols and the Oirats during the Yongle
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reign were eager to present tribute. According to the Chinese regulation, Arughtai 
was allowed one mission a year only. In practice, he sent more than two missions 
every year between 1411 and 1424. When Mahmud presented his first tribute in 1408, 
he was living well economically though threatened by the Eastern Mongols militarily. 
Both Arughtai and Mahmud continued to send tribute when they grew considerably 
stronger after several years of tributary relations with the Ming. Sustenance needs are 
more powerful in explaining the Mongols’ repeated requests for the late Ming to 
allow tributary relations as well as their raids when the requests were not met. In the 
early Ming, however, since tributary relations were encouraged, it cannot adequately 
explain the Mongols’ exploitative bandwagoning with the Ming.
A higher level of explanation can be found in the Mongols’ intention to use Ming 
wealth for self-strengthening. Chinese goods were not just used for sustenance, but 
also, and more importantly, for strengthening their tribes economically, politically, 
and militarily. Here one finds again the inadequacy of a pure economic explanation 
for Mongol motivations behind their tribute missions. Political and strategic 
considerations have to be brought in. Economic benefits were the foundation for
84 Ibid.
85 For a full list o f Mongol tribute missions to the Ming from 1403, see Serruys 1966.
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building political and military power. Because the Mongols wanted to grow strong so 
as to attempt steppe hegemony, they simply ignored Chinese regulations for the 
frequency and size of their tribute missions. In other words, they wanted to gain 
more than “normal” tributary relations allowed by violating Ming regulations.
Chinese wealth was useful for the Mongols for an important reason only found in the 
nomadic world. The Mongols themselves rested on animal wealth, which had to be 
pastured extensively and could not be concentrated in a governmental center of 
power; but Chinese wealth, in the forms of gifts and goods such as paper money 
(which, among other things, could be used in trade with Chinese merchants), silver, 
textiles, grain, etc., could be stored. This wealth, which the Mongols could not obtain 
by themselves, could moreover enable the tribal ruler to buy his followers’ obedience,
OiT
which was critical for the tribe’s overall power. Chinese goods, therefore, had 
direct economic and political functions for ambitious chieftains.
Tribute to the Ming court could, in addition, bring not only Chinese goods, but also 
political prestige and military advantage. Ming official titles, for example, could 
enhance a tribal ruler’s prestige among his followers and other tribes. Being a 
nominal Ming vassal could in principle bring Ming military protection. In fact, this 
was what Arughtai came close to achieve around 1413. Although the Ming was 
unwilling to provide direct military support, it was unwilling to see him destroyed by 
Mahmud either. Moreover, Ming power could be used to play inter-tribe politics. 
Both Arughtai and Mahmud tried to take advantage of their relations with the Ming 
to harm the other. Finally, it is important to note that Mahmud explicitly requested 
weapons from the Ming. This might be due to his lack of ironware for producing 
sufficient numbers of weapons for military expansion. All these illustrate that the 
purpose for which Ming power was used was hardly only economic: It was to 
eventually destroy the rival and establish steppe hegemony.
Such use of their tributary relations broke away sharply from Yongle’s original
86 Fletcher 1986, 14-5.
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intention of encouraging Mongols to present tribute. By initiating tributary relations, 
Yongle intended to have the Mongols as vassals to observe Chinese orders and serve 
Chinese interests while showing his superiority over them; by presenting tribute, the 
Mongols tried to take advantage of their relations with Yongle to pursue 
self-interested ends other than loyally serving their supposed overlord. In the 
beginning of their relations with the Ming, sustenance needs might be a concern in 
their tribute. As time went by, their ambitions grew with their strength. More strength 
led to greater ambitions; greater ambitions created further needs to use and abuse the 
Chinese. These factors demonstrate the prominence of the Mongols’ bandwagoning 
strategy toward the Ming. It can in fact subsume what Barfield has identified as the 
strategy of extortion while conveying the meaning of both the Mongols’ use and 
abuse of Ming power. At its core, this is a self-strengthening strategy for 
self-interested ends. It shows the real nature of Mongol tribute and “submission” to 
the Ming court, all the while demolishing the notion of Chinese authority over the 
Mongols.
Finally, in addition to defying and bandwagoning, the Mongols also challenged the 
Ming by competing with it politically and militarily. In an important sense and in 
many cases, the strategy of challenging was a logical corollary of the strategy of 
bandwagoning. Strengthened by exploiting Ming power, the Mongols next tried to 
expand their own power at the expense of the Ming. In 1413 Mahmud led his horde 
near the Keriilen River preparing, most likely, to attack both the Ming and Arughtai. 
Between 1422 and 1424, Arughtai raided the Ming frontier. These raids, as I have 
explained, were intended to finance his expansion in the steppe and challenge 
Chinese dominance there. Before then, he had subjugated the Uriyangqad Mongols 
who were nominally Ming’s vassals, thus openly challenging Ming rule in eastern 
Inner Mongolia. And his followers had begun pillaging Ming frontier even before 
1421. These were challenges when the Mongols were regaining their strength. Yet, 
even during the Hongwu reign when they were chastised by the Ming army, they had 
challenged the Ming claim of superiority already. Militarily, the Northern Yuan court
87 Barfield 1989.
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reassembled Mongol hordes to renew strength and organized frequent raids into the 
Ming frontier. Politically, they proclaimed their own reign titles as a rival claim to 
Ming rule, even pressing the Koreans to accept their rather than the Ming’s reign title. 
Because defying, bandwagoning, and challenging were the primary strategies that the 
Mongols employed toward the Ming, one can safely conclude that the structure of 
Sino-Mongol relations during the early Ming was more anarchic than hierarchic.
Conclusion
The evidence presented in this chapter gives further support to the theory of Chinese 
primacy by showing that the main pattern of interaction in Sino-Mongol relations is 
Chinese domination, both political and military, vis-a-vis Mongol resistance and 
accommodation. Together with the preceding two chapters on Sino-Korean and 
Sino-Japanese relations, these case studies support the key propositions of the theory. 
We can now explore the implications of these findings for some contemporary 
perspectives on historical East Asian politics. Chapter 6 will draw on the analysis of 
East Asian politics during the early Ming to examine the analytical utility of existing 
models built around the concept of the “tribute system” for understanding and 
explaining historical East Asian politics. Chapter 7 will turn to the relevance of 
history for contemporary Chinese foreign policy thinking.
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Chapter 6 
Rethinking the “Tribute System”
One central question animating this study is to explore the meanings and uses of the 
“tribute system” as an analytical category employed by various scholars. The 
introductory chapter has given a brief review of the extant writings on the tribute 
system. Extending and further refining that preliminary critique, this chapter seeks to 
thoroughly evaluate the major works on the tribute system by drawing on the 
preceding theoretical and empirical chapters. The purpose is to assess, in light of the 
nature of historical East Asian Politics during the early Ming, the analytical utility of 
tribute-system-centered perspectives for understanding China’s foreign relations and 
the larger political dynamics between China and its neighbors.
There are three interrelated ways in which the concept “tribute system” has been 
used in a large and venerable literature. I discuss them in turn but focus on 
Fairbank’s interpretive model since this has been the most influential and has really 
established the tribute system paradigm in the study of East Asian diplomatic 
history.1 Each of the three views of the tribute system has limitations for explaining 
historical East Asian politics. It then makes sense to ask whether we should strive for 
alternative theoretical frameworks that might produce greater explanatory power. The 
“tribute system” is, of course, a concept before it is a fact; it is first of all “a Western 
invention for descriptive purposes.”2 As such one can legitimately ask how useful 
the invention has been. Although the concept clearly captures a key feature of 
historical East Asian politics, an overemphasis on it over the years has also created 
biases in our conceptual and empirical enquiries. Yet, a pure tribute-system 
perspective, however well developed, is ultimately inadequate, because historical 
East Asian politics were not all about “tribute” and its associated practices.
1 By the “tribute system paradigm” I mean a research tradition that has the “tribute system” as the central 
organizing concept for conceptual and empirical analysis.
2 Mancall 1968, 63.
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Given the inadequacies of the extant literature, I consider the necessity and 
possibility of moving beyond the tribute system paradigm if we want to establish a 
more solid conceptual basis for advancing our understanding of historical East Asian 
politics. Indeed, although the starting point of this study is the early Ming tribute 
system, it has been a conscious attempt to explain the larger political dynamics 
between Ming China and its neighbors without recourse to the “tribute system.” The 
theory developed in Chapter 2 covers what the extant models claim to explain, but 
also explains additional phenomena that these models do not cover. After critiquing 
the extant tribute-system perspectives and models, I give some preliminary 
suggestions on moving beyond the tribute system paradigm.
The Tribute System: Three Views
Associating the “tribute system” with traditional China’s foreign relations has 
become a standard practice since the nineteenth century when it was thought that 
China’s peculiar notions of foreign relations were one of the underlying causes 
behind its failure to deal adequately with the Western challenge. That unique 
institutional and textual complex of traditional Chinese foreign policy was referred to 
as the “tribute system.” But it was not until Fairbank’s immensely influential 
elaboration of it from the 1940s through the 1960s that the “tribute system” really 
became the master organizing concept in the study of East Asian diplomatic history.
Since the main features of Fairbank’s model have already been outlined in the 
introductory chapter, a repetition will not be necessary. It is important, however, to 
keep two additional observations in mind when evaluating the model. First, the 
model was meant to describe and interpret the official relations between China and 
its neighbors by employing a sinocentric framework. Its scope seems to cover the 
whole period of East Asian history from virtually the dawn of the Chinese 
civilization until the nineteenth century.
Second, it needs to be noted that Fairbank, as a historian, did not mean to apply his
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“tribute system” notion to the “international politics” of East Asia, as a political 
scientist would probably do. Fairbank “has made no pretense of establishing a 
general theory of Chinese history and has stated his distaste for abstract theorizing in 
many places.”3 For him the main question was how to understand and define the 
“Chinese world order.” It is for the purpose of defining the scope and essence of such 
an order that he highlighted the sinocentric vision held by Chinese rulers and elites. 
He probably never assigned himself the task of providing an overall framework of 
interpretation for East Asian international relations. He was rather laying out some 
big ideas as organizing concepts that might be refined and developed in further 
research. His model therefore should be properly evaluated against the question of 
how accurately the “tribute system” notion and the “Chinese world order” scheme 
capture the nature of the historical East Asian order. Its inadequacies can then 
suggest areas of improvement needed to advance our understanding of historical East 
Asian politics.
Although Fairbank’s model has been the most well-known, it is not the only 
conceptualization of the tribute system. There are two additional, though interrelated, 
views of the tribute system in the scholarly literature.
The second view, found most frequently among Chinese historians and with a 
distinguished pedigree in Chinese scholarly discourse, sees the tribute system as 
China’s bureaucratic management of foreign relations.4 The focus has been on the 
organizational and functional development of a complex set of principles, rules, and 
procedures that were developed by China’s scholar-officials to deal with foreigners. 
This research tradition has been centrally concerned with the historical development 
of ritual practices and the bureaucratic institutions and cultural assumptions behind 
such ritualistic expressions of foreign relations. Thus, for example, a study of the 
Ming tribute system would include the organization of the bureaucracies of the Ming 
dynasty that dealt with foreign relations, the elaborate set of ritual practices for
3 Evans 1988, 5.
4 This is the clearest in Li 2004. See also Yu 2000.
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foreign envoys to observe while in the Chinese capital, details on the composition of 
foreign tributes and Chinese return gifts, tribute frequency and routes, and so on.
Because the tribute system is conceived of as China’s bureaucratic innovation for 
foreign affairs, this perspective sheds little light on the dynamic interaction between 
China and its neighbors. The tribute system is viewed strictly on the Chinese side and 
from the Chinese perspective. Because this is so, this perspective cannot serve as an 
adequate basis for our understanding of the overall relations between China and its 
neighbors. It deals mostly with the bureaucratic aspects of Chinese foreign policy, 
not the larger East Asian order. In terms of Chinese foreign policy, scholars writing 
from this perspective tend to emphasize its ritualistic and symbolic elements 
associated with tributary relations. For example, Li Yunquan, in a thorough 
examination of the bureaucratic development of the tribute system in Chinese history, 
argues that Chinese rulers valued not so much the substance of tributary relations as 
the appearance of tribute missions and their function in demonstrating the superiority 
of Chinese rule.5 While this is true in many cases regarding the tributary part of 
China’s foreign relations, it cannot be a valid generalization for traditional Chinese 
foreign policy as a whole.
The third view, found among IR scholars writing from an English School perspective, 
sees the tribute system as an institution of the historical East Asian international 
society. According to a classic English School definition, institution refers to “a set of 
habits and practices shaped towards the realization of common goals.”6 Neoliberal 
institutionalists define institutions as “persistent and connected sets of rules (formal 
and informal) that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity, and shape
expectations.” 7 These definitions overlap somewhat; both view institutions as
coherent sets of principles and practices that structure and organize relations.
Following this perspective, Yongjin Zhang argues that “the tribute system is the
5 Li 2004.
6 Bull 1977, 74.
7 Keohane 1989, 3.
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fundamental institution that embodies both philosophical assumptions and 
institutional practices within the Chinese world order and that structures relations and
o
ensures co-operation between China and other participants in Pax S i n i c a It was 
through the tribute system that China and other countries conducted meaningful 
relations with one another. The tribute system in this sense embodies cultural 
assumptions such as sinocentrism and describes rules and practices such as 
foreigners’ paying tributes to the Chinese court and the latter’s bestowal of gifts and 
investiture to the former.
Conceived of as an institution in this sense, the tribute system becomes a central 
interpretive factor for historical East Asian politics. However, although viewing the 
tribute system as an institution is apparently appropriate from a theoretical standpoint, 
it also entails some analytical problems. First, the tribute system is only one—though 
perhaps the more prominent—among several institutions in the historical East Asian 
system. By itself it cannot capture the whole picture of China’s foreign relations, as 
these were only partly expressed through institutional practices of the tribute system. 
Other institutions identified by the English School, such as war and even the balance 
of power, can also be found in East Asian history. Many analysts tend to 
overemphasize the significance of the tribute system at the expense of due attention 
to other institutions that have also played important roles.
Second, one problem with the institutionalist perspective is that these institutions 
often themselves require explanation.9 Thus, in our case, if we are to understand the 
motives, strategies, and interests behind China’s construction of, and other countries’ 
participation in, the tribute system, we will have to deconstruct and explain the 
tribute system in the first place. The question is not whether the tribute system can be 
seen as an institution, as it surely can be, but how much interpretive or explanatory 
power such a perspective can generate.
8 Zhang 2001,57.
9 For an attempt in the European context, see Reus-Smit 1999.
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Third, seeing the tribute system as an institution without paying adequate attention to 
its historical evolution will give the misleading impression that the tribute system 
was somehow static and unchanging throughout history. In practice, however, the 
characteristics and nature of the tribute system varied considerably in different 
historical periods. We will therefore have to speak about different tribute systems 
rather than a single tribute system in history. The changing nature of historical East 
Asian politics will be missed unless the changing characteristics of different tribute 
systems are examined, even though the tribute system itself is far from the totality of 
international politics in this region. This also suggests the inadequacy of an 
institutionalist perspective of the tribute system for understanding historical East 
Asian politics.
The following two sections attempt a focused evaluation of Fairbank’s model while 
further developing the above criticisms. The purpose is to discover its inadequacies, 
suggest areas for improvement, and use it as a heuristic device for thinking about 
new conceptualizations about historical East Asian politics. Although I draw on 
historians’ criticisms briefly mentioned in the introductory chapter, this evaluation is 
not a repetition of the points already made. The critique developed below connects 
and expands these points in a systematic way while offering new perspectives by 
drawing on the substantive work of this thesis.
The Inherent Weakness o f  the Fair bank M odel
This section evaluates the model in its own terms. The question asked is not how 
well it can stand against historical evidence—the task for the next section—but how 
logically consistent the model itself is. Evaluating it as an interpretive model, three 
questions can be asked. First, how useful are the assumptions underlying the model? 
Interpretive propositions often follow from assumptions; the more useful the 
assumptions are, the better these propositions will be. Second, how clear and 
coherent is its internal logic? Ambiguous models with inconsistent logic obfuscate 
more than they clarify. Third, how much interpretive power does it seem to offer?
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ASSUMPTIONS
The underlying assumption behind Fairbank’s model is sinocentrism, the idea that 
Chinese rulers believed themselves to be central and superior to other peoples in the 
known world. It follows from this assumption that they would try to get foreign 
rulers to acknowledge their superiority by presenting tributes and accepting vassal 
status.
It should be noted, however, that by claiming to be the “ruler of the tianxia,” the 
Chinese did not intend to rule the entire known world.10 Rather, the tianxia was 
limited to the surrounding areas of the Chinese empire, roughly corresponding to 
what we today know as Northeast and Southeast Asia and parts of Central Asia. Gao 
Mingshi has recently argued that according to the Chinese conception, the world 
might be divided into three areas with diminishing Chinese influence: inner vassal 
area, outer vassal area, and temporary non-vassal area.11 The Chinese did not expect 
the extension of their authority over states of the last category; in fact, they often 
treated them as equals. For example, before the Chinese were able to subject the 
Turkic, Uighur, and Tibetan states, the Sui and Tang dynasties maintained 
“brotherly” relations with them; so were the Han with the Xiongnu. And when these 
tribal states grew powerful and posed security threats, they were regarded as 
enemies—far from tributaries as the sinocentric assumption would suggest.
The first problem with the sinocentric assumption is that its usefulness varies with
19the historical periods that one examines. True, at least in terms of rhetoric as
recorded in the Chinese historical sources, Chinese rulers seemed to have held the
notion of superiority since pre-Qin times. Yet the apparent constancy of perceived
superiority is deceptive, made all the more so by “a respectable tradition of dealing
1
with reality separately so that there was no need to change the rhetoric” developed 
by Chinese scholar-officials as they contemplated their theory of imperial foreign
10 Gan 2003, 508.
11 Gao 2003.
12 For a masterful discussion on the evolution of the Chinese idea of superiority, see Wang 1968.
13 Wang 1983, 62.
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relations. Did the rulers of China throughout its two-thousand-year dynastic history 
make foreign policy decisions on the basis of Chinese superiority most of the time? 
At least one has to make a distinction between periods when China was unified and 
strong and when it was divided and weak, because material power and external 
environment can often decisively shape rulers’ perceptions and decision making. As 
Wang Gungwu pointed out, the rhetoric of superiority “was based on strength and 
was meaningless during periods of weakness and disorder.”14 The effect of the 
sinocentric assumption on actual policymaking had to be conditioned by power 
realities. Chinese rulers’ “actions and policies may have been shaped more by the 
logic of the situation than by the distinctive world-views and values of the 
Sinocentric tribute ideology.”15 The founder of the Southern Song dynasty, for 
example, found himself compelled to accept the status of a vassal of the Jin 
dynasty—his powerful northern rival—in 1138.16 Less dramatically, rulers of 
various Chinese dynasties such as the Han, Sui, and Tang had to accept “brotherly” 
or equal relations with their powerful northern and western nomadic neighbors.
Sinocentrism can be a useful assumption in times of Chinese strength when the belief 
of superiority was more or less matched by reality. But even here one has to examine 
its exact effect on policymaking. Many believe that sinocentrism had led to a foreign 
policy of rigidity and inflexibility. But this need not be the case. The Han, Tang, 
Ming, and Qing all in different periods displayed a flexible and extroverted pattern of 
foreign relations.17 Moreover, sinocentrism did not always lead to the demand for 
the submission of foreign rulers as China’s vassals even during periods of Chinese 
strength. The Tang, for example, did not insist on the declaration of vassalage from 
Japan. 18 From another perspective, if sinocentrism was such an important 
motivational force, one might indeed be puzzled by “its relatively weak translation 
into impulses to conquer and physically dominate “inferior” peoples.”19 Yet the 
early Ming cases in the preceding chapters show that Chinese rulers would attempt
14 Ibid., 57.
15 Wills 1988, 226.
16 Yang 1968, 20. See also Rossabi 1983a
17 Hunt 1984, 6-7.
18 Song 2002,41.
19 Wills 1988, 226.
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military domination only when they faced security threats and only after political 
domination had failed. The underlying motivation for physical domination was not 
sinocentrism, but security. These examples demonstrate not only that the importance 
of sinocentrism in Chinese foreign policy making cannot be exaggerated but also that 
the effect of sinocentrism on policy varies in different cases and needs to be 
empirically determined.
In times of Chinese weakness, sinocentrism’s dubious utility suggests that the 
assumption of Chinese superiority alone is insufficient and bound to be misleading. A 
weak China must also worry about its survival. At least this was what the Song 
experienced with its powerful northern rivals. For those periods we need an 
assumption of Chinese rulers’ motivation for the security of their regime. Wills 
reflected this thinking when he emphasized the concept of “defensiveness.” 20 
Fairbank recognized that for Chinese rulers “the chief political problem was how to 
maintain Chinese superiority in situations of military weakness.” He then outlined 
the “aims and means in China’s foreign relations.”21 He did not, however, integrate 
these thoughts into his model. The model thus mirrored the ideal pattern of the 
official Chinese view, despite Fairbank’s full awareness of the historical exceptions 
to sinocentrism on the part of the Chinese rulers themselves.22 The model thus seems 
to have given an essentialized view of Chinese culture with respect to foreign 
relations, leaving the impression that the Chinese were somehow only capable of 
seeing their superiority.
Assumptions are only useful to the extent that they can facilitate model building. 
Although sinocentrism seems a useful and even indispensable part of these 
assumptions, it cannot be the only or even the primary one. Indeed, Wills believes 
that sinocentrism may be the “wrong place to begin” the analysis of Chinese foreign 
policy because it “short-circuits the necessity of paying attention to all the evidence, 
to all institutions and patterns of action” and serves to “cut short an interpretive
20 Wills 1984 and 1988.
21 Fairbank 1968a, 11.
22 See Fairbank 1969, 459.
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process that ought to begin by assuming broad similarities of human needs and 
motives.”23
The second flaw with the assumption of Chinese superiority is its one-sidedness or 
incompleteness. Recall that the model also deals with foreign rulers’ motivations in 
accepting tributary relations; it is not a model only for the Chinese side of the story, 
though it is highly biased toward it. And yet the model only contains an assumption 
on the part of the Chinese rulers without a proper one for that of foreign countries as 
if the latter were only passive respondents to Chinese initiatives. Thus, although 
Chinese rulers are said to hold their superiority in conducting foreign relations, did 
the rulers of other polities believe in Chinese superiority when considering relations 
with China? What were their perceptions of China and of foreign relations more 
generally? From the model one can only infer that they conformed to the Chinese 
view.24
Finally, sinocentrism is fundamentally a cultural assumption. This reflected the 
tendency in the American historical scholarship of the 1950s and 1960s to invest 
enormous explanatory power in the nature of China’s “traditional” society or 
culture. But as pointed out above, cultural assumptions alone cannot be adequate 
even for Chinese foreign policy during periods of Chinese strength. Socio-cultural 
explanations are not problematic in themselves; they just need to be supplemented by 
explanations drawing on other factors and at other levels.
Sometimes one can find in cultural analysis another implicit assumption that 
“traditional China’s foreign relations” are somehow radically different from the 
foreign policies of other great powers in history and therefore we need a unique set 
of languages and tools to interpret them. This need not be the case. How, for example, 
can the considerations of power and interest, in addition to culture, not important in
23 Wills 1988,226.
24 As Fairbank says, drawing again on sinocentrism, that “the uncultivated alien, however crass and stupid, could 
not but appreciate the superiority of Chinese civilization and would naturally seek to ‘come and be transformed’ 
(lai-hua) and so participate in its benefits.” Fairbank 1942, 132.
25 Cohen 1984, 189.
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any state’s foreign policy making? Admittedly, concepts such as “power,” “security,” 
and “interest” may have to be defined and applied differently across time and space, 
but these concepts are not always reducible to culture. Progress in theorizing 
historical East Asian politics will require turning away from the assumption of 
Chinese or Asian uniqueness and instead looking for patterns of similarities as well 
as differences in political dynamics across different regions.
Logic aside, these three problems regarding the assumptions behind the model—the 
failure to deconstruct sinocentrism, to deal squarely with other countries’ foreign 
policy assumptions, and to move beyond cultural stereotypes—will compromise the 
value of its interpretive propositions.
LOGIC
The logic of the model is not quite clear cut. Fairbank emphasized that Chinese rulers 
used tributary relations mainly for the purpose of self-defense. Yet he also said that 
they could be used for aggression as well. “Broadly speaking under the Sung [Song] 
it [tribute] appears to have been used mainly on the defensive, while under the 
Mongols it served for expansion and under the Ch’ing [Qing] it promoted stability in 
foreign affairs.”26 What accounted for these dramatic differences? Moreover, how is 
the assumption of Chinese superiority related with Chinese rulers’ use of tribute for 
defense, aggression, or stability? These puzzles expose a key problem in Fairbank’s 
thinking about the tribute system. It was perhaps believed that the model could be 
generalized across Chinese history, but in fact its power fell short of this ambitious 
goal. Fairbank could have limited the scope of the model to a specific period (e.g., 
the mid-late Qing) and then dealt with other tribute systems in other periods 
separately and in their own right.
The model says that the relationships between China and other states were hierarchic. 
Although this hierarchy is easy to understand from the Chinese point of view since 
Chinese rulers believed in their superiority, one still wonders how they could in fact
26 Fairbank 1942, 137.
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achieve this hierarchy and make foreign rulers submit. Was Confucian cultural 
attraction as emphasized by the model sufficient for this purpose? On the part of 
foreign rulers, was their motivation for trade with China as identified by the model 
powerful enough for them to accept inferiority? It must also be noted that the rulers 
of China’s close neighbors, from Vietnam to Japan, had their own self-centered
conceptions of world order. Indeed, different self-centered views of superiority
• •  • 11  • «existed side by side. It is not clear whether, when, and how sinocentrism
successfully overcame the self-centeredness of other rulers. Analytically, we lack a 
mechanism that can explain how sinocentrism might create a genuine hierarchy 
between China and its neighbors. Also puzzling is the fact that in his “Aims and 
Means” table Fairbank in fact pointed out the varied aims and means in Chinese
1 ftforeign policy. How do these fit within the model? That the model was 
underdeveloped is apparent enough.
POWER
On the surface, the model claims to explain everything in China’s foreign relations, 
since the tribute system was said to be “a scheme of things entire.” In substance, 
what have been written about are often the ceremonial aspects of the tributary 
relations between China and its neighbors. It would also appear that the model was 
primarily meant to deal with relationships within the so-called sinic zone, that is, 
those among China, Korea, Vietnam, Japan, and Liuqiu. Yet we know that China’s 
relations with its northern neighbors constituted the core of a large part of its political 
history. Although these relations were frequently violent, peaceful tributary 
intercourse was not absent. Moreover, discussion of the nature of tributary relations 
has seldom moved beyond the meaning of “tribute” and the relationship between 
tribute and trade. But tribute and trade are not all or even the most important of what 
was going on between China and other states. There is a critical failure to take into 
account the multiplicity of their relationships. The motivations behind their policies, 
the means and strategies they employed, and the patterns of their interactions: These
27 Wang 1968, 60.
28 Fairbank 1968a, 13.
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important questions are at best inadequately addressed. It seems that although the 
model presents the tribute system as a world order in itself, its central questions are 
limited to a narrow range of issues in tributary relations.
The model is also a heavily biased one. It pays far more attention to the Chinese side 
of the story than that of other states. Its interpretive power with regard to the latter is 
therefore very limited.29 Moreover, heavily influenced by sinocentric perspectives, 
the model tends to portray historical East Asian politics from an idealized Chinese 
view. This surely has something to do with Fairbank’s heavy reliance on Chinese 
sources. These sources tend to facilitate the reification of the tribute system since 
they almost universally describe any foreign envoy coming to the Chinese capital as 
paying tribute to the emperor.
Viewed as a whole, the biggest problem with the model is that it is “a static 
framework, which lacks any sense of change and reflects mainly the world order the 
Chinese court preferred to perceive.”30 It seems to have regarded the ritualistic 
aspects of tributary relations as having central importance: granting of patents of 
appointment and official seals, presentation of tribute memorials and local products, 
performance of the koutou, receipt of imperial gifts in return, trade privileges at the 
frontier and in the capital, and so on. The heavy emphasis on these issues makes one 
wonder whether the Chinese and their neighbors were only capable of repeating 
these formalities in their interactions. No room was allowed for the flexibility of their 
relations, no change for their attitudes and policies toward each other, and no 
variations in their underlying motivations and strategies.
The M odel and the Early M ing Case
The tribute system, whether viewed as China’s bureaucratic management of foreign 
relations or as an institution for interstate relations, found its sophistication and
29 This “China bias” is, however, a common problem in the literature.
30 Wang 1989, 15. See also Perdue 2003, 66.
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expansion during the Ming dynasty. It therefore makes good sense to see how 
Fairbank’s model works against events in the early Ming period. In political science 
terms, this period provides an “easy test” for the model. If it fails here, then its 
general validity will be strongly questioned. In this section I draw on the three case 
studies of Sino-Korean, Sino-Japanese, and Sino-Mongolian relations to evaluate the 
empirical validity of the model. Three questions are asked: How useful is the 
sinocentric assumption when applied to this period of Chinese primacy? How closely 
does the model catch the “appearances” of the interactions between China and its 
neighbors? How well does it capture the underlying motivations, strategies, and aims 
in their policies toward one another, that is, the nature of East Asian politics during 
this period?
SINOCENTRIC ASSUMPTION
Sinocentrism is a useful assumption in periods when China was unified and strong, 
such as the early Ming. As we have seen in the preceding three chapters, early Ming 
emperors generally approached foreign rulers from a position of superiority and 
demanded their acknowledgement of this superiority and their acceptance of 
tributary status. There are notable exceptions, however. Joseph Fletcher long ago 
pointed out that the Yongle emperor addressed the ruler of the Timurid Empire as a 
fellow monarch in a 1418 letter, in effect renouncing his claim to superiority. I 
have shown that Yongle received a non-submissive envoy from his adversary the 
Eastern Mongols in 1407 and treated him like a diplomat, even ordering troops to 
guard him back to his own territory as the emperor was trying to manage relations 
with the still hostile Eastern Mongols.
These examples show that at times the Chinese could be uninhibited by sinocentrism 
and instead pursue pragmatic policies for practical objectives. Thus, even under the 
condition of Chinese primacy, it is not always true to say that “Outside countries, if 
they were to have contact with China at all, were expected and when possible obliged
31 Fairbank and Teng 1941,137; Mancall 1984, 13; and Wills 1984,14.
32 Fletcher 1968.
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to do so as tributaries.”33 Because the model only stipulates a rigid set of Chinese 
attitudes toward foreigners, it naturally missed this pragmatism. The deeper problem 
underlying this neglect is the failure to appreciate the fact that imperial China, like 
every other state, also had to deal with a variety of security problems that might 
affect its survival. Under such circumstances, pragmatism would work much better 
than sinocentrism. Because China had to ensure security as much as it had to 
promote superiority, we should expect flexibility in Chinese foreign policy. Indeed, 
early Ming China’s foreign policy exhibited a great deal of flexibility and 
pragmatism.34
DESCRIPTIVE ACCURACY
The model posits that all foreign rulers who wanted to have relations with China 
must do so as China’s tributaries and describes a set of ritual practices that are 
believed to be an integral part of these tributary relations. How accurate is such a 
picture for East Asian politics in the early Ming?
It may be an accurate description of Sino-Korean relations, but it fails to capture 
major aspects of Sino-Japanese and Sino-Mongolian relations. As I have shown in 
detail, the Japanese and the Mongols refused to pay tribute to the Ming for a long 
period of time. The Japanese shogun Yoshimochi isolated Japan from China in 
1411-24. Prince Kanenaga had earlier on executed Chinese envoys and challenged 
sinocentrism in his letter to the Hongwu emperor. The Mongol royal house 
consistently rejected Ming tributary offers during the Hongwu reign. During the 
Yongle reign Mahmud and Arughtai only intermittently accepted tributary status. For 
quite some time, therefore, the Japanese and the Mongols were not in the early Ming 
tribute system, however conceived.
It may be said that their “absence” in the Ming tribute system does no harm to the 
model, the logic being that if they did not accept tributary status then they had no
33 Fairbank 1968a, 4.
34 In various periods of its history China had “an utterly pragmatic and flexible approach toward foreign 
countries.” Wang 1968, 43.
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relations with China. If all “relations” had to be “official” relations sanctioned by the 
Chinese, then such a defense would be justifiable.35 It would, however, strip the 
model of much of its interpretive value. For, even when the Japanese and the 
Mongols were outside the early Ming tribute system, their interactions with Ming 
China—often the more interesting aspects—continued nonetheless. Can we say that 
Yoshimochi’s 1418 letter to Yongle denying responsibility for Japanese piracy is not 
an instance of interactions between Japan and China, Kanenaga’s execution of 
Chinese envoys and his defiant letters to the Ming court not part of the larger 
Sino-Japanese relations, or Mongol resistance and challenge against Ming China, 
often characterized by wars, not emblematic of the nature of Sino-Mongol relations 
during the early Ming?
The relations between China and other countries need to be conceived of broadly 
beyond those of a tributary nature. This is because international relations in historical 
East Asia were not all tributary. Fairbank would certainly not assert that China’s 
foreign relations were all tributary, but his focus on “tribute” gives the impression 
that tributary relations were ubiquitous and even the only important thing going on. 
As it stands, the model misses a large and important part of the political dynamics in 
China’s foreign relations. The tribute system cannot be regarded as the only medium 
or institution for interstate relations, much less “a scheme of things entire.” As Wills 
puts it, “the tribute system was not all of traditional Chinese foreign relations, and 
may not be the best key to a comprehensive understanding of these relations. The 
Western literature on early Sino-Westem relations may have given excessive 
emphasis to tribute embassies.”
Insofar as China’s relations with Korea, Japan, and the Mongols are concerned, the 
early Ming tribute system, as a mechanism or institution for China’s foreign relations, 
encompasses only Sino-Korean relations and a small part of Sino-Japanese and 
Sino-Mongolian relations. Quite a bit of the interesting interactions between China
35 It needs to be noted, however, that there are important exceptions to the assertion that all official relations must 
be tribute-based. Tribute, for example, was not the only way for the Manchu Qing court to arrange official 
relationships with the nomadic peoples in Inner Asia. Chia 1993,80.
36 Wills 1984,4.
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and its neighbors lay outside it. How then can one claim that between 1368 and 1842 
“China’s foreign political, economic, and cultural relations were conducted in a 
world ordered by, and experienced through, the tribute system”?
INTERPRETIVE POWER
It is in terms of interpretive power that the model confronts the greatest difficulties. 
According to the model, Chinese rulers wanted to construct hierarchic relations with 
foreign countries for reasons of prestige and political defense; foreign rulers paid 
tribute to China because they desired trade and profit; and with a large ideological 
component in their relationships, Chinese rulers relied chiefly on Confucian culture 
and the rule of virtue to win foreigners over while foreign rulers acceded to Chinese 
demands and observed prescribed rituals perhaps because of their desire for trade.
Yet we have seen that early Ming rulers demanded tributary relations not just for 
prestige or legitimation, but also, and in many cases more importantly, for security at 
the frontier; foreign rulers paid tribute to China not just for trade, but for a variety of 
purposes ranging from survival, legitimacy, economic self-strengthening, political 
legitimation, military protection, to hegemony; Chinese rulers not just relied on 
Confucianism to extend their influence—they in fact used a great deal more “hard 
power” than “soft power” to obtain compliance from other states; and foreign rulers 
not just obediently observed Chinese regulations—at times they violated these norms 
to pursue their self-interested objectives. The model is incapable of capturing the 
multiplicity of the relations between China and its neighbors.
At times Fairbank recognized the complexity of these relations. In various places and 
especially in his “Aims and Means” table as pointed out by James Millward, he 
indirectly acknowledged that Qing relations with Inner Asia involved something 
other than the tribute system. Yet, although among various types of relations he 
identified—military conquest, administrative control, cultural-ideological attraction,
37 Mancall 1984,13.
38 Millward 1998, 9.
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diplomatic manipulation—only cultural-ideological attraction can fit within his 
model, Fairbank did not take die next step of reformulating it on the basis of these 
complexities. And although he pointed out that “the Chinese world order was a 
unified concept only at the Chinese end and only on the normative level, as an ideal
i n
pattern,” he did not further explore the implication of his own caveat.
The biggest problem of the model, however, is its inability to capture the nature of 
historical East Asian politics. Part of the problem is its scope. It is believed to be 
applicable throughout China’s dynastic history. Yet such a wide scope has stripped it 
of specification and precision. Thus the model appears at once too general and not 
general enough—too general because it cannot capture the great variations in China’s 
foreign relations, and not general enough because it cannot incorporate the varied 
motives and strategies behind China’s and other countries’ policies toward one 
another.40
To understand the nature of historical East Asian politics, one must have an idea of 
the motives, aims, and strategies underlying the relations between China and other 
states. The model talks of Chinese motives as mainly prestige, aims as mainly 
defense, and strategies as mainly persuasion. Yet we have seen that Chinese motives, 
aims, and strategies are much more varied than these. Early Ming emperors wanted 
political or military domination over foreign rulers for both legitimation and security, 
and they employed the strategies of war, blackmail, and inducement in addition to 
persuasion to achieve these objectives. The flexibility and pragmatism displayed in 
these strategies contrast sharply with the rigidity and unitary nature of Chinese 
foreign policy that the model implies. Even on the motive of prestige, one can argue 
that Fairbank did not give enough attention to tributary practice as a way to 
legitimate the rulership of Chinese emperors.
The model talks of foreign rulers’ motives as mainly trade and strategies as mainly
39 Fairbank 1968a, 12.
40 A similar point is made in Wang 1989, 19, 21.
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accommodation. Yet the motives of the Korean, Japanese, and Mongol rulers during 
the early Ming ranged from mere survival, through profit, to hegemony, while their 
strategies varied from accommodationist ones (when they paid tribute) such as 
submission and bandwagoning to non-accommodationist ones (when they refused to 
establish proper tributary relations) such as balking, defying, and challenging. 
Because the model focuses too much on the ritualistic aspects of tributary relations, it 
has naturally missed that part of relations outside of normal tributary politics. Even 
in tributary relations where the model supposedly finds its best application, it is 
incapable of seeing the varied motivations and strategies behind tribute missions.
Fairbank of course recognized these variations, as did Mancall when he wrote about 
“the extraordinary variety of Chinese political strategies.” Yet these variations were 
attributed to the “genius” of the tribute system.41 But, one must ask, where did the 
“genius” come from in the first place? The “genius” of specific tribute systems in 
history is something to be explained. By themselves these tribute systems as 
historical institutions tell us little about the nature of China’s relations with other 
countries. The tendency to attribute every variation in the relations between China 
and other countries to a monolithic and omnipotent tribute system impedes, rather 
than facilitates, further enquiry into the nature of historical East Asian politics.
“Tribute” and the accompanying rituals are almost the exclusive focus of Fairbank’s 
model. But does it really capture the varied meanings of tribute? If the “moral value 
of tribute” and the “material value of trade” are all what the model has to say on this 
question, then it will again fail this critical test. We know that Chinese rulers 
demanded tributary relations for the purpose of domestic political legitimation42 and 
for security at the frontier. We also know that the nature of tribute varies with the 
tribute-bearer. Tribute embassies did not always imply submission to the Chinese 
emperor nor can they all be explained by the trade motive. The Mongols’ varied 
motives behind their tribute to the Ming court, for example, include
41 Mancall 1984, 30.
42 On this also see Wills 1984, 177-8, in which Wills notes the “primacy of domestic audiences.”
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self-strengthening economically from Chinese gifts and goods, benefiting politically 
and militarily from Chinese prestige and protection, and taking advantage of Ming 
power strategically for their own expansion. A number of scholars have recently 
argued, mostly in the case of the Qing, that “tribute” encompassed many different 
kinds of trading and power relationships.43 Peter Perdue points out that Qing 
relations with the Dutch, Russians, Kazakhs, Mongols, Koreans, Ryukyus, and later 
British all fit into the tribute system, but each had a separate political and commercial 
relationship to the Qing empire.44 The model as it stands cannot incorporate these 
varied relationships. Its utility is limited even in areas where it is meant to apply the 
best.
The inadequacy of the model in the early Ming puts its usefulness for the larger East 
Asian history into serious doubt. That the model is incapable of interpreting major 
events in the early Ming when China was unified and powerful and when 
sinocentrism found a strong expression makes one wonder how well it can perform 
in periods when China was divided and weak. Perhaps unsurprisingly, Rossabi and 
his collaborators found that the “Chinese world order” did not persist for the entire 
period from the secondary century B.C. to the Opium War. During the weak Song 
dynasty, Chinese foreign policy displayed a great deal of flexibility and pragmatism. 
Chinese rulers could not demand that foreigners adhere to the “tribute system” 
scheme of conducting foreign relations. The Song’s military weakness compelled its 
officials to treat its neighbors as equals, and a true multi-state system operated during 
this time 45 Wang Gungwu puts it nicely that “When all you could do was to try to 
hold the line, there was obviously no Chinese world order.”46
The difficulty the model has encountered in interpreting major events in East Asian 
history has a simple explanation. The model was mainly based on the experiences of 
the late Qing and was believed to be able to account for the Qing’s failure to 
adequately meet the Western challenge. Yet there are assumptions unique to the late
43 Perdue 2005; Millward 1992, 1998; and Cosmo 2003.
44 Perdue 2003, 66.
45 Rossabi 1983a
46 Wang 1983,62.
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Qing period behind the model which may not apply to other periods of Chinese 
history. As Wills observes,
Ch’ing [Qing] policy toward maritime Europeans drifted toward the great 
confrontation of the nineteenth century isolationist, preoccupied with issues 
of ceremonial and documentary precedence, seemingly unable to focus on the 
realities of the intrusion into its world of great powers that did not accept or 
even tolerate Chinese practices in foreign relations. Isolationism, 
ceremonialism, and a focus on appearances rather than on realities outside 
China also were characteristic of the institutions and regulations of the tribute 
system. The ceremonial core of that system assaulted by Macartney in the 
kowtow controversy and the request for a resident minister were even more 
vehemently defended after 1842. Thus it is not hard to see why, especially 
when looking back from the nineteenth century, it has seemed to make such 
good sense to refer to the whole pattern of isolationist, appearance-obsessed, 
Sinocentric foreign policy as a “tribute system.”47
But not all of “traditional China’s foreign relations” are isolationist, 
appearance-obsessed, or sinocentric.48 That part of the model which may make good 
sense with respect to the late Qing’s policies toward the Europeans might well be out 
of touch with Chinese foreign policies in other periods. It is then not surprising that 
the model has encountered so many difficulties when applied to other periods.
Beyond the Tribute System
The many problems discussed above at least suggest the need to move beyond the 
original framework established by Fairbank. Although many scholars have already 
been doing this for a long time, their critiques, while insightful about the 
inadequacies of the model, do not suggest abandoning the “tribute system” as an
47 Wills 1984, 187.
48 Such a characterization may not be accurate even for the mid-late Qing period. Qing policies during this period 
were not always rigid and sinocentric. Hunt 1996, 31.
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analytical category. Only Janies Hevia has really set out to bypass it and construct his 
own analysis from a postmodern perspective.49 Yet recent writings on the tribute 
system do in fact suggest the need to deconstruct the tribute system as a monolithic 
entity. Perdue, for example, observes that “This ‘system’ was constantly under 
challenge, breaking down, being reconfigured and rebuilt. It was never stable, fixed, 
nor uniform. In regard to some regions, like Korea, relations were fairly stable; 
elsewhere, particularly in the northwest, wide fluctuations occurred.”50 This clearly 
implies the need to deconstruct the tribute system and explain the varied degrees of 
stability in China’s foreign relations.
Every tribute system has its own content and specificity as an institutional feature of 
historical East Asian politics. If we take the Han as the first historical period when 
the tribute system began to take shape,51 the system must have evolved with its 
changing characteristics reflecting the changing nature of the relations between 
China and other countries. There cannot be one single, unchanging tribute system 
throughout Chinese history—even ritual practices accompanying tribute missions 
had changed as different dynasties had their own tributary regulations. One thus 
needs to recognize the evolutionary nature of the tribute system as a historical 
institution. The evolution “was determined by past traditions as well as by 
contemporary conditions” that Chinese rulers perceived and confronted. The Han 
tribute system, for example, must be different from the Ming or Qing tribute system. 
These tribute systems must be differentiated on the basis of historical realities. They 
are different systems because the underlying power realities, motives, and aims of 
China and other countries were differently related in their respective periods. The 
institution of the tribute system is therefore the phenomenon or the dependent 
variable to be explained.
Yet, there is a deeper problem when discussing the tribute system in relation to the 
nature of historical East Asian politics. Explaining the tribute system in a historical
49 Hevia 1995.
50 Perdue 2003, 67.
51 YU 1967.
52 Wang 1968,62.
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period hardly means explaining East Asian politics of that period. As noted above, 
the tribute system, if viewed as an institution for interstate relations, is only one 
among several institutions in East Asian history. An analysis framed around the 
tribute system is therefore necessarily incomplete for the larger political dynamics 
between China and its neighbors. This can be clearly seen from the early Ming case 
discussed above. While some strategies of Ming China and its neighbors such as 
persuasion and submission can be seen from a tribute-system perspective, other 
strategies such as war, threat, defying, and challenging cannot be neatly put into a 
tribute-system framework. Of course, no scholar has claimed that the tribute system 
is everything in East Asian international relations. Their overemphasis on it has 
nevertheless slighted the importance of other institutions and political dynamics.
These two points suggest the need to develop concepts and frameworks that will be 
able to explain both the tributary and non-tributary part of historical East Asian 
politics. For example, we need to move beyond traditional concepts such as 
“hierarchy” in understanding the nature of China’s foreign relations. As Wang 
Gungwu pointed out a long time ago:
Traditional Chinese dealings with non-Chinese peoples are often described as 
having been based on hierarchical principles. This I believe to be inadequate 
for an understanding of the tributary system. More important is the principle 
of superiority together with that of security or inviolability. From this, it 
should become clear that Chinese institutions were not as inflexible as they 
have often been made out to be by students of nineteenth-century history.53
In moving beyond the tribute system paradigm, one can ask a number of questions 
derived from the discussions of the preceding sections. How useful is sinocentrism as 
an analytical assumption for foreign policy making in imperial China? What were the 
precise effects of sinocentrism on traditional China’s foreign relations? What other 
assumptions do we need? Why were Chinese foreign policies characterized by
33 Ibid., 61.
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rigidity sometimes yet pragmatism and flexibility at other times? How can one 
explain the extraordinary range of variations, whether in terms of motives, strategies, 
or degrees of stability, in China’s foreign relations? What were the motives and 
strategies in other countries’ relations with China? In what sense can one say that a 
hierarchy between China and these countries were established? What were the 
meanings of tribute presentation and its associated ritual practices? What lay behind 
tribute and ritual? Finally and more generally, what were the patterns of interaction 
between China and its neighbors?
Answering these questions satisfactorily will move one big step forward toward 
identifying the multiplicity of the relations between China and its neighbors as well 
as broadening our conceptual horizon of historical East Asian politics. Once this 
multiplicity is shown, the inadequacy of tribute-system-centred models will become 
apparent.
From a political science perspective, we need more enduring concepts about 
international politics than merely the supposedly omnipotent “tribute system.” As I 
have emphasized, the tribute system itself needs to be explained. We need more 
fundamental concepts that can lead to deeper levels of explanations for historical 
East Asian politics. These concepts, whether time-honored ones such as power, 
security, or culture, or entirely new ones to be developed, should be relevant for 
understanding both tributary and non-tributary politics between China and its 
neighbors and should be able to cross the analytical divide created by the tribute 
system paradigm. Following a tribute-system perspective, one would also have to 
construct a complementary framework for non-tributary relations in order to explain 
the overall relations between China and its neighbors. Clearly, a model that is able to 
account for both the tributary and non-tributary part of China’s foreign relations 
would be superior to one that can only account for one aspect.
One approach is to focus on the varied political, military, and economic conditions in 
different historical periods and examine how these affected the relations between
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China and its neighbors. If patterns of interaction emerge in relation to specific 
conditions, new models or theories might be developed. This is the approach I have 
taken in building the theory of Chinese primacy in Chapter 2. It focuses on one 
structural condition (Chinese unipolarity) and theorizes how power realities and 
cultural assumptions might lead to varied interests and strategies on the part of China 
and its neighbors.
One final question remains: Can we do away with the “tribute system” concept 
altogether? Obviously the answer depends on the intellectual payoffs that can be 
generated by the retaining or abandoning of the concept. I shall only suggest that one 
can describe and analyze the relations between China and its neighbors without 
adhering to the “tribute system” language. I have done so in the preceding, four 
chapters. One may be able to do so not only for East Asian politics during the early 
Ming but also for regional politics in other periods. The “tribute system,” after all, is 
an intellectual invention. One may not be able to get away with using the term 
“tribute” since it appears so prominently in Chinese sources, but one can talk about 
tributary relations without feeling simultaneously obliged to stick to the tribute 
system. What is important is to understand what actually lay behind these relations. 
This can also serve as an important reminder that the actual “international system” of 
historical East Asian politics is much broader than the “tribute system.”
Conclusion
This chapter has identified three ways in which the term “tribute system” has been 
used in the extant literature—as the bureaucratic management of foreign relations on 
the Chinese side, as an institution for interstate relations from an English School 
perspective, and as the medium for China’s foreign relations as developed in 
Fairbank’s interpretive model. I have focused on Fairbank’s model and found it 
problematic for a number of reasons. Not only is it internally flawed, but it is also 
incapable of interpreting major events in East Asian history. It tries to account for 
some very long continuities in the relations between China and its neighbors, yet
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variations and changes in these relations were as impressive as continuities. The 
utility of the model is limited, and we have to agree with Wills that “we could not 
keep in focus all aspects of the Chinese diplomatic tradition, all sources of conflict, if 
we began by calling all of the Chinese diplomatic tradition the “tribute system.”54 
One might add that the model is even less useful when dealing with regional politics 
as a whole, since it is heavily biased toward the Chinese side.
Fairbank, it must be emphasized, recognized various anomalies and offered caveats 
regarding his framework. He did not, however, systematically refine his model on the 
basis of these anomalies. It is clear that the model, as Fairbank put it, is a 
“preliminary framework,” laying out some central ideas and themes for possible 
further development. It is not my intention to oversimplify or caricature it. Rather, I 
have wanted to identify its inadequacies and suggest ways that we might move 
beyond this “preliminary” stage of conceptualizing historical East Asian politics. I 
have also been concerned with how IR scholars can produce better theoretical and 
empirical work on historical East Asian politics by critically drawing on the 
foundation so prominently laid by Fairbank and others. At least in the field of 
historical East Asian politics, we need a fruitful dialogue between political scientists 
and historians.
What of the idea of the “tribute system” then? Wills suggested that “It would be 
conceptually clearer if the term ‘tribute system’ were used only for this systematic 
complex of bureaucratic regulation developed around A.D. 1400.”55 This conception 
of the tribute system might be too restrictive. But at the very least scholars need to 
make clear which tribute system is being discussed. It does not even make much 
sense to speak of the Ming tribute system or the Qing tribute system as a whole, 
since we know that early Ming foreign policy differed from that of the mid-late Ming, 
as did early Qing foreign policy from that of the mid-late Qing. The more important 
task then is to explain these tribute systems by developing a further set of conceptual
54 Wills 1984, 172.
55 Wills 1988, 225.
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frameworks. Enquiry into the nature of historical East Asian politics cannot stop at 
the tribute system.
Yet taking a historical tribute system as the object o f analysis in understanding the 
relations between China and other countries during a specific period is also 
inadequate, since this will ignore the relations outside of normal tributary politics. 
Ultimately, we may ask a question similar to what Hevia has posed: If the “tribute 
system” is removed, what do the relations between China and other polities look 
like?56 For too long discussions about East Asian international relations have almost 
invariably come down to discussions about the tribute system. It is time to think 
about ways to move beyond this paradigm.
56 Hevia 1995, xi.
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Chapter 7 
Myths of the “Chinese Tradition”
Chinese intellectuals have long thought of China as having a unique historical 
experience dramatically different from that of other great powers in history. The 
preferred narrative of China as a benevolent power seeking peace and harmony when 
it was strong and as an easy victim of foreign exploitation and predation when it was 
weak has become entrenched in Chinese political culture since the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries. Chinese weakness during the “century of humiliation” 
has produced the so-called “victim mentality” among Chinese elites.1 After three 
decades of unparalleled economic growth, however, some Chinese analysts are now 
trying to get rid of this “victim mentality” by creating a new discourse of “great 
power mentality” or even a new mentality of “Chinese superiority” in international 
affairs. Along the process they seem to have constructed and reconstructed a 
“Chinese tradition” that is believed to be characterized above all by peace, harmony, 
defensiveness, and non-coercion in its foreign relations. To be sure, very few 
scholars would think that they were making myths about China’s past with practical 
implications for the present and future. The cumulative consequences of their 
writings about “China’s tradition,” however, have produced precisely this effect.
The belief that there is one clear tradition of Chinese pacifism, benevolence, and 
magnanimity demonstrated by the benign role that the Chinese empire is believed to 
have played in East Asia is deep-rooted among many Chinese analysts. 
Essentializing Chinese traditions of statecraft along this line is, however, a parochial 
and misleading interpretation of Chinese history. There are, in fact, several, rather 
than just one, traditions in imperial Chinese foreign policy. The nature of historical 
East Asian politics is also much more complicated than these analysts suggest. Yet,
1 On the theme of national humiliation, see Cohen 2003, chap. 6; and Gries, chap 3.
2 By “tradition” I mean a set of principles and practices in traditional China’s foreign relations that might 
influence contemporary Chinese foreign policy as a coherent body of precedents. By “myth” I mean a belief that 
has no foundation in fact but is given a special meaning and significance for some present purpose. For a 
theoretical discussion on myth, see Tudor 1972.
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although this supposed “Chinese tradition” is a myth to varying degrees, the myth 
itself can have a profound impact on the contemporary discourse of Chinese foreign 
policy.
This chapter draws out the policy implications of this study by critiquing the 
proposition that a single, persistent tradition of Chinese pacifism and benevolence 
can be used to construct a contemporary model of Chinese foreign policy and 
international relations. Its objective is two fold. First, drawing on the case studies in 
this thesis, I examine the traditions of imperial Chinese statecraft by critiquing the 
three dominant myths of Chinese and East Asian history that can be found in some 
part of the Chinese literature. It must be said at the outset that these views do not 
exhaust the diversity of scholarly arguments on the subject. I focus on them because 
they constitute a noteworthy part of the literature with important implications for the 
future thinking of Chinese foreign policy.
Second, I explore the changing role of history in the discussion and formulation of 
contemporary Chinese foreign policy. Significantly, more and more Chinese analysts 
are now harking back to China’s “glory” during ancient and imperial times, rather 
than dwelling on the “century of humiliation,” for inspirations about China’s future 
roles in the world. An important question to ask now is how, as the memory of the 
“century of humiliation” recedes in prominence, the more distant past of “imperial 
glory” might influence Chinese foreign policy thinking. Over twenty years ago when 
China had just started the reform and opening process, the historian Michael Hunt 
speculated that “The rise in appeal of the imperial past seems likely to happen in any 
case, for it offers the only indigenous benchmark for measuring progress toward a 
position of restored national power and pride.”3 As China now rises to reclaim its 
great power status, it is time to examine Hunt’s hypothesis.
History can influence foreign policy in a number of ways. I identify myth—the 
construction and reconstruction of the Chinese past and the creation of a mythology
3 Hunt 1984, 38.
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about a supposed “Chinese tradition” at the level of academic and popular 
discourse—as an important mechanism through which China’s formidable historical 
experiences become a key source for ideational change in foreign policy. After 
identifying three myths of the “Chinese tradition” and critiquing them in detail, I 
discuss the consequences of these myths and their implications for future Chinese 
foreign policy.
Constructing the Myths o f  the “Chinese Tradition ”
The myths of the supposed “Chinese tradition” are the widespread views that 
traditional China was a peaceful power, that it provided peace and stability in East 
Asia, and that as such it is an ideal model and superior source for constructing the 
future world order.
MYTH 1: IMPERIAL CHINA WAS PEACEFUL
One of the persistent and profound myths in the Chinese literature is the deep-rooted 
view that China is a peaceful power and the Chinese nation a peace-loving people. 
The idea of “Chinese pacifism” that imperial China was peaceful and that its wars 
were basically defensive and viewed as a last resort has also become the 
conventional wisdom among some Western observers.4 But it is among the Chinese 
themselves—from the general public through commentators and scholars all the way 
up to the government—that this argument finds its most passionate expression and 
vehement defense. At its core is the idea that peace (he Si) is the essence of imperial 
Chinese foreign policy and, as a result of its peaceful nature, imperial China created 
and maintained a harmonious world in East Asia. China is believed to have created a 
historical trajectory—symbolized above all by peace and harmony in its internal and 
external relations—dramatically different from those of other states.
This “Chinese pacifism” has received strong support from both historians and IR 
scholars inside China, with occasional echoes from scholars of Chinese origin
4 Hu 2006, 256.
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working outside China. He Fangchuan, a prominent historian, declares that peace is 
the “gene” of the Chinese civilization. In a famous essay on the historical East Asian 
system, He argues that the distinguishing character of what he calls the “Huayi 
order” is its peacefulness. He is struck by the “peace, friendship, and harmony” in the 
relations between China and other countries. The sharp contrasts of these “Chinese 
characteristics” with the frequently violent historical orders established by other 
great powers, such as the Roman, Ottoman, British empires and the contemporary 
United States, amply demonstrate the superiority of the “Huayi order.” He suggests 
that the “essence of peace” of the historical East Asian order must be inherited in 
building new regional and international orders today.5
Many IR scholars concur. One author asserts that traditional China’s foreign policy 
was characterized by peace, benevolence, tolerance, and limited war of a 
non-utilitarian nature. Imperial China did not use its strength to bully the weak; 
contemporary China will keep this peaceful tradition during its rise.6 Another author 
writes that the desire for peace and harmony is “engrained in the Chinese blood” and 
claims that during its five-thousand-year history, the “Chinese nation” have never 
fought wars with other peoples and countries unless “ethnic survival” and “national 
security” were threatened.7 Huiyun Feng likewise asserts that the Chinese empire 
“seldom displayed aggressive intentions toward other countries nor made any 
attempts at expansion despite the capability to do so. In China’s 5,000 years of 
history, there were only two large-scale military expansionist movements carried out 
by the nomadic minorities of Mongolian and Manchurian people.” 8 Similarly, 
Shaohua Hu argues that under all circumstances “Imperial China was far from 
militaristic, but rather revealed a consistent pattern of pacifism.” “No matter if it was 
strong or weak, Imperial China seemed reluctant to initiate the use of force in its 
foreign relations for both moralistic and pragmatic reasons.”9
5 He 2007a.
6 Zhang 1998.
7 Wang 2006, 12, 16.
8 Feng 2007, 26.
9 Hu 2006, 270, 275.
199
These sweeping generalizations show how deep-seated the belief of “Chinese 
pacifism” has been. But if  traditional China was peaceful, what accounted for this 
supposedly “Chinese characteristic”? The answer commonly given is Chinese culture. 
Thus Li Shaojun comments that the development of the Chinese civilization has been 
determined by traditional Chinese culture with the distinguishing idea of he-he (ffl 
'n ). In its emphasis on peace, cooperation, and integration, he-he is uniquely Chinese 
and demonstrates the Chinese desire for harmony in the world. According to Li, 
traditional culture stabilized China’s internal and external relations through 
assimilation and integration of different peoples and cultures. He then contrasts 
Chinese culture with Western culture, claiming, reflecting another stereotype, that the 
former has contributed to ethnic integration inside China while the latter has given 
rise to numerous wars and conflicts in the global expansion of capitalism.10 China’s 
alternative to the Western model of historical development is thus effortlessly 
created.
Confucianism is held to be the key to China’s alleged peaceful nature. Conventional 
wisdom has it that Confucianism renounces war as a legitimate means of statecraft. 
Instead it emphasizes the limitation and regulation of force by benevolence (ren C ), 
virtue (de 1%), and propriety (li 4L). Moreover, Confucianism distinguishes two 
types of rule and promotes the wangdao (T ii i  kingly way) of transforming people by 
virtue over the badao (R ift the way of rule by might) of compelling people by 
force.11 And not only Confucianism: According to Hu, almost all major Chinese 
schools of thought detest the use of force.
MYTH 2: IMPERIAL CHINA PROVIDED PEACE AND STABILITY IN. EAST 
ASIA
The second myth, increasingly heard among China’s IR scholars, naturally follows 
from the first. Because traditional China is seen as a peaceful power and because 
Chinese culture (Confucianism to be precise) emphasizes virtue, it is argued that a
10 Li 1999.
11 Hu 2006,259; and Zhang 1998, 7.
12 Hu 2006,258.
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benevolent and magnanimous Chinese empire provided peace and stability in 
historical East Asia. One author writes that China’s traditional “Tianxia 
view”—vaguely referring to any idea imperial China held about the 
world—privileged benevolence and virtue and China sought harmonious coexistence
with its neighbors. Peace was the paramount goal in the Chinese conception and
• 1 ^ pursuit of order.
According to Qin Yaqing, the historical East Asian order defies Western conceptions 
of international relations. First, the order was maintained not by the “culture of 
anarchy” but by China’s unique historical experience and cultural construction—so 
unique that they cannot be described in Western languages. Second, although China 
used force many times for pacification and conquest, force was not the ideal of the 
“Tianxia view;” the highest stage of “force” (wu K ) was to “stop using force” (zhige 
it3 c). Third, since the ideal of the “Tianxia view” was world harmony, the means of 
order maintenance is ritual governance—a kind of institutional and normative 
governance model. Finally, the foundation of ritual governance is virtue; therefore 
the order was maintained above all by China’s virtuous rule—a practice that is 
believed to be fundamentally different from the Western, especially realist, 
understanding of international order.14
Such understandings of the historical East Asian order seem to be prevalent in the 
Chinese literature. The belief is widespread that this order was maintained by culture 
and morality for the sake of peace and mutual benefit between China and other 
countries. In writing about the tribute system, one author argues that China’s purpose 
in establishing such a system was peace; whether or not to join the system was 
entirely up to other countries, and China would not compel them to pay tribute if 
they did not want to.15 What China demonstrated was “ideational” rather than 
“material” power, and its influences over its neighbors were primarily political and
13 Du 2006.
14 Qin 2007, 14-5. See also Qin 2006,10.
15 Song 1998, 40-43.
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cultural.16 The image of China as a benevolent and magnanimous power seeking 
mostly peace, harmony, and mutual benefit for East Asian countries is thus well 
established.
MYTH 3: TRADITIONAL CHINA PROVIDES SUPERIOR SOURCES FOR 
CONSTRUCTING THE FUTURE WORLD ORDER
If the first two myths have a long tradition in Chinese thinking, a third myth is now 
rapidly emerging to catch the imagination of Chinese elites. This myth grows out of 
the latest reconstruction of the “Chinese tradition”, and has pushed the first two 
myths to their extremes. At its core are two messages, exemplified by two recent
1 7studies on China’s political and diplomatic traditions. First, the historical East 
Asian order centering on China—part of what the philosopher Zhao Tingyang calls
1 ftthe “Tianxia system”—provides an almost perfect model for the future world order. 
Second, compared with Western ideas, traditional Chinese thought is a superior 
source for thinking about the future world order. In asserting that traditional China 
provides superior sources for constructing the future world order, some scholars are 
now calling for the Chinese to “rethink China,” to start an ideological debate with the 
West, and to think about how China can contribute to the making of the future world 
order.
Perhaps no one advocates “rethinking China” better than Zhao Tingyang. Zhao 
begins his popular book19 with a discussion on “why we need to discuss the Chinese 
worldview,” explicitly advocating that we now have to “rethink China” or 
“reconstruct China.” As he asserts, “When China becomes an important part of the 
world, we must discuss the significance of Chinese culture and thought for the world. 
If China’s knowledge system is unable to participate in the construction of the 
world’s knowledge system so as to create a new world knowledge system, and if 
China cannot become a great power of knowledge production, it will still be a small 
power even if it is a big power of material production with a huge economic scale.
16 Zhang (Xiaoming) 2006.
17 Zhao 2005; and Xiang 2007.
18 Zhao 2005.
19 For reviews, see: Zhang (Shuguang) 2006; Xu 2007; and Callahan 2008.
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When China has to think about problems of the whole world and be responsible for 
the world, it must say something to the world and offer thoughts about the world. 
China’s worldview thus becomes the foremost problem.”
Zhao thinks that China can become a new kind of great power, one that is responsible 
for the world and different from historical empires in world history. In constructing a 
new kind of “Chinese exceptionalism,” he aims to “create new world concepts and 
world institutions.” He advocates taking “Tianxia”—vaguely understood as the 
“world”—as the foremost unit of analysis. This is believed to be able to surpass the 
Western mode of thinking in terms of the “nation-state.”21 He declares, “The 
historical significance of ‘rethinking China’ lies at recovering China’s own ability to 
think, reconstructing its own worldviews, values and methodologies, and thinking 
about China’s future, Chinese concepts about the future and China’s roles and 
responsibilities in the world.”22
Zhao argues that China’s political philosophy based on the “Tianxia theory” is the
9*^ ♦best theoretical preparation for the construction of a world institution. What is 
China’s unique political philosophy? According to him, first, Western thoughts are all 
about conflict; only Chinese thought is capable of thinking about harmony.24 Second, 
Chinese philosophy seeks to revise the Hobbesian logic of the “state of nature” and 
to create a new interpersonal logic such as one defined by Chinese concepts like
9 ^virtue and ritual. Third, while Western philosophy can only explain the 
preservation of individual rights and national interests, Chinese philosophy, because 
it is based on the holistic “Tianxia view,” can explain the “political system and 
governance of the world” and the preservation of the values of mankind and the
9 Ainterests of the world.
Zhao 2005, 2.
Ibid., 3.
Ibid., 7.
Ibid., 160.
Ibid., 15.
Ibid., 23.
Ibid., 24.
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What is Zhao’s “Tianxia system” then? Although his writings appear ambiguous and 
even contradictory at times, several features of his model can be identified. First, in 
his view, the relationship between China and “others” was not confrontational in 
nature; other peoples were not the objects of Chinese conquest. Where there were 
conflicts between China and other groups, they were “utilitarian conflicts” for local 
interests, not “absolute conflicts” to deny “others” in terms of “spirit” or 
“knowledge.” Second, the idea of the “Tianxia” as one big family limited the 
tendency for it to develop into a military empire. “Tianxia” was not a conquest 
empire, but rather a cultural empire. But this was not a cultural empire of domination 
in terms of universalizing Chinese values; domination was not sought because the 
basic principle of li created self-restraint. Li was the universal principle in managing 
interpersonal and “international” relations in the “Tianxia system.” Third, “Tianxia” 
was defined by li and ren (benevolence), creating a world cultural institution that 
minimized cultural conflicts which in turn gave rise to a world political institution 
based on the principle of he (^0 peace/harmony). China’s historical “Tianxia 
empire” is therefore a “peaceful empire.”27 Finally, because China’s Son of Heaven 
(tianzi took the “Tianxia” as his family, there was “no outsiders” (wuwai
£h). Based on the principle of wuwai, other countries or regions were only unknown 
or far-away from the imperial core; they did not stand in relations of opposition or in 
need of imperial conquest.
Although Zhao has excited many eager to present a “China model” during China’s 
rise, he is not without critics. One criticism comes from Xiang Lanxin, who faults 
Zhao for using a dualistic perspective in interpreting traditional Chinese thought and
9 ofor misunderstanding the essence of traditional Chinese culture. Yet, although 
Xiang criticizes Zhao’s interpretation of traditional China, he in fact shares a 
fundamental similarity with Zhao—both champion the superiority of Chinese ideas 
in understanding and practicing world politics. Their books are different in terms of 
style and argumentation. Substantive arguments aside, they can be put together both
27 Ibid., 84, 169.
28 Xiang 2007, 14, 38.
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as advocates of the superiority of Chinese ideas in managing international affairs. 
Xiang argues, in particular, that China needs to start an ideological debate with the 
West on the management of international affairs, with the goal of discrediting 
Eurocentrism as the dominant narrative of historical development and perhaps 
replacing it with a new China-centered model.
A further similarity is found in the premises behind their projects. Like Zhao, Xiang 
asserts that “If the historical significance of China’s integration into the world is far 
beyond conforming to the existing international rules and norms, then it must make 
an ideological contribution to the world in the area of international politics...When 
the world urgently needs new thinking on international relations, China cannot focus 
only on international economics without offering its own political ideology.”
Xiang wants to construct a Chinese ideology able to stand up against Eurocentrism in 
framing world politics. At a time of growing Chinese power and, as a result, 
increasing confidence in Chinese culture, the Chinese should no longer uncritically 
accept Westerns ideas and ways of thinking. They need to rediscover the essence of 
Chinese culture and refine it to suit contemporary circumstances. This will be the 
ultimate source of Xiang’s proposed new ideology. Reading Xiang one is given the 
impression that the contemporary international order somehow waits for China to 
rescue. At least, Xiang suggests, the Chinese should take as their responsibility to 
develop a new ideology and a whole new set of ideas and theories to save the world. 
His similarity with Zhao in stating China’s grand international mission is impressive 
indeed.
Thus Xiang sets out to reclaim the value and superiority of Chinese thought and 
revive the tradition of Chinese culture. Why then does he think Chinese ideas are 
superior to Western ones in managing international affairs? No systematic answer is 
given to this question, but two points are worth noting. First, drawing on 
Confucianism, he emphasizes that in contrast to the West, China is not a “violent
29 Ibid., 2.
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civilization.” According to him, Western thought emphasizes confrontation and 
struggle, a mode of thinking perhaps with origins in the dualism of the Christian 
culture. In contrast, Chinese thought does not take struggle as a motivation; between 
opposites there is always integration or mutual accommodation. The differences 
between Western and Chinese ways of thinking are repeatedly stressed: While the 
West thinks in terms of dualism and antagonism, China thinks in terms of holism and 
harmony. Second, Xiang argues that imperial China’s governance system is superior 
to the feudalism of Western Europe. Traditional Chinese politics is more reasonable 
and humane because it was “based on the people” (yi ren wei ben (MAA A). This 
ensured that the legitimacy of China’s imperial government was based on 
“benevolence to the people” (qin min ^  K;).30
Evaluating the myths o f  the “Chinese Tradition ”
The three views just outlined are myths because they are distorted representations of 
the Chinese past. This can be shown by asking a few obvious questions.
THE EVIDENCE
The assertions of Chinese pacifism often fly in the face of historical realities. 
Shaohua Hu asks a good question: “If China was peaceful, how can one explain the 
great expansion of the Chinese territory? After all, Imperial China at its inception 
occupied a territory only about a quarter of the size of today’s China.” In arguing 
for Chinese pacifism, however, Hu fails to provide a satisfactory answer. The 
standard answer given in the Chinese literature is invariably a cultural 
explanation—China expanded not by war and conquest but by cultural assimilation. 
If this was the case, how did the Qin emerge from the crucible of interstate 
competition in the Warring States period and create the first empire in Chinese 
history? How did the Han expand into the Western Regions and the Korean 
Peninsula? How did the Tang extend its empire into Central Asia? How did the Ming
30 Ibid, 92, 94, 102.
31 Hu 2006, 258.
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reclaim territories in the north that the Song failed to recover? How did the Qing 
create a vast continental empire stretching over Mongolia, Tibet, and Xinjiang, 
territories over which no previous Han Chinese dynasty had effective control? When 
these questions are asked, it becomes apparent that “War, not Confucian ideals, 
explains how China expanded from the Yellow River valley in the Warring States era 
to the continental empire in the Qing dynasty.” 32 One historian believes that 
“China’s history has in fact been at least as violent as Europe’s.” Indeed, according 
to a chronology compiled by China’s military historians, a total of 3,131 wars 
occurred during China’s imperial history from the Qin to the Qing, averaging almost 
1.5 wars each year.34
The argument that it is culture rather than war that explains Chinese expansion is 
often based on the frequently made assertion of the amazing power of Chinese 
culture in ethnic integration and political unity. Yet, speaking of the relations between 
the Tang and its neighbors, Denis Twitchett observes that
The neighbouring states, even those which had adopted Chinese as their 
literary language and administrative lingua franca, were not inexorably drawn 
to adopt Chinese culture and political models wholesale, ‘transformed by 
culture’ as orthodox Chinese political theory would express it. They adopted 
from Tang China only what seemed to them useful and appropriate.. .The stable 
states of the eighth century each had its own powerful cultural identity as well 
as a fierce sense of political independence. Buddhism was a far more 
widespread influence in all these cultures [e.g., Tibet, Nanzhao] than Chinese
c
models, and transformed them at a deeper level.
The case of the Tang is crucial because it is during this period that other polities’ 
extensive borrowing from Chinese culture and institutions took place. Yet culture 
alone was unable to transform enemies into friends or even further bring them into
32 Hui 2008a, 58. On the importance of the military and war in Chinese history, see van de Ven 2000.
33 van deVen 1996,737.
34 “Zhongguo Junshishi” bianxiezu 2002.
35 Twitchett 2000,147.
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the fold of “China.” What have been believed to be the effects of culture were very 
often the effects of war. Indeed Peter Lorge argues that “There was no ‘China’ 
without war:”
[A] 11 of the successful imperial Chinese dynasties were extremely skilled in 
the use of war in state formation and maintenance. Chinese empires were not 
created by the cultivation of virtue, a fundamentally cultural orientation to 
political order, or ideological pleas for ethnic unity; they were created by 
decades of war and political strife...Although this has been most apparent 
during the rule of “alien” conquerors like the Mongols or Manchus, it has 
been equally true of the Han Chinese dynasty as well. All imperial dynasties
' i n
were conquest dynasties.
One of the myths regarding Chinese history is the view that military expansions were 
carried out only by non-Han Chinese dynasties such as the Yuan and the Qing; Han 
Chinese dynasties were almost always defensive and inward-looking. Yet this can 
be easily challenged by evidence from the Qin, the Han, the Tang, the Ming, or even 
the Song. Everyone seems to agree that the Song was especially weak and 
civil-focused among all Chinese dynasties. Yet it is this supposedly civil-oriented 
dynasty that sent a successful expedition to conquer the West River region in the 
early 1070s as a first step in a larger strategy to destroy the Tanguts. The campaign, 
moreover, “was clearly expansionistic and assuaged the injured military feelings the 
court had been nursing for decades.”39 Indeed, Yuan-Kang Wang shows that the 
Song behaved aggressively at the first sight of opportunity.40 So was the Ming, a 
regime that emerged from rebellions of the 1350s to become a regional power in the 
Yangtze River valley and then a force capable of expelling the Mongols from north 
China. In the end, as Crossley points out, the “monolithic assumption that there were 
‘Chinese’ dynasties that were somehow not conquest dynasties, contrasted to
36 Lorge 2005, 178.
37 Ibid, 2.
38 See, for example, Feng 2007,26.
39 Lorge 2005, 179.
40 Wang 2001.
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‘conquest’ dynasties, all of which had been perpetrated by foreign (barbarian, 
non-Han, alien) dynasties, was not credible. All empires in China, from that of the 
Qin in 221 BCE, are manifestly conquest empires, regardless of the origins of the 
ruling house.”41
Yet some may not be very much troubled by such evidence. Sometimes it is asserted 
that these belong to China’s “internal politics,” not “external relations.” The Tanguts, 
so the argument goes, were eventually brought into China, as were the peoples of 
Mongolia, Tibet, and Xinjiang. Such a retrospective methodology is a major 
impediment to a sound understanding of Chinese history. But let us try the hard test 
and see whether China displayed consistent pacifism toward “other countries” such 
as Korea and Japan in its “proper foreign relations.” Chinese aggressions are easy to 
find during the Han and Tang dynasties. I shall make the test even harder by looking 
at the foreign policies of the early Ming (1368-1424), since the Ming, as He 
Fangchuan argues, is the foremost case of Chinese pacifism.
Leaving aside its repeated campaigns into Mongolia which He and many others 
overlook (I have argued in the case studies that most of these campaigns were more 
offensively than defensively oriented), did the early Ming behave aggressively 
toward its neighbors such as Korea and Japan? Yes, more than has usually been 
realized. Although force was not used, the threat of force was frequent. I have 
identified four salient strategies that early Ming rulers had employed toward their 
neighbors. Many analysts have for long emphasized just one of these: persuasion. Yet 
the other three—war, blackmail, and inducement—are just as important in telling us 
about the nature of Ming foreign policy as persuasion. Early Ming rulers threatened 
Korea and Japan because they perceived security threats from Japanese pirates and 
Korean collaboration with the Mongols and Jurchens. Were their threats in the form 
of “I’ll punish and even invade you if  you don’t comply with my requests” 
indications of China’s peaceful intention? One may wonder how the Korean and 
Japanese rulers might have thought about China’s “peaceful nature” given the threats
41 Crossley 2002, 29-30.
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they had received. The Japanese decided to meet the Chinese with arms on several 
occasions at least. The mere fact of threat itself would cast doubt on the “peaceful 
nature” of Chinese foreign policy. Certainly it shows that China’s relations with other 
countries were not that harmonious after all.
CULTURE AND FOREIGN POLICY
Many Chinese analysts seem to believe that culture has a major causal impact on 
foreign policy. As we have seen, their favorite explanation of the supposed peace in 
Chinese foreign policy is Chinese culture. The literature on “Chinese strategic 
culture” has blossomed, along with the revival of interest in traditional culture in 
China in general. Some analysts, however, go further than simply claiming an 
“impact” of culture on foreign policy. They believe that culture can determine 
foreign policy without fully explaining why. Li Shaojun asserts that the development 
of the Chinese civilization, a model believed to be fundamentally different from that 
of the West, determines that China will be a factor for peace in the twenty-first 
century.42 He Fangchuan argues that China’s rise in the contemporary world will 
again be peaceful partly because of the tradition and “gene” of peace in the Chinese 
civilization.43
Assuming for the moment that culture determines foreign policy, can the conclusion 
that Chinese foreign policy is peaceful follow? A “yes” answer often follows from 
equating “Chinese culture” with “Confucianism” while overlooking what the 
Chinese cultural tradition might have actually been. Since Confucianism advocates 
benevolence and virtue, a Confucian foreign policy would supposedly rest on 
persuasion rather than coercion. And since Confucianism was the official ideology of 
the imperial Chinese state, the conclusion that traditional Chinese foreign policy was 
peaceful follows naturally.
But Confucianism is not all of what Chinese culture is about. It does not monopolize
42 Li 1999, 30.
43 He 2007b, 392.
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the Chinese cultural tradition. What about Legalism—a school of thought that 
emphasizes the maximization of power and the utility of force and punishment—and 
its influence on Chinese political development and foreign policy? If one wants to 
take a cultural approach, the first proper question should be “Which Chinese 
culture?” and then determine the relative causal weight of different cultures on 
behavior.
In fact, Chinese strategic culture is considerably more varied than a simple 
Confucian paradigm suggests. Iain Johnston, for example, finds two competing 
paradigms, with the parabellum paradigm playing a major role in the strategies of the 
Ming dynasty than the Confucian-Mencian paradigm.44 Critiquing this, Huiyun Feng 
argues that the Confucian defensive strategic culture trumps the offensive realist 
one.45 Andrew Scobell contends that neither the Confucian-Mencian nor the 
parabellum paradigm is sufficient to encompass the richness of China’s strategic 
tradition. Rather, the two strands interact to produce the paradoxical outcome of 
idealist logic (the Confucian school) combined with hard realpolitik security policies 
(the realpolitik school). China thus has a “dualistic” strategic culture.46 Another 
author identifies three paradigms, adding that of the “realistic kingly way” to the 
Confucian and parabellum paradigms.47
Still, others find a great many “diplomatic schools” in the Warring States period each 
with implications for China’s strategic culture. Ye Zicheng, for example, argues that 
ancient China,had both the “realist” and “idealist” schools of thought on foreign 
relations, each with its own variants. These different “diplomatic schools” share 
many similarities with Western perspectives on international relations. More 
recently, Yan Xuetong has shown that ancient Chinese thoughts on foreign relations 
share many characteristics with modem IR theories. Elements of realism, liberalism,
44 Johnston 1995.
45 Feng 2007.
46 Scobell 2003.
47 Chen 2004, 24-27.
48 Ye 2003; and Ye and Pang 2001.
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and constructivism can all be found in the writings of pre-Qin thinkers.49 These 
researches show that it is ultimately mistaken to infer the peaceful nature of Chinese 
foreign policy from the peaceful nature of Chinese culture—neither was by nature 
peaceful. They also show that, since Chinese culture shares so many similarities with 
Western ideas, it is not that unique after all.
Indeed, even though Confucianism was the official ideology since the Han, its role in 
Chinese politics and foreign policy may not be that consequential in reality. Chinese 
rulers might have in fact followed “Legalism with a Confucian facade,” as Victoria 
Hui emphasizes. Hui further argues that the actual Chinese tradition is better 
characterized by Legalism than by Confucianism; Confucian moral restraints had 
only shaky foundations in ancient and imperial China.50 Peter Lorge even suggests 
that “traditional Chinese culture was partly a martial culture.”51
Is Chinese culture pacifistic? The question does not permit a simple “yes” or “no” 
answer. Chinese culture contains both “idealpolitik” and “realpolitik” elements and 
which element played a more profound role in Chinese history is still an open 
question.52 The evidence presented so far, however, has cast strong doubt on a direct 
casual link between a peaceful Chinese culture and a peaceful Chinese foreign policy. 
History suggests that just as different streams of Chinese culture emphasizes peace as 
well as force, so actual Chinese foreign policy has been both peaceful and conflictual. 
The challenge is to explain the variation and specify the causal chain between culture 
and foreign policy if such a chain can be identified.
But cultural explanation must face another analytical challenge: Foreign policy is not 
determined by culture alone. Cultural explanation is ultimately incomplete, and a 
host of other internal and external factors may influence foreign policymaking. Even
49 Yan and Xu 2008.
50 Hui 2005, 2008a.
51 Lorge 2005, 3.
52 It would be interesting to examine the origins of the various myths of Chinese history. In terms of culture, 
Hans Van de Ven writes that “The idea that Chinese culture was one of peace is partly a Confucian aspiration, 
partly an Enlightenment image produced when dynastic wars ravaged Europe, and finally partly a notion that was 
given new life after World War I by those in the East and West who wrote about pacifistic Eastern Cultures as an 
alternative to violent Western ones.” van de Ven 1996, 737.
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if Chinese culture was peaceful, it does not follow that Chinese foreign policy would 
also be peaceful. And peace in Chinese foreign policy was not a necessary result of 
its peaceful culture. Just as the cause of war is found at the level of the individual, the 
state, and the state system, so the conditions of peace rest on a delicate balance 
between internal and external factors. Adding to the task of weighing the causal 
importance of different cultures, analysts must also determine the causal weight of 
culture as opposed to “material factors,” to use the somewhat clumsy language in IR. 
Because factors other than culture can influence foreign policy, it is ultimately 
misleading to claim the “peaceful nature” of China or Chinese foreign policy. Can 
something be peaceful or violent by nature? Peace and war are as much determined 
by circumstances as they are by culture. The Chinese, it has been said, “are capable 
of peace as well as war, and cultural precedent does not tell us which they will 
prefer.”54
MEANS AND ENDS
The emphasis on peace and harmony characterizes neither traditional Chinese 
foreign policy nor Chinese culture. Some Chinese analysts seem oblivious to the 
wars during Chinese unification and expansion, mistake the effect of war for the 
effect of culture, fail to identify and weigh the causal importance of different streams 
of Chinese culture, and overlook a variety of factors other than culture that can 
influence foreign policy. Another problem in their analyses is the confusion of means 
and ends of traditional Chinese foreign policy.
Many have thought that peace and harmony were the goals of traditional Chinese 
foreign policy. They very often were not. The quick belief that they were may partly 
stem from analysts’ taking the official statements of the imperial Chinese state at face 
value. What were in fact ideological expressions have sometimes been taken as 
evidence supporting China’s pursuit of peace and harmony by means of culture and 
virtue. But, as Wang Gungwu pointed out long ago, statements of virtue were often
53 See in particular, Waltz 1959.
54 Nathan and Ross 1997, 21.
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ideological; actual policy had to be determined by a more realistic appraisal of the 
facts.55 The memorials penned by Confucian scholar-officials have to be examined 
against events and alternative accounts rather than simply taken for granted. If one 
reads these official statements, it indeed appears that China was an all benevolent 
power acting only for the peace and prosperity of all countries. The reality, however, 
was often very different. I shall only use the case of the early Ming to illustrate the 
importance of distinguishing means and ends of its foreign policy.
Early Ming rulers had two primary concerns in their foreign policies: ensure security 
at the frontier and enhance domestic legitimacy by gaining foreign recognitions of 
their superiority. These twin objectives, combined with early Ming’s superior power 
and the rulers’ conception of their sinocentric identity, led to a grand strategy of 
political and/or military domination toward neighboring countries. What were the 
primary means used for domination? So long as the ends could be achieved, the 
particular means did not very much bother either the Hongwu or Yongle emperor. 
The ends justified the means. Thus, they tried four principal strategies toward their 
neighbors: persuasion, inducement, threat, and war. Persuasion and inducement were 
peaceful means, while threat and war were coercive strategies. Where did peace and 
harmony fall in early Ming’s strategic design? Nowhere except in the stated 
ideal—and this only after Chinese domination was achieved.
Ensuring security and gaining foreign recognitions of their superiority were the 
concrete ends of early Ming foreign policy. Whether peace and harmony would 
follow is an entirely different matter. They may or may not. Because peace and 
benevolence were the expressions of Chinese means to specific ends, as were war 
and threat, one cannot tell whether early Ming foreign policy was either peaceful or 
aggressive. The nature of early Ming foreign policy cannot be put in terms of simple 
dichotomies between peace and war, harmony and violence. The early Ming in fact
55 Wang 1968, 43. Wang further pointed out that although Tang and Song historians believed that it was China’s 
possession of virtue that led to successful foreign policy, it was in fact through the skilled use o f force that the Sui 
and Tang rulers brought power and glory to the empire. Indeed, Chinese ministers would later find out that there 
was no real contradiction between virtue and force so long as the force was applied by a ruler possessing virtue. 
The argument about virtue vs. force then easily becomes tautological, i.e., ideological. Wang 1968, 46, 49.
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experienced peace as well as war, harmony as well as violence. Rather, one must 
distinguish the means and ends of its foreign policy and show how they were given 
practical expressions in specific cases. For example, even if early Ming emperors’ 
initial concern in the north was security, their superior power would propel them to 
adopt offensive means—conquest and preventive war—to achieve it.
THE NATURE OF CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY
What then is the nature of traditional Chinese foreign policy? The question is too big 
and I will not attempt even a partial answer. I shall suggest, however, that the ends in 
rulers’ view and the capabilities at their disposal can explain a big part of their 
foreign policies. Thus, early Ming rulers’ need for security and legitimacy, combined 
with the power and vigor following dynastic founding, led to a grand strategy of 
domination through the means of persuasion, inducement, threat, and war. One can 
ask three questions when thinking about the nature of Chinese foreign policy in 
specific periods: What were the rulers’ objectives and why? What means did they use 
to achieve these objectives? Why those means but not others?
The example of Zheng He’s overseas voyages in the early fifteenth century illustrates 
nicely the utility of such an approach. This example has added significance because 
Zheng He’s voyages have been seen as the clearest yet proof of China’s peaceful 
foreign policy. The seven voyages between 1405 and 1433 have been invariably 
interpreted by Chinese analysts as demonstrating Ming China’s wish to conduct 
peaceful cultural and economic exchanges with foreign countries. Their favorite 
argument, in a long tradition of sentimentalizing Chinese history to create a preferred 
alternative to European history, is that in contrast to the Europeans, Zheng He tried 
no conquest or colonization but instead focused on exploration and friendly exchange. 
He Fangchuan, for example, believes that Zheng He’s voyages showed the Chinese 
desire to share peace with other peoples and to enhance their civilizations by 
spreading Chinese culture.56
56 He 2007b, 308-9.
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Yet, if my argument about early Ming foreign policy is right, Zheng He’s voyages 
should be more properly seen as an attempt to meet the objectives of either security 
maintenance or identity recognition. Since security was not an issue when it comes to 
the polities in maritime Southeast Asia and beyond, foreign recognitions of the 
Yongle emperor’s superiority must be the paramount goal. Zheng He’s voyages, 
therefore, can be seen together with Yongle’s other grandiose projects, such as the 
Mongolian campaigns, the construction of the imperial palace in Beijing, and the 
conquest of Vietnam, as one of his several major attempts to buttress his legitimacy 
by gaining tributary states beyond the immediate vicinity of the Ming empire.
Indeed, in a recent study Edward Dreyer argues that the purpose of Zheng He’s 
voyages was “to force the states of Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean to 
acknowledge the power and majesty of Ming China and its emperor” and “to enforce 
outward compliance with the forms of the Chinese tributary system by the show of
C 7
an overwhelming armed force.” In fact, the Mingshi (Official History of the Ming 
Dynasty) has explicitly stated these objectives. Zheng He’s biography states that 
Yongle “wanted to display his soldiers in strange lands in order to make manifest the 
wealth and power of the Middle Kingdom.”58
What about the means to this end? Was Zheng He prepared to try all the four 
strategies of persuasion, inducement, threat, and war? Apparently he was. The 
Mingshi says that Zheng He’s fleet “went in succession to the various foreign 
countries, proclaiming the edicts of the Son of Heaven and giving gifts to their rulers 
and chieftains. Those who did not submit were pacified by force.”59 Zheng He was 
well prepared to fight and in fact did fight on at least three occasions. Moreover, 
Dreyer points out that “the Chinese saw the three battles as major accomplishments 
of Zheng He’s fleet, rather than as incidental exceptions to a career of peaceful 
exploration.” One must think that peace was never the main objective of Zheng He’s 
voyages; showcasing Chinese power and superiority and winning Yongle more
57 Dreyer 2007, xii, 163. For another recent work which argues that “the voyages constituted a maritime
proto-colonialism,” see Wade 2005. 
i8 Dreyer 2007, 33.
59 Ibid.
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tributary states were.
One must also think that the fact that the voyages were largely peaceful should be 
explained by the power asymmetry between Zheng He’s fleet and the political units 
he visited, rather than by the alleged peaceful intentions of the voyages. Faced with 
“several myriads of government troops and over a hundred big ships” (as Zheng He 
bragged about the power of his fleet),60 except for the most recalcitrant, who would 
want to fight such an overwhelming force that emerged out of the blue? Again as 
Dreyer puts it, “Zheng He’s armada was frightening enough that it seldom needed to 
fight, but being able to fight was its primary mission.”61 Zheng He’s voyages, then, 
insofar as its purpose was concerned, were not so different from Yongle’s other 
foreign policy actions. Although the voyages were largely harmonious, their purpose 
was to impress or even overpower other countries so as to demonstrate Chinese 
superiority.
Chinese pacifism a myth if one believes that it trumped other intellectual and 
political traditions in historical China. The claim that China was a peaceful power 
and the Chinese nation a peace-loving people is in fact extremely flawed and shallow. 
The point is not to go to the other extreme—the equally untenable view that 
traditional China was an inherently aggressive power. The preceding discussion 
should not be seen as arguing for Chinese militarism. I have tried to show that apart 
from the image of a peaceful China, there is another China—militarized, 
power-political, and aggressive at times—that one must not lose sight of. The “two 
faces” of China warn strongly against essentializing the Chinese tradition, for there is 
simply no single tradition to speak of.
THE NATURE OF HISTORICAL EAST ASIAN POLITICS
Having deconstructed the myths about imperial Chinese foreign policy, it will now 
be easy to evaluate corresponding myths on the nature of the historical East Asian
60 Ibid., 29.
61 Ibid., xii (emphasis in original).
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order. Again the question centers on the understanding of ends and means. Many 
Chinese analysts believe that in constructing the tribute system. China wanted to 
achieve peace, harmony, and mutual benefit with other countries. And China 
maintained the system through “ideational” rather than “material” power, that is, a 
kind of normative governance supported by China’s virtuous rule.
Virtuous rule, however, often reflected Chinese rulers’ wish to dominate their 
neighbors by moral force. Such political domination entailed that these countries had 
to act correctly according to the Chinese conception—not to interfere in their 
neighbors’ affairs nor to invade adjoining territory; to maintain their dynastic affairs 
in proper form; and to be open and sincere in their dealings with the Chinese emperor. 
Only when such a moral order was maintained can peace and harmony be expected. 
Yet, beneath the niceties of such an order, one finds that peace and harmony were not 
the immediate goals of the early Ming’s effort to establish tributary relations with its 
neighbors. Tributary politics were rather underpinned by the twin motives of security 
and legitimacy. Did early Ming China consistently apply the rule of virtue toward its 
neighbors? Hardly. Although initially the Hongwu and Yongle emperors tried to 
persuade and induce foreign rulers to accept their superiority, they soon resorted to 
threat and even war when compliance was not forthcoming. The more troublesome 
the relations became, the less “virtuous” China’s policies followed. It would appear 
that Chinese benevolence was often only possible when foreign rulers complied with 
Chinese wishes.
Historical East Asia during the early Ming is not just a normative order, although it 
no doubt contains some such elements. A careful examination of dynastic records 
will show that coercion was a prominent element in Chinese policies toward its 
neighbors. Some IR scholars believe that historical East Asia was unique in that it 
was not characterized by power politics, as in modem Europe, but by virtue and 
ritual. They conclude that realism cannot be applied to this part of.the world. Are war 
and threat not part of power politics? Historical East Asian politics were more
62 Whitmore 1977,51.
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power-political than they have realized. The attempt to pit East Asia against Western 
Europe, virtuous rule against power politics, peace and harmony against war and 
instability as if these rigid dichotomies could be sustained, is misguided and 
untenable. A more fruitful comparison of the international politics of the two regions 
in history will have to first get rid of these superficialities.
The question of whether China was a benevolent empire that provided peace and 
stability in East Asia has to be answered on a case-by-case basis. In the case of the 
early Ming dynasty, China was at times benevolent, yet was equally if not more often 
demanding and even aggressive. Peace and stability in foreign relations were seldom 
the primary goals. Beyond the Ming, the relations between China and its neighbors 
cannot be characterized by peace or stability even though during various periods the 
system did appear to be stable. The analytical challenge is to explain the variation in 
system stability.
TRADITIONAL CHINA AS A MODEL FOR WORLD ORDER?
We will now be able to evaluate Zhao Tingyang’s and Xiang Lanxin’s arguments for 
the superiority of Chinese ideas and models. Both praise Chinese culture for being 
able to think about peace and harmony and think in terms of holism and integration. 
This is contrasted with Western philosophy which both Zhao and Xiang criticize as 
being able to think only in terms of dualism, antagonism, and individual interest. 
Such interpretations are an important basis upon which they champion the superiority 
of Chinese ideas and the necessity for China to offer new ideas for international 
affairs.
Yet such interpretations of Chinese and Western cultures are simplistic and mistaken. 
True, Confucianism emphasizes peace and harmony. But so did liberal thinkers such 
as Grotius and Kant in the West. To claim that Western philosophy is incapable of 
thinking seriously about peace is to discount its entire liberal tradition. Moreover, 
Zhao and Xiang write as though Chinese culture were all for peace and harmony, 
while Western culture were all for conflict and struggle. Yet there are important
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Chinese schools of thought that emphasize struggle and force, just as there are 
important Western schools of thought that emphasize peace and harmony. While their 
differences are undeniable, one should not overlook important similarities. If 
imperial China was indeed ruled by “Legalism with a Confucian facade,” one must 
acknowledge the central role Legalism—which above all emphasized the utility of 
power and punishment—played in Chinese history. As one commentator has pointed 
out, the conclusion of the alleged Chinese superiority can only be reached by 
comparing the “best” Chinese ideas (e.g., Confucianism) with the “worst” Western 
ideas (e.g., Hobbes).64
The belief in imperial China’s ability to think about and act for peace and harmony 
unites Zhao and Xiang despite their substantive differences. They seem to have 
assumed that because Confucianism advocated benevolence and peace, imperial 
China had pursued them and realized them. Thus, Zhao, following the stereotypical 
interpretation in the Chinese literature, thinks that China was able to transform 
enemies into friends by attracting them rather than conquering them. The assumption 
is unwarranted, as I have shown above. Chinese pacifism is often a myth, as is the 
image of a benevolent China acting for the common good of other countries.
In the writings of many Chinese, traditional China appears to have always acted for 
the sake of common interests, defying what (Western) realism says about the nature 
of international politics. It is Zhao’s central argument that the Chinese in imperial 
times were able to think in terms of the “Tianxia” (never mind whether this means 
the Chinese empire, the entire world, or the “international system” of which China 
was a part, for its meaning shifts as the text goes) rather than the “nation-state.” This 
is believed to be good because it shows that Chinese rulers were taking into account 
other countries’ interests in addition to their own. Yet “thinking in terms of the 
‘Tianxia’” often also implied sinocentrism and the desire to impose a Chinese 
conception of international order onto others. Zhao fails to explicitly acknowledge
63 For a brief note on the similarities as well as differences between Chinese and Western thoughts in 
international relations, see Bleiker 2001, 195-6.
64 Xu 2007, 137.
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the inequality in such a “Chinese world order.” Did Chinese rulers act for the 
interests of other countries? What I have found among early Ming emperors are 
instead the concerns for the security of their empire and the legitimacy of their rule. 
Toward these ends they tried to dominate their neighbors—hardly what one would 
call “altruism”.
Can the Chinese empire and the historical East Asian order that was more or less 
centered on it be models for the future world order? Since one has to make so many 
qualifications on the superiority of the “Tianxia system,” the answer cannot be quick 
and firm. Certainly the model represented by traditional China is not as perfect as 
Zhao believes. The belief rests on the alleged superiority and advantages of the 
historical East Asian order which frequently turn out to be myths while discounting 
elements of power politics and inequality which were also an integral part of the 
system. One must also recognize that modeling something on the basis of something 
else requires comparability and similarity between the two, at least structurally. Can 
the world be remade to conform to the historical East Asian model? Can China’s and 
East Asian’s past be the world’s future? Essentially, this is what Zhao advocates. But 
he has shown neither how his “Tianxia” utopia might be realized in practice nor how 
the modeling can be done.
Historical Myths and Contemporary Chinese Foreign Policy
Because they are distorted representations of the Chinese past, the three beliefs just 
evaluated are better called myths. But that they are myths does not imply their 
unimportance or incredibility. Nor, as a practical matter, do myths always entail 
harmful effects on policy discussions. In this section, I explore the role of myth as a 
mechanism through which history becomes the source of ideational change and 
examine the practical implications of the myths of the “Chinese tradition” for the 
evolution of Chinese foreign policy.
Henry Tudor wrote that myths are “believed to be true, not because the historical
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evidence is compelling, but because they make sense of men’s present experience.”65 
Paul Cohen points out that myths may or may not be part of the actual historical past; 
but in order to work effectively, they must “possess a degree of plausibility. They 
must be believable, even if not true.”66 The myths of the “Chinese tradition” just 
discussed possess more than a degree of plausibility. Indeed, the first and second 
myths have been believed to be true ever since the imperial era. Expanding the first 
two, the third myth has quickly found a large number of followers. Such myths, 
because they speak to the enduring mindset of Chinese pacifism, can in fact be far 
more persuasive and influential in intellectual debates and everyday discourse than 
more accurate presentations of the Chinese past, which necessarily have to be more 
nuanced, complicated, and even uncomfortable in terms of substantive arguments. 
The power of myths lies in their attraction through simplification and magnification 
at the same time.
In this sense, the realities of the Chinese and East Asian past may not be that 
consequential when it comes to current debates about China’s future roles in the 
world. What is important may not be what actually happened in the past, but what is 
now believed to have happened. And the myths of a pacifistic Chinese tradition are 
not intrinsically bad. Myths are necessary condensations of historical traditions that 
form a useful shorthand for debate.67 In fact, the myth of Chinese pacifism can quite 
possibly have beneficial effects on contemporary Chinese foreign policy, if Chinese 
elites and policymakers can privilege the idealpolitik tradition over the realpolitik 
tradition and consistently translate the themes of peace and harmony into behavior.
But this is not the only implication of these myths. The emergence of a particular 
myth is always intended to meet the needs of a particular time. “A myth is a story 
told with a view to promote some practical purpose.”68 Myths represent “a pressing 
of the past into the service of a particular reading of the present... a dynamic 
interaction is set up between present and past, in which the past is continually being
65 Tudor 1972, 124.
66 Cohen 2003, 213.
67 Kammen 1991.
68 Tudor 1972, 125.
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reshaped, either consciously or unconsciously, in accordance with the diverse and 
shifting preoccupations of people in the present.”69 Consider the myth of Chinese 
pacifism as an example. For imperial Chinese government, de-militarization was an 
important part of imperial ideology to hide the value or coercive effectiveness of war 
as a political, cultural or social tool.70 For the Chinese of post-imperial China, it has 
been equally important to establish the historical reality of a weak or fragmented 
China that was subject to foreign exploitation and conquest. Further, the “victim 
mentality” following the “century of humiliation” has created a powerful need to 
present Chinese history as a preferred alternative to the Western experience.
But now, after three decades of phenomenal economic growth, Chinese elites are 
confronting another pressing need—to find an appropriate ideology or guiding 
principle for China’s expanding role in international affairs and to show, as a result, 
that China will be a different kind of great power from those of the West. Importantly, 
this need has stimulated intellectuals to look farther back into imperial Chinese 
history rather than the more recent past of the “century of humiliation.” If narratives 
about the “century of humiliation” have framed the ways in which China has
71interacted with the West since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, it 
will be less consequential as an ideational source for Chinese foreign policy thinking 
in the twenty-first century, even though these narratives will continue to remain an 
important background reminder of China’s past sufferings (and thus the need to be 
wealthy and powerful). The myth of Chinese pacifism still serves a useful purpose, 
as it is believed to be able to distinguish Chinese ways of international relations from 
the West. But the distinguishing feature of the new myth, as exemplified in the 
writings of Zhao, Xiang, and others, is how it has moved significantly beyond 
pacifism into an explicit discourse of Chinese superiority over the West in managing 
international affairs.72 The myth of Chinese superiority is being given further
69 Cohen 2003,201.
70 Lorge 2005, 2.
71 Gries 2004, 46.
72 Of course, “Chinese superiority” associated with Confucianism has appeared at least since the 1990s in 
Chinese nationalist discourse, but in recent years the discourse of “Chinese superiority” in international affairs 
has gained increasing momentum and become popular among prominent intellectuals. On the “superiority” 
discourse in Chinese nationalism, see Zheng 1999, chap. 4.
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plausibility by the increasingly popular discourse about “China models” among 
prominent Chinese intellectuals. Indeed, the myth of Chinese superiority in 
managing international affairs and the arguments of “China models” that advocate 
China’s uniqueness in politics, economics, and foreign policy are mutually 
reinforcing, creating a powerful call for a distinctive Chinese model of international 
relations during China’s rise.
The straightforward implication of the myth of Chinese superiority is thus the likely 
emergence of an important line of discourse on Chinese uniqueness and superiority 
in managing international affairs. If the impressively enduring myth of Chinese 
pacifism has given rise to a “peace discourse” on the part of the Chinese government 
to dissipate the fear of Chinese power among neighboring countries, the new myth of 
Chinese superiority promises to offer grand Chinese visions of international relations. 
In a review of Zhao’s book, William Callahan thinks that Zhao has proposed a new 
Chinese hegemony for the twenty-first century. The success of the book “shows that 
there is a thirst in China for ‘Chinese solutions’ to world problems, and a hunger for 
nationalist solutions to global issues, especially when they promote a patriotic form 
of cosmopolitanism. This is the main significance of The Tianxia System in China’s 
foreign policy-making. Indeed, it is not an isolated example but the sign of a broader 
trend where China’s imperial mode of governance is increasingly revived for the
n'xtwenty-first century.”
There is every possibility that the discourse of Chinese uniqueness will continue to 
rise in prominence, resulting in an ideological clash between Chinese and Western 
approaches to international affairs, at least at the level of elite discourse. This should 
especially be true if China manages to maintain an environmentally and socially 
sustainable economic growth in the next few decades. The “superiority mentality” 
will be further agitated if the West is perceived to further decline in political and 
economic terms and fail to resolve pressing global issues such as international 
instability and climate change. One must wonder what a difference the three decades
73 Callahan 2008.
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of China’s rise has made in transforming Chinese elite mindset from the “victim 
mentality,” to the “great power mentality,” and even to a kind of “superiority 
mentality.”
Three caveats, however, must be added. First, the impact of the myth of Chinese 
superiority has not yet had an observable impact on official policy behavior, though 
the influence of traditional ideas such as the “harmonious world” is apparent in 
China’s new policy discourse. Second, among the many Chinese intellectuals looking 
into the ancient and imperial past, not all of them have indulged in mythical 
arguments as defined and evaluated here. There is likely to be a debate among the 
Chinese themselves about how to interpret China’s past. Scholars with a more 
balanced understanding of Chinese history will appreciate the multiplicity of China’s 
traditions and the folly of championing Chinese superiority, whether in terms of ideas 
or behaviors. As more and more scholars begin to “rethink China,” new 
interpretations of Chinese history will continue to be put forward with an eye to their 
utility for solving contemporary problems. It is their relative prominence in a 
discursive network of knowledge production that will determine which sorts of ideas 
can have the greatest impact on actual foreign policy. Third, myths and their impact 
on policy are not unique to the Chinese case. In fact, myth is a prevalent 
phenomenon in all societies. American foreign policy, for example, has also been 
profoundly influenced by historical myths.74 And, as already mentioned, myths are 
not intrinsically “good” or “bad.” Myths are even needed to initiate intellectual 
debates. The important question, then, is to examine the source and content of myths 
and their practical consequences in actual cases.
The key point of this section is that myths arise when there is a practical need for 
them at a particular time. This can be clearly seen in the above discussion about the 
myths of the “Chinese tradition,” especially in the rise of the myth of Chinese 
superiority in managing international affairs during the present period when China’s 
rise has created a strong need for new thinking on Chinese foreign policy. But
74 See Hixson 2008; and Mead 2001.
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whether myth or not, a general note on the influence of history on future Chinese 
foreign policy can be added. With the more distant history of “imperial glory” 
coming to the fore as the source of inspiration for new thinking, there will be a new 
Chinese articulation about how the world should be run, presented as distinct from 
Western approaches to international affairs. Scholars with a more balanced view of 
Chinese history are also likely to come up with distinctively Chinese ideas about 
international relations and how China might contribute to shaping the future world 
order, even if their arguments are not as one-sided and sweeping as those identified 
above. The influence of traditional ideas such as “harmony” is already present in 
official policy statements. In an important sense, the “ideological debate” between 
China and the West, which Xiang eagerly advocates, has already started. The 
material rise of Chinese power has finally triggered a cultural and ideological rise of 
Chinese visions of world order, with China’s long and rich history, subject to 
multiple interpretations, serving as a vast reservoir for new ideas.
There is a further possibility that, as Chinese elites increasingly see China as 
possessing a distinctive, if not always superior, set of history, culture, and value for 
the management of international affairs, and as they start to perform China’s role as a 
“responsible great power,” they will likely try to socialize other countries about 
Chinese approaches in international politics. So far scholars have typically focused 
on how China has been socialized by international norms and institutions. Yet, as 
Chinese diplomats become defter in international institutional settings, and as 
China’s traditions continue to be discovered and developed into new ideas for foreign 
policy, it is not unreasonable to think that they will try to socialize their foreign 
counterparts about international issues by employing a distinctive Chinese set of 
values and models. We have to pay more attention to the changing role of history as a 
source for ideational change in Chinese foreign policy and how this might in turn 
influence its behavioral patterns.
Conclusion
75 Johnston 2008.
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I have pursued two interrelated objectives in this chapter. First, I ask whether there is 
a clear Chinese tradition of benevolence, peace, and harmony in foreign relations. 
Instead of one such tradition, however, historical China in fact displayed several 
traditions simultaneously.76 The variety of Chinese thought and behavior makes one 
wonder whether any persistent tradition can be identified in its history. Confucianism 
promotes morality and benevolence, yet Legalism emphasizes the importance of 
power and punishment, and these are just two among China’s many schools of 
thoughts developed in the Warring States period. Sometimes China displayed a 
pacifistic approach in foreign affairs, yet during other periods China appeared highly 
opportunistic in realizing its self-interest through power politics. At times China 
appeared to be a factor for peace in East Asia, yet often it also disrupted regional 
stability. The dynamics and multiplicity of the relations between China and other 
countries are puzzles to be explained.
Yet the myths of the supposed “Chinese tradition” have practical consequences for 
contemporary thinking about Chinese foreign policy. Prior to the 1990s the effect of 
the myth of Chinese pacifism mainly lies in providing an intellectual background for 
the “peace discourse” intended to dissipate the suspicion and fear of Chinese power 
among other countries. More recently, however, a new myth of Chinese superiority 
in international affairs, based on a simplistic and biased reading of Chinese history, 
has emerged with a clear view of Chinese uniqueness in foreign policy thinking and 
behavior. This should not be surprising in itself—growing power will almost always 
lead to expanding interests and new thinking about international politics. The 
noteworthy part is the shift of the historical focus from the recent history of the 
so-called “century of humiliation” to the more distant past of “imperial glory.” But 
even this is not surprising. As Chinese elites look for inspirations for China’s new 
roles in the international system, returning to that part of the history when China was 
indisputably the preeminent power in East Asia is entirely natural. Whatever they
76 From a different perspective, Michael Hunt also argued that historical Chinese foreign relations had “multiple 
traditions”; Hunt 1984, 4-10. Waldron has also argued that there was no consistent “traditional” Chinese approach 
to strategy and that “the real Chinese past is not a single tradition, but rather several different and competing 
ones”; Waldron 1994, 88, 113.
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may find in the process of rediscovering history, new Chinese articulations of world 
order in the twenty-first century is almost certain to emerge. An important agenda on 
the analysis of Chinese foreign policy, therefore, is to examine Chinese 
interpretations of their history, the effect of these interpretations on ideational change 
in foreign policy, and what kind of “ideological debates” with the West might result 
as a consequence.
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion
The tribute system has been an indispensable reference point in the study of 
historical East Asian politics. The starting point of this study has been to examine 
how it is used by scholars. This exploration has led to a number of other questions, 
touching on how various aspects of the nature of historical East Asian politics have 
been presented in the academic literature. The central analytical task of the study is 
to explain East Asian politics during China’s early Ming dynasty. It becomes evident 
that existing models constructed around the concept of the “tribute system” cannot 
fully interpret or explain the relations between China and its neighbors, nor can a 
dogmatic application of existing realist and constructivist theories of IR yield much 
explanatory power. It is thus necessary to develop an alternative model with greater 
explanatory power for historical East Asian politics during this period. The theory of 
Chinese primacy that I have attempted to build expands and synthesizes elements of 
realism and constructivism by drawing on the historical material from the region.
Although the empirical material of the study is historical, its implications go beyond 
historical accuracy. By developing a theory of Chinese primacy and evaluating it 
with in-depth historical case studies, I show that the international politics of East 
Asia can be better explained without adhering to the tribute system framework. The 
thesis then explains the possibility of formulating better explanatory frameworks for 
historical East Asian politics. The study also evaluates a number of myths about East 
Asian history, such as the persistence of a sinocentric, hierarchic order, the 
willingness of other polities to accept Chinese hegemony, and a harmonious and 
stable order maintained by the Chinese empire. That these were myths even during 
the early Ming should encourage more research on the variety of international 
relations in East Asian history. In this concluding chapter I summarize these findings, 
highlight the implications, and suggest avenues for further research.
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Findings
The thesis is organized around the central concern of evaluating the utility of the 
tribute system paradigm and how one can develop better frameworks to explain 
historical East Asian politics. Several arguments have followed from this concern 
with implications for theory and policy.
CONCEPTUALIZING A CHINESE UNIPOLARITY
At the core of these arguments is the proposition that historical East Asian politics 
should not be represented in terms of the tribute system as an unchanging institution 
of the international system/society. Instead, it has to be understood as constantly 
changing in reaction to the structure of the East Asian system. In the early Ming, 
when the tribute system was supposed to be at its height, it is possible to understand 
the structure of East Asian politics as unipolar. The theory of this unipolar politics 
developed in Chapter 2 avoids prioritizing cultural superiority as the main defining 
factor of this system, in favor of positing the political dynamics of Chinese political 
and/or military domination versus other countries’ accommodation and resistance. 
Tributary relations are brought into the framework without any reference to the 
“tribute system.” This offers a new conceptualization of historical East Asian politics 
and paves the way for some evaluation of the tribute system paradigm.
THE TRIBUTE SYSTEM RECONCEIVED
The term “tribute system” has been used in three ways in the scholarly literature. 
First, it refers to the interpretive model developed by Fairbank and followed on by 
many other scholars. I see this prominent line of research as having constituted a 
tribute system paradigm in the study of East Asian diplomatic history. The 
significance of this paradigm deserves a systematic evaluation. The thesis critiques 
Fairbank’s model and argues that it is internally flawed and incapable of interpreting 
major events in East Asian history. It therefore suggests that scholars look for new 
analytical categories and models with greater interpretive and explanatory power.
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Second, scholars have conceived of the tribute system as a historical institution for 
interstate relations and studied specific tribute systems in history. Although my 
empirical focus is not the early Ming tribute system per se but the larger relations 
between China and its neighbors, I have also paid attention to what such a system 
might tell us about the nature of East Asian politics during the early Ming period. Yet, 
the empirical chapters clearly show that the tribute system, if we conceive of one in 
the sense of regular practices embodied in tributary relations, cannot encompass the 
multiplicity of regional politics.
Finally, the tribute system has also been referred to as China’s bureaucratic 
management of foreign relations. Because this perspective is centrally concerned 
with the development of China’s bureaucratic tools and assumptions for dealing with 
foreign affairs, it does not account for the larger political dynamics between China 
and its neighbors and is therefore of limited value for understanding the international 
politics of this region.
BEYOND THE TRIBUTE SYSTEM
We therefore have to move beyond the tribute system perspective. In Sino-Korean, 
Sino-Japanese, and Sino-Mongolian relations during the early Ming, Chinese rulers 
tried to initiate tributary relations for essentially two reasons—buttressing their 
legitimacy as Chinese emperors by showing their ability to gain foreign tributaries as 
well as achieving frontier security of the empire. Ultimately, they wanted superiority 
and authority over other countries’ foreign policies toward China. Tributary politics 
on the Chinese side was therefore a form of political domination.1 There were 
variations in this part of tributary politics. For example, China had more room to 
manipulate the Koreans by putting various requirements on their tribute missions 
than they did regarding the Japanese and the Mongols, because the Koreans valued 
tributary relations with the Ming much more highly than the Japanese or the Mongols. 
Manipulation or not, China’s desire to impose a set of tributary obligations on its
1 Although this study has not examined Sino-Vietnamese relations in the early Ming, John K. Whitmore 
concluded in a study on the Ming conquest o f Vietnam that the Ming “wished to dominate the varied nations of 
the world by moral force...rather than physical power.” Whitmore 1977, 51.
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neighbors demonstrated the nature of political domination in its foreign relations. 
However, when it faced pressing military threats but was unable to eliminate them 
through tributary politics, as in the case of its relations with the Mongols, it resorted 
to military domination. This was possible because of its military strength in the first 
place.
Faced with the Chinese request for establishing tributary relations, Korean, Japanese, 
and Mongol rulers acted in a variety of different ways. The Koreans accommodated 
China in most cases, but their accommodation generally reflected more 
bandwagoning for ensuring security and autonomy, gaining profit, and increasing 
power than submission out of a perception of Chinese authority over their policies. 
One surprising finding is that there were relatively few instances of Korean 
submission in the sense of voluntarily following Chinese instructions during the early 
Ming period. The Koreans, moreover, also sought to resist Chinese demands when 
they became too excessive.
Resistance was more prominent in Japanese and Mongol responses to China, though 
at times these two peoples also accommodated China. For the Japanese, resistance 
was more frequent because of the protection offered by Japan’s island position as 
well as the rulers’ sense of their emerging national identity and pride. When Japan 
accommodated China, as in the case of Yoshimitsu, the likely motives were 
economic profit (which also underpinned Japan’s other “improper” tributary missions) 
and domestic prestige and legitimation, though Yoshimitsu may have also genuinely 
admired Chinese culture and thus perceived a certain degree of Chinese authority.
The Mongol resistance to the Ming was the most impressive. This is unsurprising 
given the fundamental conflict of their interests with those of the Ming, especially 
during the Hongwu reign. When the Mongol chieftains bandwagoned during the 
Yongle reign, their motives ranged from mere regime survival to steppe hegemony.
Such a picture of the multiplicity of the relations between China and its neighbors
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not only demonstrates the inadequacies of Fairbank’s original model, but also 
suggests the relative unimportance of the tribute system as a historical institution in 
regional politics during this time, particularly with regard to Sino-Japanese and 
Sino-Mongolian relations. Even when tributary relations were more prominent and 
thus the tribute system more important, as in Sino-Korean relations during this period 
or in China’s relations with its neighbors during other periods, examining the nature 
of these relations would require a systematic deconstruction of the tribute system. 
Thus, we will gain much and lose little by moving beyond the tribute system 
paradigm. The theory developed in Chapter 2 is a small step toward this direction.
SINOCENTRIC HIERARCHY CHALLENGED
Finally, it is widely held in the literature that the historical East Asian order is a 
sinocentric hierarchy, more likely so with regard to unified and powerful dynasties 
such as the Han, Tang, Ming, and Qing. Yet my study of East Asian politics during 
the early Ming shows that if we define hierarchy in terms of relational authority, the 
system was actually more anarchic than hierarchic in many respects. Foreign rulers, 
including the Koreans, generally did not feel the authority or legitimacy in Chinese 
rule over them. In most cases they did not feel that they “ought to obey” instructions 
from China, but rather acted according to self-interested calculations. Because 
Chinese authority was usually absent, the system belonged to the more anarchic end 
of the anarchy-hierarchy spectrum. The anarchic nature of this period is also 
indicated by the instability in China’s relations with Korea, Japan, and the Mongols.
Of course, elements of hierarchy were also there, as in the cases of investiture in 
Sino-Korean relations and Yoshimitsu’s exceptional accommodation with the Ming 
in Sino-Japanese relations. In general, however, anarchy-induced, self-interest 
motivated politics were more impressive than hierarchic politics underpinned by the 
principle of sinocentrism. It was very hard for foreign rulers to fully internalize 
sinocentrism and act as China’s loyal tributaries. It would be interesting for future 
studies to examine whether East Asian politics before and after the early Ming period 
were more anarchic or hierarchic.
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Implications
Although the thesis aims to solve a historical puzzle about the tribute system, it also 
has implications for international relations theory and policy discussions on 
contemporary East Asian politics.
THEORY
Some Chinese scholars believe that historical East Asian politics is so unique that it 
completely defies Western IR theories. The belief is misguided and simplistic, 
based on a dubious understanding of the nature of theory and a shaky understanding 
of the reality of historical East Asian politics. Since my empirical focus is only the 
early Ming period, my claim should be limited. But evidence from this period clearly 
shows that, to varying degrees, Western IR theories are useful in illuminating politics 
between China and its neighbors. Recent realist researches on the behavioral logic of 
unipolarity are relevant, as are the constructivist focus on ideas, identity, and the 
normative structure. Although I have not explicitly drawn on the English School, its 
analytical focus on institutions and norms are surely also relevant and useful. 
Although a general theory of international relations that are able to explain 
international politics across time and space may not be possible, some enduring 
concepts such as power and culture and hypotheses about their behavioral effects 
will have relevance beyond the somewhat artificial “East-West” divide.
That Western IR theories are useful does not, however, mean that they are 
unproblematic. It is not the purpose of this study to “confirm” these theories. Rather, 
one purpose is to show how they perform against historical material from East Asia 
and how they might be refined, improved, or rejected. Viewed in these terms, it is 
apparent that several existing theories must confront the empirical anomalies from 
historical East Asia. The biggest problem is with balance-of-power theory, as has
2 Qin 2007,14-5; and Qin 2006, 10.
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been variously pointed out in the general IR literature.3 The problem with this theory, 
however, says little about the merit of realism as a research program, since the realist 
tradition contains many other theories. Hegemonic stability theory, for example, 
might be more useful. The concept of “unipolarity” seems to be particularly useful in 
light of the endurance of American supremacy in the present era. Yet even in the case 
of the United States, the logic of unipolar politics is not fully presented. In the case 
of historical East Asian politics it often does not measure up against the available 
evidence.
The theory of Chinese primacy builds on existing concepts and theories while 
attempting some expansion and refinement. It suggests, among other things, that the 
dichotomy between balancing and bandwagoning cannot capture the full dynamics of 
unipolar politics. We need to conceive of a range of different strategies that the 
dominant and secondary powers can employ toward each other. The theory also 
emphasizes the exploitative nature of the bandwagoning strategy and the 
self-strengthening motive behind such a strategy. It also develops a synthetic 
explanation by building the factors of both power and identity into a coherent 
framework in terms of the co-constitution of agency and structure in the historical 
East Asian system.
POLICY
The findings cast strong doubt on the beliefs that the historical East Asian order was 
a sinocentric hierarchy and that countries in this region were willing to accept a 
Chinese hegemony or hierarchy. That the Koreans, Japans, and Mongols at various 
times tried the strategies of balking, defying, challenging, and isolation is sufficient 
to show this. Of course, it is tricky to derive any straightforward implication of 
historical East Asian politics for regional politics in the present era. Much change 
and even transformation have occurred in terms of the structure and agency of the 
East Asian system. The political, economic, social, and cultural conditions 
underpinning regional politics have also undergone major transformations. I shall
3 A recent wide-ranging work is Kaufman, Little, and Wohlforth 2007.
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nevertheless suggest two thoughts relevant for policy discussion. First, it is now 
being argued that hierarchic politics might return to East Asia. But, if the historical 
East Asian system with China’s material preponderance and cultural preeminence 
was not an unproblematic hierarchy, what are the grounds for believing that a 
hierarchy centering on China will emerge when it is unlikely for China to 
re-command its premodem position in structural terms?
Second, the patterns of interaction between imperial China and its neighbors were 
domination versus accommodation and resistance. Given the changed conditions on 
both sides, what might new patterns of interaction in contemporary East Asia look 
like? Particularly relevant is the argument that some countries are now increasingly 
bandwagoning with a rising China. Historically, bandwagoning behavior was 
encouraged by China’s economic resources and cultural influence. Might a stronger 
China no longer bent on domination encourage bandwagoning and thus in some way 
contribute to regional stability? These questions could well be topics for new 
research.
Further Research
As noted at the beginning of this thesis, the historical East Asian field is a fertile 
ground for theoretical innovation. IR study in this field has begun only recently. A 
vast number of empirical puzzles are still waiting to be solved, out of which 
theoretical developments might emerge. Three areas appear particularly interesting in 
light of this study.
STRUCTURAL VARIATION OF THE EAST ASIAN SYSTEM 
This study only examines one structural feature of the historical East Asian 
system—unipolarity—and then only theorizes patterns of interaction within this 
system. It says little about the origin and transformation of such a unipolar system. 
This is the limitation of the study, but it also points to avenues for further research. A 
key task will be to look at periods of both Chinese strength and weakness and explain
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the structural variation of the East Asian system. Unipolarity could not be the only 
structure of this system, since Chinese power did not remain a constant. The 
challenge is to explain how, why, and how frequently alternative structural forms 
have emerged. A theory so developed will truly be a theory of historical East Asian 
politics. It may complement theories developed out of the European experience and 
thus advance the IR theoretical agenda.
Within this broad avenue of the structural change of the historical East Asian system, 
many more specific topics and puzzles can be discovered and studied. For example, 
Wang Gungwu points out that historically China had risen three times in its imperial 
history—during the Qin-Han, Sui-Tang, and Ming-Qing periods respectively. 
Contemporary China is thus undergoing a fourth rise from a historical perspective.4 
A comparison of these four cases of China’s rise and their consequences will be very 
interesting. It will also be promising for theory development on the important 
question of power rise and its implications for international order, and will not only 
add to our empirical knowledge of the historical experience of China’s rise in Asia 
but also enrich existing theories on power rise developed out of the modem European 
context.
THE NATURE OF CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY
A second area is the foreign policy of imperial China. Traditionally, this has been the 
focus of historians. But as has been pointed out, the field of East Asian diplomatic 
history has become unfashionable and underpopulated among historians since the 
1970s. With a few notable exceptions, IR scholars have not made major advance into 
this field. As a result, our understanding of traditional China’s foreign policy still 
remains largely descriptive, crippled moreover by some persistent stereotypes. This 
study has shown the dynamics and multiplicity of China’s foreign relations and these 
are the puzzles to be explained.
As Chapter 7 has illustrated, imperial Chinese foreign policy in fact displayed a wide
4 Wang 2009.
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range of behavioral patterns, and peace and war were just two extremes along a 
continuum of behavioral variation. The puzzle is obviously to explain this variation. 
Although studies on the foreign policies of single dynasties can be useful, it will be 
more fruitful to design comparative case studies across several dynasties for more 
generalizable findings. This will pave the way for further studies on the overall 
foreign policy patterns or grand strategies of the Chinese empire. Future studies in 
this area will also require more solid conceptual foundations and more explicit 
theorizing. On the other hand, studying the historical puzzles of Chinese foreign 
policy will not only advance our empirical knowledge, but also stimulate theory 
development in foreign policy analysis.
THE NATURE OF OTHER COUNTRIES’ POLICY TOWARD CHINA 
A third area of research is the foreign policies of other East Asian countries. It is 
unfortunate that when discussing historical East Asian politics, we have focused so 
much on China to the detriment of our understanding of its neighbors, who are of 
course an indispensable part of the larger political dynamics. More theoretically 
conscious studies are needed to examine the nature of their initiatives and responses 
toward China.
This study has focused on the policies of Korea, Japan, and the Mongol tribes during 
the early Ming when China was relatively open and powerful. What were the policies 
of China’s neighbors when China was divided and weak? How did they view their 
own positions in the region? It will also be interesting to document their evolving 
perceptions of and changing attitudes toward China historically. Although China as 
the preeminent power in East Asian history has naturally attracted much scholarly 
attention, a complete understanding of the nature and dynamics of East Asian politics 
will elude us until other East Asian countries are given due analytical attention in our 
studies.
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Appendix I 
M ajor Periods in Imperial China
Eastern Zhou 771 -2 5 6  BC
Warring States 403-221  BC
Qin 221 -2 0 6  BC
Earlier Han 206 BC -  AD 8
Later Han 2 5 -2 2 0
Period of North-South disunion 2 2 0 -589
Northern Wei 386-535
Sui 589-618
Tang 618-907
Northern Song 960-1125
Southern Song 1127-1279
Yuan (Mongols) 1279-1368
Ming 1368-1644
Qing (Manchus) 1644-1912
Source: Fairbank and Goldman 2006, 24.
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